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The objective of the legality principle is to promote autonomy by providing
individuals with opportunities to plan courses of conduct free from state intrusion. If
precise rules are not prescribed in advance, individuals may lack notice of what is
prohibited and may be subjected to arbitrary treatment. Thus, the Constitution
commands that legal officials honor formal terms of engagement and limit enforcement
efforts to narrowly defined crimes. But, under pressing conditions, the prevailing rules
may prove too rigid, compelling courts to carve out post hoc exceptions. As a matter of
practice, these exceptions tend to operate asymmetrically—benefiting the state only.
This Article uses Fourth Amendment doctrine to examine that asymmetry.
I coin the term “meaningful understanding” to describe the functional Fourth
Amendment methodology by which courts sometimes accommodate law-enforcement
needs, fears, and even mistakes. The enterprise is admirable, but there is a dark side:
a judge cannot understand meaningfully a reasonable officer in his particular situation
without concurrently tolerating an otherwise impermissible intrusion upon autonomy.
The officer enjoys a piecemeal exception that the individual experiences as a piecemeal
(and often unanticipated) burden. In this way, meaningful understanding works to
excuse unexpected coercion. The individual is left unfairly surprised—unable to plan
a law-abiding life consistent with the promise of the legality principle.
This troubling state of affairs arises most often in the context of order-maintenance
policing. Street encounters are fast-moving and understandably unpredictable. In
such circumstances, officers may end up deviating unforeseeably from the usual rules,
confounding the capacity of pedestrians and motorists to comprehend the scope of state
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power and the quality of individual rights. We need not look far to find tragic real
world examples. I discuss several, including the traffic stop and arrest of Sandra
Bland, a motorist whose subsequent death in a jail cell became a focus of the legal
and social justice movement known as “Black Lives Matter.”
The jurisprudential path forward, however, is not to command greater fidelity to
formal Fourth Amendment rules, but instead to try within limits to understand much
more. In this vein, Jeremy Waldron has described a “procedural” conception of
legality, characterized by “modes of argumentation” capacious enough to bring all
reasonable sides of the story to bear. The goal is ambitious. But the Article concludes
with a modest and viable set of doctrinal reforms to better pursue meaningful
understanding—articulated and evaluated bilaterally.
It wasn’t only wickedness and scheming that made people unhappy, it was confusion
and misunderstanding; above all, it was the failure to grasp the simple truth that other
people are as real as you. And only in a story could you enter these different minds
and show how they had an equal value. That was the only moral a story need have.
IAN MCEWAN, ATONEMENT (2001)
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INTRODUCTION
I like to ride my bike on the sidewalk, to let my dog run free, to spend warm
afternoons in the park with a cold beer. But, obviously, I may not be allowed to
do these things. The state manages my existence in public spaces. It picks sides.
By constraining my autonomy to do what I want to do with my bike, pet, and
intoxicants, the state has created an environment in which another individual
may enjoy the outdoors without dodging dogs and bikes, without smelling stale
beer. This is the story of order-maintenance enforcement.1 As the name
implies, it is a story of state ordering. The state forces me to trade disordered
autonomy for engineered autonomy—autonomy within state bounds.2
In a liberal criminal justice system, the exchange may be considered fair
enough, even before we appeal to some invented notion of the social
contract.3 Liberalism presupposes certain checks on the manner by which the
state manufactures order—checks intended to ensure, at a minimum, that
offenses are promulgated and enacted prospectively and plainly.4 The
objective, here, is not only to provide the public with notice of proscribed
conduct but also to limit the state’s arbitrary exercises of power.5
The principle of legality is the name given to this requirement that
offenses be previously and precisely defined. In our criminal justice system,
it finds expression through a series of “bulwarks” designed to promote notice
and to protect against arbitrary and capricious enforcement—constitutional

1 On order-maintenance enforcement, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2005); Josh Bowers, Grassroots
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007) [hereinafter Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining]; Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1655 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence]; Josh Bowers & Paul H.
Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and
Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (2012).
2 See RICHARD BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 41 (4th ed. 2015) (“At the level of societal
organization, Enlightenment thought emphasized . . . [that t]he state owed its authority to the
aggregate surrenders of individual freedom necessary to the formation of the social compact.
Everyone gave up some freedom in order to secure the benefits of an ordered society.”); cf. infra
notes 47, 52–55 and accompanying text (defining individual autonomy as the capacity of the
individual to predict, plan, and live according to her own reasons).
3 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. XIV, para. 7 (1651) (discussing obligations that arise
from the social contract); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971) (describing the
formation of a social contract). But see Rolf Sartorius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67
VA. L. REV. 3, 12 (1981) (“As an account of the putative foundation of political obligation . . . any
theory of an implied social contract must fail.”).
4 See infra notes 46–53, 61–64, 114, and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 26, 41-42, 113, 127, 295, 385, 431, and accompanying text (discussing the
conventional perspective that formalism best checks arbitrary exercises of power).
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rules against, for instance, ex post facto laws and vague offenses.6 The rule of
lenity may also be understood as legality’s effort—in the face of
constitutionally tolerable statutory ambiguity—to give the benefit of the
doubt to the individual whose liberty is threatened by conviction and
punishment. Even burdens of proof (and the presumption of innocence more
generally) operate on a like notion that—unless and until the state can
demonstrate otherwise—the rights of the individual against the coercion of
the criminal law ought to trump the instrumental needs of the state.7
Of course, this idea of notice is no more than a fiction for a number of wellexamined reasons. Holmes’ “bad man” does not pore over penal codes,8 and
public-order offenses are mala prohibita only.9 Accordingly, even the “good”
man—the man who wishes only to do the right thing—may lack “social duty”
notice that the state has proscribed criminally some instance of statedetermined disorderly conduct.10 When it comes to public-order offenses, the
notion that “everyone is presumed to know the law” carries comparatively less

6 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884); see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 93 (1968) (“The devices worked out by the courts to keep the principle of legality in
good repair comprise a cluster of doctrines that give the criminal law much of its distinctive content.”).
7 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 109-10 (2004) (describing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a constraint
on government power); see also Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 280 (2002)
(“The presumption of innocence determines the allowed limits of interference by the State in the
autonomy of an individual . . . .”).
My project is non-consequential. I am concerned with the legality principle and the judge’s
obligation to administer it. Accordingly, I bracket the empirical question of whether ordermaintenance policing works either to promote public safety and order or to counteract more
serious crime. As the debate over broken-windows theory has demonstrated, the answers to
these questions are largely unsettled. See generally, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, New York City’s
Natural Experiment, in THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007) (evaluating the
effectiveness of order-maintenance policing); see also Jeffrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing,
Crime, and Legitimacy in New York and Los Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic
Crime Declines, in NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 243 (2013) (same);
HARCOURT, supra note 1 (arguing that order-maintenance policing is ineffective). My personal
opinion is that even if heavy-handed order–maintenance tactics were to be proven effective at
fighting serious crime, the negative externalities would remain prohibitively high. See Bowers
& Robinson, supra note 1, at 279-280 & n.318 (suggesting decriminalization of public-order
offenses). These social costs are measured in broken households, broken relationships, and
broken bones. Supra notes 33–40, 113–16, 204–08, 279–96, 422–31 and accompanying text; see
also Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, supra note 1, at 92-93 & n.35 (describing the collateral
costs of order-maintenance policing). But, again, that empirical question is largely tangential to
the immediate project.
8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
9 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 279-80.
10 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913); see also Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at
214 (describing the “faithful man” as “an individual who complies with the law not because he
rationally calculates that it is in his best interest to do so but because he sees himself as a moral actor
who divines that it is right to defer to legitimate authority”).
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weight than when our criminal codes approximate a shared morality.11
Moreover, law enforcers have no shortage of public-order offenses from which
to choose, leaving some only seldom or selectively enforced.12 In such
circumstances, even a diligent study of the law may reveal only so much about
whether, when, where, and how police officers might concentrate their energies.
And, to the extent the individual guesses right, her predictions often have less
to do with binding legal codes than with sociopolitical, economic, and cultural
forces and considerations—some, normatively defensible; others, less so.13
This is a pessimistic picture. But it is not new. In the past two decades,
there has developed a rich literature on “overcriminalization,” which
catalogues the difficulties of predicting state action based on even precisely
defined public-order offenses.14 There are also some scholars who have
examined the intersection that intrigues me most here—the manner by which
Fourth Amendment doctrines have contributed to the shortcomings of code
law. In this Article, I rehearse some familiar observations—most notably, the
failure of the Fourth Amendment to adequately check pretextual searches and
seizures.15 But my principal aim is to identify, analyze, and criticize an underappreciated and counterintuitive way in which Fourth Amendment doctrines
have operated to obscure the individual’s capacity to forecast what she can
and cannot do, free from state intrusion.
Imagine that an officer hopes to arrest me for drinking alcohol in the park.
The principle of legality ostensibly dictates that he needs an applicable valid
statute and sufficient proof of guilt, which the Supreme Court has defined as
probable cause.16 Or does he? The Court has carved several exceptions to its
purportedly hard-and-fast Fourth Amendment rules. Most notably, it has
held that an officer may get things wrong yet remain on the right side of the
Fourth Amendment. He may make a reasonable mistake about the facts that
he relies upon to establish probable cause. He even may err about the scope

11 Compare State v. Boyett, 32 N.C. 336, 343–44 (1849) (“[E]very one has an innate sense of right and
wrong, which enables him to know when he violates the law, and it is of no consequence, if he be not able
to give the name, by which the offence is known in the law books, or to point out the nice distinctions
between the different grades of offence.”), with Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary
of the Vagueness Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2055, n.13 (2015) (explaining that “fair notice” is a particular
problem when it comes to “street cleaning” statutes and other public-order offenses), and John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 216 (1985) (same).
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part II (discussing police officers’ good and bad reasons for action).
14 See infra notes 432–44, 85, and accompanying text.
15 See infra Part II.
16 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001); see also United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (upholding search incident to a warrantless arrest); infra notes 87–88, 93,
99–113, 117 (discussing Atwater and related doctrine).
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of the criminal law itself (which is, paradoxically, the kind of mistake almost
wholly unavailable to an untrained layperson).17
Consider a few twists to the hypothetical. Suppose that the law has
changed such that the open-container ordinance in question no longer applies
to a container of alcohol wrapped in a paper bag. Moreover, suppose that my
paper bag suitably conceals my container such that the officer mistakes a flash
of the red exterior of my alcohol-free Coca-Cola for a Budweiser beer. If the
officer’s legal and factual mistakes are deemed reasonable, then his conduct—
the arrest—is constitutional. In turn, I am subjected to a different constraint.
As I read it, the operative rule is no longer defined exclusively by statutory
language (simplified to the following): In public, possess no open containers of
alcohol. It is defined also by the officer’s perspective and practice: In public,
possess no open containers of something that an officer reasonably could believe to be
alcohol (even if it is not) in a manner he reasonably could believe violates the law
(even if it does not). The end result is that the officer has the opportunity to
arrest me with neither sufficient proof of a criminal act nor even an applicable
criminal statute. My autonomy is constrained by the reasonable officer’s
belief, evaluated from his perspective. Put differently, the arresting officer’s
reasonable belief constitutes an extenuating circumstance sufficient to excuse
him from legality’s usual rules.
To get to this point, the Supreme Court has relied upon an odd (but,
conceptually, neither incompatible nor indefensible) pairing of
methodologies. The first and primary methodology is founded on the principle
of legality. The second is founded on what I call a principle of meaningful
understanding. The principle of legality is thought to dictate that police
officers must be guided by bright-line rules or, at least, well-structured
standards—most notably, the Fourth Amendment’s ostensible warrant and
probable cause requirements.18 The principle of meaningful understanding
recognizes, by contrast, that it may be impractical or even impossible to hold
officers categorically to these rules and standards. Consequently, a court may
use a methodology of meaningful understanding to prioritize affective and
particularistic questions of what constitutes reasonable enough police behavior,
all things considered.19 Here, the judicial craft is closer to sociology than
conventional legal analysis and decisionmaking. Max Weber, for instance,
championed a method of sociological inquiry called verstehen, which translates
roughly to “meaningful understanding.” The central premise of verstehen is
17 See infra Section IV.A (describing doctrine and discussing traditional rule that mistake or
ignorance of law is no excuse).
18 See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (discussing baseline Fourth Amendment
requirements).
19 See infra Section I.C (discussing “general reasonableness”).
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that we cannot expect to understand meaningfully a situation until we “wear
the shoes” of the actors involved “to see things from their perspective.”20
But the seemingly peculiar feature of the Supreme Court’s prevailing
Fourth Amendment methodology of meaningful understanding is that it has
come to operate almost entirely asymmetrically—to the benefit of the state
only. The critical legal studies camp would argue that this asymmetry is a
product of institutional indifference, implicit and systemic bias, or even
purposeful discrimination. And those arguments may have merit.21 But there
is also a more charitable explanation—an unidentified neutral logic—that
might account, at least partially, for the Court’s asymmetric methodology of
understanding. My positive contribution is to pinpoint this neutral logic, to
map it onto Fourth Amendment doctrine, and, perhaps counterintuitively, to
trace its roots back to the dominant conception of the legality principle. My
normative contribution is to reveal why the Court’s neutral logic—even if
conceptually defensible—remains practically flawed. Finally, my prescription
is to urge the Court not to abandon its methodology of understanding, but to
carry it further—to try, within limits, to understand much more.
*

*

*

The hitch is that the criminal justice system cannot function fairly or
effectively with reference to only the rules designed to guide and control
conduct. Inevitably, the system must carve exceptions. And, when it comes to
these exceptions, the conventional wisdom is that the system need not speak
in terms prospective and precise.22 Rather, exceptions permissibly may be
20 JOHN J. MACIONIS & LINDA M. GERBER, SOCIOLOGY (7th ed. 2010); see also infra Section
III.A, notes 303–06, and accompanying text.
21 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323 (1987) (summarizing the critical legal studies movement with the quip
that “people in power sometimes abuse law to achieve their own ends”); Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567–70 (1983) (outlining judicial lack of
objectivity). Likewise, there may be other comparatively benign biases at work. For instance, the
Court may unconsciously prioritize safety and policing need, evaluating these aims in the aggregate
but the intrusion in isolation. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 384 (3d ed. 2011) (“Whatever the best answer in theory, historically Fourth
Amendment law does seem to have responded to law enforcement needs.”); see also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There have been powerful hydraulic pressures
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and
give the police the upper hand.”); cf. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 84
(2015) (maintaining that Americans consider “safety . . . a higher value than justice, perhaps the
highest value”); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders & the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 852 (2000) (observing that aggregative reasoning may lead to
harsh criminal justice policies).
22 See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text (describing why piecemeal affirmative
defenses do not offend the rule of law).
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post hoc and particularistic—at least as long as they operate only to forgive
rule violations. The rationale is twofold. First, positive legality is not
offended by pleasant surprises, and an exception that tends toward leniency
produces only a pleasant surprise. Second, there is no comparable need to
classify ex ante (and with precision) the rulebreaking behavior that might
qualify for a lenient exception, because an individual could not plan for the
qualifying behavior in any event. Consider, for example, the hungry man,
tempted to steal food. The dominant conception of the legality principle
dictates that he must have the means to know that theft is generally
prohibited, but he need not be made aware also of the circumstances under
which he might be forgiven for carrying away a loaf of bread. Genuine
necessity will find him. If he is truly starving, he will seek nourishment,
independent of applicable legal rules or contextual exceptions therefrom.23
Return to my hypothetical. Positive legality demands that I have the
means to know the substantive rule that forbids me from drinking in public.
Likewise, the arresting officer must have the means to know the substantive
and procedural rules that specify how he may enforce my rules against me.
But, in the face of extenuating and often unforeseeable circumstances, one or
the other of us might come to enjoy a piecemeal and post hoc exception. It is
not necessary, however, that the respective beneficiary anticipates the
exception since the exception does not burden the beneficiary with additional
legal oversight. The beneficiary remains as free as before to plan and carry
out a rulebound course of action.24 The practical mistake, however, is to
assume that the officer and I plan our courses of action in isolation. In fact,
our two sets of rules and exceptions operate relationally—almost reciprocally.
When the officer plans his conduct, he plans his exercises of power over me. And
when a court excuses that officer for some failure to abide by his own rules,
the court extends his dominion. This is the unappreciated price of a judicial
methodology of meaningful understanding that asymmetrically benefits
government regulators. Once a court understands the regulator in an
empathetic and affective sense, the individual’s rules are made fuzzier thereby.
In my hypothetical, I am left genuinely puzzled about what I can and
cannot do. I am left surprised—unfairly surprised. And this is exactly the kind
of “unfair surprise” that offends the aim (if not the prevailing letter) of the
legality principle.25 I have no sufficient way of knowing prospectively that my

23
24
25

See infra notes 144–145 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of “acoustic separation”).
See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text.
See PACKER, supra note 6, at 86-90 (observing that the principle of legality operates as a
protection against “unfair surprise”); Jeffries, supra note 11, at 216 (same); see also RICHARD BONNIE
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 81 (3d ed. 2010) (observing that the legality principle is designed to provide
a “prophylaxis against the arbitrary and abusive exercise of discretion in the enforcement of the penal
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partially concealed, open can of soda may excuse a state intrusion on my
autonomy. I am not even expected to anticipate my own piecemeal exceptions
to my own rules. How, then, am I expected to anticipate the officer’s exceptions?
To decipher that attenuated set of signals, I would need to know more than
the underlying rules. I would need to understand meaningfully the psyche and
motivations of the reasonable officer within his particular circumstances. That
level of meaningful understanding should perhaps be the job of judges. But,
in a liberal criminal justice system committed to giving the benefit of the
doubt to the suspect or accused, it should not be made mine.26
To put matters in economic terms, a piecemeal exception to the law of the
police shifts information costs from the officer to me. It diminishes the clarity
of my obligations and the quality of my rights. To know what I may do, I
must discover not only the code law but also whatever professional police
norms and practices a court may come to understand after the fact. The law
is made cloudier for me. I must do more than guess at the blurry edges. I
must divine the officer’s good enough perceptions. I must read his abstract
reasonable mind (and, likewise, the abstract reasonable mind of the
accommodating judge). Comparatively, the law is made more accessible to
the officer. Or, more accurately, he enjoys a lighter burden for law’s ongoing
imprecisions. When he navigates the blurry edges of permissible and
impermissible conduct, he is given the benefit of his own reasonable (albeit
potentially mistaken) perspective. From his standpoint, his good-enough
law”); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974, 2038-39 (2008) (indicating
that the “premise” of the vagueness doctrine is to protect defendants and constrain the state).
Throughout this article, I use the terms legality and rule of law almost interchangeably. I
recognize that the concepts may differ (depending upon definitions). But the common convention
is to conflate. See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 212 (linking the rule of law to the legality principle);
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (“It is, after all, an
accident of usage that the particular phrase the Rule of Law is used for this ideal. Some theorists use
the term legality or principles of legality instead.”). If nothing else, the legality principle and the rule
of law share the same liberal objectives. See Waldron, supra, at 6 (observing that the central premise
of the rule of law is that “people in positions of authority” not be left to act upon “their own
preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and wrong”); see also RONALD
A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 17 (2001) (observing that the principal objective of the
rule of law is to “help[] assure that the processes of government, rather than the predilections of the
individual decisionmaker, govern”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decisions Rules & Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 668 (1983) (“[T]he rule of law is said to limit
officials’ discretion and thereby to curb their potential arbitrariness. The rule of law reduces the
danger that officials may indulge their self-interest or give vent in their decisions to personal
animosities or prejudices.”); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Dark Side of the Relationship Between the Rule
of Law and Liberalism, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 516, 519 (2008) (“Liberalism asserts that liberty
from the encroachments of fellow citizens and from the arbitrary whims of government officials
cannot exist without the rule of law.”).
26 See supra notes 5-7, infra notes 47, 50–53, 149–151, 172–175, 267, 376, and accompanying text
(discussing the state’s obligations to provide adequate notice, and examining the individual’s
corresponding duty to learn law and abide by it).
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perceptions may bring the law’s blurry edges into sharp-enough focus (even
if he cannot know precisely which extenuating circumstances might qualify
for a given set of exceptions in a given set of circumstances).
Asymmetric understanding operates along two dimensions. In the first
instance, courts evaluate the perspective of the officer but not the individual.
Moreover, courts consider only the particulars that benefit the state—the
details that excuse otherwise impermissible intrusions. In either event, the
prevailing asymmetric methodology operates to undermine notice
asymmetrically. The individual is left in a precarious position whereby she
cannot adequately plan—as a matter of right—a course of conduct free from
state intrusion. With respect to the purposes of the legality principle, the
implications are these: (1) the individual is less aware of the scope of police
power, (2) she is less able to stand her ground, and (3) in the extreme,
asymmetric understanding could even generate a vicious cycle. The very
effort to exercise rights might trigger and excuse more substantial state
intrusions, which, in turn, might serve to expand and obscure further the
scope of police power.27
This phenomenon potentially reaches well beyond criminal justice. Across
a range of regulatory regimes (including, most obviously, administrative law),
a fair claim could be made that the judicial effort to understand a government
regulator’s needs and perspective might produce unintended confusion for
the regulated party. But my ambitions are more modest. For several reasons,
I limit the focus to criminal procedure and order–maintenance policing. First,
the concept of notice plays an outsized role in criminal justice precisely
because the stakes of enforcement and punishment are atypically high.28
Second, order–maintenance enforcement is likelier to produce confusion
because public-order offenses proscribe conduct that is not intuitively
blameworthy, and individuals lack even “lawyer’s notice” of the kind that
typifies white-collar criminal law and other regulatory regimes.29 Third,
police officers are likelier to break the rules of street encounters (excusably or
otherwise), because “officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving”.30 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, street encounters are
27 See infra notes 176–178, 196–207, 251, 267 and accompanying text (describing the manner by
which exercises of rights may invite and authorize state intrusions, and discussing the traffic stop
and arrest of Sandra Bland).
28 See PACKER, supra note 6, at 74 ([H]uman autonomy . . . is a fortiori important for that most
coercive of legal instruments, the criminal law.”); supra notes 8-11, infra notes 48–50, 173, 376–377,
and accompanying text.
29 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 216; infra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
30 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989); infra notes 162–64, 178–81, 218–20, 223–24,
250, and accompanying text.
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likelier to entail a particularly illiberal form of intrusion—that is, the
imposition of rough justice, intentional or otherwise.
It may be tempting to distinguish order–maintenance street stops and
arrests from post-conviction penalties. But rough justice is not limited to
what happens at sentence. Lesser forms of coercion likewise might offend the
legality principle.31 As Malcolm Feeley famously explained, when it comes to
petty crime enforcement, “the process itself is the primary punishment.”32
Fast-paced encounters sometimes devolve rapidly—from menacing stop and
humiliating arrest to violence or worse (followed, thereafter, by state pleas for
understanding).33 In my hypothetical, the officer might soon discover the
error of his ways—that I am a normatively and legally innocent man, who
possessed only a soft drink.34 But, by that point, I might be in cuffs, on the
ground with an arm around my neck and a taser to my back. If I try to protest,
I might suffer worse. And, even if I try to comply, I might fail to do so in just
the right way (at least, in the eyes of the reasonable officer).35
Of course, my hypothetical poses no real-world problem. There is no
authentic unfairness to a white, middle-aged law professor’s imagined
confusion or putative disappointment at a fictional afternoon visit to the park
spoiled by an officer bent on public ordering. The genuine problems are not
made up. They are problems experienced routinely within communities and
by populations inordinately made subjects of not only disorder but also ordermaintenance enforcement.36 They are problems that are exacerbated by (and
that, in turn, may exacerbate) implicit bias and the too-short reach of the
Equal Protection Clause.37 They are problems for individuals who lawfully
31 PACKER, supra note 6, at 98 (describing the practice of arrest “for investigation” or “on
suspicion” as offensive to the principle of legality).
32 MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 199 (1979); see also JOSH
BOWERS, LEGALITY & ROUGH JUSTICE (manuscript in progress) (on file with author) [hereinafter
BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE]; infra notes 279–95 and accompanying text (describing arrest as a form
of punishment and citing sources).
33 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing the
lasting toll of even peaceful stops and arrests); infra notes 40, 341, 430–32 and accompanying text
(describing police-civilian interactions in majority-minority communities, and discussing the arrests
and deaths of Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and Philando Castile).
34 See infra notes 124–126, 376–79, 402–406, and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
normative innocence).
35 Cf. PACKER, supra note 6, at 98 (explaining that the “ideal” of the legality principle is
“flouted” when police officers arrest an individual whom they believe was merely “up to no good,”
even if the individual is held in custody for “only for a few minutes”).
36 See infra notes 112–14, 204–07, 388, and accompanying text (describing a culture of fear in
heavily policed communities).
37 See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (describing the shortcomings of prevailing
Equal Protection doctrine). I do not pretend that the legality question (here, as it relates to Fourth
Amendment doctrine) is the only relevant question or even the principal question pertaining to
official exercises of coercion. But it is a primary question that, in practice, also implicates other

140

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 129

resist the state only to find exercises of rights met by greater police intrusions
still.38 Most of all, they are problems for real people with real names, like Eric
Garner and Philando Castile—people for whom low-level police intrusions
are hardly trivial and anything but hypothetical.39 These are the problems of
order-maintenance policing—problems that likewise demand meaningful
understanding.
This project is, itself, an effort at meaningful understanding. I hope to
explore how a system so deeply committed to a formal conception of legality
has come to tolerate so much rough punishment. In the process, I reiterate a
normative proposition that has been a central tenet of my scholarship to
date—the claim that particularistic judicial oversight of official exercises of
coercion is entirely consistent with (and perhaps even necessary to) the rule
of law as an effective buffer against sovereign prerogative.40 To my thinking,
there is much more to the legality principle, properly understood, than ever–
more precisely defined rules. The legality principle also embodies a

primary questions, like discrimination and inequality. See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 213 (“[A]lthough
there is no necessary connection between the formal requirements of the rule of law and any
substantive notion of equality, in the context of contemporary American society the two are closely
linked.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 193-94
(2002) (examining intersecting concerns of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth Amendment);
Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 790 (1994) (“[I]t is far more
sensible to try to read the Fourth in light of other norms that do embody our overall constitutional
structure today—free speech, free press, privacy, equal protection, due process, and just
compensation”); Akhil R. Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1097, 1123-24 (1998) (noting that “issues of race . . . should be addressed in a comprehensive framework
of constitutional reasonableness”). Perhaps a more rigorous Equal Protection or Due Process test
could reach more effectively instances of arbitrary enforcement, but I have my doubts. In any event,
the Fourth Amendment is the traditional mechanism by which the Supreme Court has regulated law
enforcement. As such, I see it as the most logical site of constitutional interpretation, critique, and
reform. I should recognize, however, that other scholars have offered alternative constitutional
reforms, designed to achieve the same objectives. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the
Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process Test Should Replace Outrageous Government Conduct Defense,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 265-272 (1993) (endorsing a more vigorous due process test of fundamental
fairness); Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 933 (2016) (endorsing
a “non-comparative [Equal Protection] right to rational governmental action,” which she defines, inter
alia, as “a right not to have one’s liberty curtailed for no reason”).
38 See infra notes 177–78, 196, 268, and accompanying text (examining cases where individuals’
assertions of rights provoke fresh state intrusions).
39 See infra notes 421–32 and accompanying text (discussing these and other recent cases).
40 See generally Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1 (questioning judicial
deference to prosecutors’ equitable charging decisions); Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2014)
[hereinafter Bowers, Pointless Indignity] (endorsing a “two-ply constitutional test” to comprehensively
evaluate the legal and normative merits of arrests); BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32, infra
notes 139–41, 319–28, accompanying text, and Section V.C. (endorsing a procedural conception of
legality, administered judicially).
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procedural dimension, capacious enough to accommodate context,
perspective, voice, and narrative—considered and expressed bilaterally.
The Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I describe the dominant
conception of the legality principle and its preference for precisely defined
rules, which are thought to promote consistent and predictable law
enforcement. In Part II, I revisit certain well-examined objections to the
conventional formalistic approach—most notably, that an officer may exploit
overbroad criminal codes to inflict rough punishment based upon little more
than an inchoate hunch. In Parts III and IV, I transition from the officer’s
manipulation of the rules to his enjoyment of the exceptions. I explain that
Fourth Amendment rules are only ostensibly firm. And I discuss the
asymmetric shift from legality to understanding once an officer has broken the
rules. Specifically, I examine the doctrines whereby courts have accommodated
the officer’s perspective—his reasonable mistakes, fears, and needs, shaped by
his professional experiences. And I reveal the manner by which the individual
is burdened in turn—that she may offer no competing claim that a court
should also accommodate her reasonable perspective—her reasonable mistakes,
fears, and needs, shaped by her lay experiences. In Part V, I analyze several case
studies and respond to objections. I apply prevailing doctrines to two recent
incidents—the traffic stops of Sandra Bland and John Felton. Both incidents
have generated significant media and political attention as part of the legal and
social justice movement, “Black Lives Matter.” But I focus on the events only
to make a jurisprudential point—to show how easy the criminal justice system
has made it for the officer to replace the law’s precise meaning with a hazy
police-generated message. The new message is as inscrutable to the layperson
as historically discarded vagrancy statutes.41 If it can be deciphered at all, it
translates to just this—“Annoy No Cop.”

41 Compare infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (discussing historical vagrancy and
common law crimes), with infra notes 112–14, 267–71 (discussing modern application of
contemporary vehicle and traffic laws); cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170
(1972) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance that would allow “poor people, nonconformists,
dissenters, [and] idlers . . . to stand on a public sidewalk only at the whim of [the] police officer,”
who could use the ordinance as “a convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement . . .
against . . . groups deemed to merit . . . displeasure”) (internal citations omitted); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 671 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (remarking upon the “casual arrogance of those
who have the untrammelled power . . . to seize one’s person”); BONNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 94
(describing the due process implications of criminalizing mere “affronts to police authority”
(internal citations omitted)); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE
L.J. 2236, 2245 (2013) (examining the consequences of “allow[ing] the net to be cast at large, to
enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution” (internal
citations omitted)).

142

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 129

I. LEGALITY, AUTONOMY & AUTHORITY
There is no obvious answer to the question of when the state has
criminalized too much, too hard. And, for present purposes, I leave that
debate aside. I am not confident that the political branches are, in fact,
particularly well situated to handle the substantive determination, but one
fight at a time.42 For the sake of argument, then, I grant the Court’s
assumption that the judiciary is generally incompetent to determine when—
morally or prudentially—the state has ordered to excess:
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a
code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction
itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement.
And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what
standard (or what right) we would decide . . . which particular provisions are
sufficiently important to merit enforcement.43

Instead, I turn to the processes by which our criminal justice system has
regulated perceived arbitrary exercises of official coercion.44
A. Precision & Planning
The touchstone is the principle of legality—what Herbert Packer once
called “the first principle of criminal law.”45 The animating idea is, first, that
I am able to “predict and plan” my own life fairly and effectively only when I
am given sufficient notice of the state’s plans and, second, that legal precision

42 Cf. Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP.
26, 40 (2012) (“[T]he Court has adopted a tone of almost cheerful resignation, as if it were helpless—
as opposed to merely unwilling—to constitutionally check the overinflated criminal codes . . . . The
substantive law is what legislatures have made it and what the Court has permitted it to become.”).
43 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996). Recently, Justice Kagan expressed more
ambivalence but still concluded that the Court was unequipped to reign in criminal codes:

[T]he real issue [is] overcriminalization and excessive punishment . . . . [This statute]
is a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which
give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. And . . . [it]
is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal
criminal code. But whatever the wisdom or folly of [this statute], this Court does not
get to rewrite the law . . . . If judges disagree with Congress’s choice, we are perfectly
entitled to say so—in lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta. But we are not
entitled to replace the statute[.]
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1100-02 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
44 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 78 (“The [positive] principle of legality does not speak
to the question of what conduct should be declared criminal. Rather, it states a normative expectation
regarding how that decision should be made.”).
45 PACKER, supra note 6, at 79.
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is the best mechanism to ensure that the state hews to its own plans.46 Of
course, the desire for precision and predictability extends even beyond
criminal justice. Nevertheless, the premise is that there is an “especial need
for certainty” in a domain in which the state commonly brands and restrains
its citizens, warehousing (and sometimes even exterminating) their bodies.47
The “law of crime” is said to be “special” precisely because criminal justice is
especially coercive.48 And, in such circumstances, the conventional wisdom is
that only a formalistic approach may provide adequate protection against
arbitrary exercises of state power.49

46 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 180-83 (1968) (explaining that
criminal justice, appropriately designed, allows us “to predict and plan the future course of our lives
within the coercive framework of the law . . . to foresee the times of law’s interference”); see also
SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119 (2011); PACKER, supra note 6, at 84-85 (“[T]his is the first argument
that is always advanced in support of the principle of legality: that people are entitled to fair notice
of what the law requires so that they may plan their lives accordingly . . . . [The] more sophisticated
rationale of the principle of legality . . . is that it is necessary in order to prevent abuses of official
discretion.”); Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 673 (“[T]he importance of the rule of law [is to] guid[e]
individual behavior.”); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 223–
24 (1979) (“[T]he law must be capable of being obeyed . . . . [I]t must be capable of guiding the
behavior of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out what it is and act on it.”); supra notes
2-6 and accompanying text.
47 Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 215, 256 (1987); see also H.L.A. HART, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EXCUSES, IN
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 44–47 (2d ed. 1969); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating
Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1974) (discussing criminal law’s long tradition of “strict
adherence to rules”); cf. Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is This Right Different from
All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994) (explaining that criminal justice is different in
kind from other forms of legal regulation and that “liberty from confinement cannot be relegated to
the status of unprotected aspects of daily life”).
48 Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 97 (1996); see also Egon Bittner, The Police
on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. R. 699, 700 (1967) (“[C]rime belongs wholly to
the law, and its treatment is exhaustively based on considerations of legality”).
49 According to John Jeffries:

The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of government
power . . . . [T]he agencies of official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided
by rules . . . [as a means to promote] regularity and evenhandedness in the
administration of justice and accountability in the use of government power.
Jeffries, supra note 11, at 201, 212 (explaining that “appeals to the ‘Rule of Law,’” as they apply to the
penal law, tend to entail “the resort to legal formalism as a constraint against unbridled discretion”);
see also PACKER, supra note 6, at 88-90 (describing how the principle of legality serves an important
function in limiting arbitrary state action); Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1030
(describing a reason-giving requirement that would serve as a check on police discretion); see also
DAVID DYZENHAUS, RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 179-80
(1999) (“[T]he rule of law . . . refer[s] to the idea that law should meet certain procedural
requirements so that the individual is enabled to obey it . . . . [It must] be relatively certain, clearly
expressed, open . . . adequately publicized . . . [and] prospective . . . . The practical effect . . . is to
set limits to the discretion of legislators, administrators, judges and the police.”).
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This formalistic conception of the legality principle provides the theoretical
underpinnings for a “rule of law as a law of rules”50—a positive and orthodox
approach, grounded in “legal formalism.”51 According to David Dyzenhaus:
“[L]aw must take the form of rules” so that people may take its requirements
into account “when planning their affairs.”52 But this invites the question: What
is so important about planning affairs? Surely, the legality principle does more
than just promote day-to-day efforts to schedule and organize efficiently.
Planning is also a tool for self-discovery and expression—for “self-ownership.”53
In the words of John Christman: “[T]o be autonomous is to be one’s own person,
to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are
not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be
considered one’s authentic self.”54 The ability to plan thereby implicates the
metaphysical as much as the mundane. In a given setting, to know what the state
may not do is to know not only what I may do but also to ponder and pursue who
I am and what I may become.55 Or, at least, that is the ostensible promise and
hope of the legality principle as it relates to individual autonomy.
The preceding is just a rough sketch of several contested concepts. There
is no settled definition of either individual autonomy or its relationship to the

50
51

Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1989).
Jeffries, supra note 11, at 201 (describing the “quite conventional” conception of the rule of
law and the principle of legality).
52 DYZENHAUS, supra note 49, at 179-80; see also SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119 (2011) (“[T]he
creation and persistence of the fundamental rules of law is grounded in the capacity that all individuals
possess to adopt plans.”); Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 670 (“[T]he rule of law is . . . essential to one’s
capacity to make and carry out life plans.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 083: Normativity,
Morality, & Ethics, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (July 24, 2016), http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_3.html [https://perma.cc/AFC6-7K4F] (“One reason
that the rule of law is important has to do with predictability and certainty.”).
53 Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 670 (“By enhancing the individual’s life-planning capacity, the
rule of law expands freedom of action, secures a measure of individual liberty, and expresses respect for
individual autonomy.”); Solum, supra note 52 (“The predictability and certainty of the law creates a
sphere of autonomy within which individuals can act without fear of government interference.”). On
self-ownership, see generally G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY (1995).
54 John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3.3 (Jan. 9, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy/-moral/
[https://perma.cc/M84W-A96Q] [hereinafter Christman, Autonomy]; cf. Jeremy Waldron, Moral
Autonomy and Personal Autonomy, in AUTONOMY AND THE NEW CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM
307 (2005) (“Talk of personal autonomy evokes the image of a person in charge of his life, not just
following his desires but choosing which of his desires to follow.”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 369 (1986) (“The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.”).
55 Christopher Wellman, Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation, 111 ETHICS 735, 738 (2001)
(“Liberalism’s aversion to [state] paternalism implies that each autonomous individual has a right to
decide which self-regarding benefits to pursue.”); Solum, supra note 52 (“What values are served by the
rule of law? Why is the rule of law important? . . . The predictability and certainty of the law creates a
sphere of autonomy within which individuals can act without fear of government interference.”).
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legality principle and state coercion. 56 Other theorists invoke related values
and principles to back the same or similar claims. For instance, Jeremy
Waldron has argued that a rule-of-law system must demonstrate sufficient
respect for citizens “as active centers of intelligence,” which Waldron rooted
in a dignity principle. Likewise, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously
championed a comprehensive privacy right “to be let alone”—to “enjoy life”
and to “own” one’s own “inviolate personality.”57 And Ronald Dworkin
asserted that a state committed to the rule of law must treat its citizens with
“equal concern and respect.”58 These notions of dignity, privacy, and equality
(and, of course, like notions of liberty and freedom) resonate with what I
mean by individual autonomy. Simply, individual autonomy is no standalone
liberal principle.59 There are other overlapping principles that may interact
with each other and also with the legality principle.60 In any event, the exact
56 For more on my conception of the principle of legality, see generally Bowers, Pointless
Indignity, supra note 40; BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32; infra Section V.C. For more on
my conception of state coercion, see generally Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1083 (2016) [hereinafter Bowers, Baselines] (discussing “the Court’s unwillingness to
take seriously the issue of coercion as it applies to plea bargaining”).
57 See Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-205
(1890); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing “the right to be let alone . . . as against the Government” to be “the right most valued
by civilized men”) overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 763-64 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is the basis of individuality. To
be alone and be let alone . . . . Personality develops from within . . . . Invasions of privacy demean
the individual . . . . The practice is incompatible with a free society.”) (quoting Attorney General
William R. Clark); cf. Christman, Autonomy, supra note 54 (“Examination of the concept of
autonomy also figures centrally in debates over . . . the right to privacy.”).
58 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 330 (2011) (“A political community
has no moral power to create and enforce obligations against its members unless it treats them with
equal concern and respect.”).
59 I should make plain, however, that I do not believe that autonomy is synonymous with other
liberal principles, including even freedom. Cf. Christman, Autonomy, supra note 54, at § 1.1 (“Some
distinguish autonomy from freedom by insisting that freedom concerns particular acts while
autonomy is a more global notion, referring to states of a person.”); see Scott Anderson, Coercion,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 27, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/
[https://perma.cc/ZG5U-YGA5] (referring to autonomy as a “special type of freedom,” which “is used
to refer to an inner state of orderly self-directedness”); Sophia Moreau, Equality Rights and Stereotypes,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 283, 294 (David Dyzenhaus &
Malcolm Thorburn eds. 2016) (distinguishing between “‘negative freedom,’ or the ability to live without
interference from external pressures” and “‘positive freedom’ or ‘autonomy,’ or a person’s ability to shape
her own life in accordance with her own beliefs and values”).
60 Indeed, I recently authored an article examining the manner by which the Court’s positive conception
of legality underserves the moral philosophic concept of dignity. See generally Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra
note 40. And Paul Gowder has even argued persuasively that the preconditions of the rule of law—regularity,
publicity, and generality—depend upon the state treating individuals equally. See Paul Gowder, The Rule of
Law and Equality, 32 LAW & PHIL. 565, 567 (2013) (“When states achieve vertical equality, their legal
institutions guard against hubris, officials’ use of their powers to claim certain kinds of superior status. They
also guard against terror, the use of the state’s power to cow individuals into submissiveness.”); cf. Hellman,
supra note 37, at 933 (describing how irrational laws implicate one conception of discrimination).
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liberal principle is less important than my less controversial methodological
claim: whatever the relevant concept (and however we may describe it), the
criminal justice system has relied generally upon a “formalist world view” to
express and advance it.61 A state actor is said to behave arbitrarily only when
he has failed to follow established, precisely drawn rules.62
In doctrinal terms, a hallmark of this formalistic conception of arbitrary
state action is the rejection of common law criminality.63 Crimes cannot be
officer-made—or even judge-made—and they certainly cannot be crafted
after the fact, no matter how reprehensible the conduct in question and no
matter how well meaning the state effort. Crimes are to be legislated ex ante
or not at all.64 But, of course, it is not enough simply to demand that the
legislature legislate. If it were, a clever representative could draft a
comprehensive two sentence penal code: “No one may behave in a morally
wrongful or socially costly manner. Anyone who does so shall be punished as justice
or public safety or order demands.”65 The example may seem fanciful, but it is
only slightly more opaque and open-ended than the catchall vagrancy statutes
that our criminal justice system historically used to maintain order.66 But
during the latter half of the last century, the Supreme Court systematically
began to invalidate as unconstitutionally vague these relatively formless
vagrancy offenses.67 The Court determined that vague statutes offended the
legality principle in the same manner as common law crimes: they neither
provided effective notice to the public of the conduct criminally proscribed
nor imposed adequate limits upon law enforcement.68 By contrast, a precise
61 Seidman, supra note 48, at 103 (“[A]lthough realism’s lessons for criminal law seem obvious,
formalism continues to dominate criminal jurisprudence.”).
62 One of the very few exceptions is Fourth Amendment doctrine pertaining to extraordinary uses
of force—or what constitutional law calls “excessive force.” See infra notes 260–63, 292, 339–46 and
accompanying text (discussing excessive force doctrine as applied in a variety of controversial cases).
63 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 190–91 (discussing common law crimes and concluding that “the legality
ideal is an explicit and self-conscious rejection of the historic methodology of the common law”).
64 See id. (“[T]he categorical insistence on advance legislative crime definition is clearly a
modern phenomenon.”); see also BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 80-81; H.L.A. Hart, Philosophy of
Law, Problems of, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 264, 273-74 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967)
(“The requirements that the law . . . should not be retrospective in operation . . . [is one of] the
principles of legality.”).
65 This is a version of another comprehensive criminal code, offered by Herbert Packer:
“[W]hoever does anything bad shall be punished as justice may require.” PACKER, supra note 6, at 92.
66 See, e.g., Jacksonville Ordinance § 26-57 (1965) (invalidated by Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156-57 (1972)) (criminalizing “[r]ogues and vagabonds, . . . lewd, wonton,
and lascivious persons, . . . habitual loafers” and many other categories of people and conduct).
67 See generally RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016).
68 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[A] penal statute [must] define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”);
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which
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penal code was thought to announce its commands comprehensibly and
comprehensively to both audiences—to the lay individuals who are the
designated subjects of sufficiently precise criminal codes and to the law
enforcers who are authorized to enforce these rules (and only these rules).
B. Conduct Rules as Cop Rules
At this point, it may be necessary to define our terms. We can distinguish
between legal rules that are designed to guide behavior, which Meir Dan-Cohen
famously dubbed “conduct rules,” and “decision rules” that direct legal officials
to interpret and apply substantive criminal laws in particular ways.69 From this
starting point, it may be tempting to define the constitutional limits on law
enforcement as “decision rules” only. Indeed, this would seem to be the
conventional view. But it is too simplistic, if not inaccurate. Unlike the
professional adjudicator, the professional law enforcer is not tasked principally
with the obligation to interpret and thereafter apply law—to reach legal
determinations as a means of resolving cases. To the contrary, his primary
function is to take action—to engage in conduct.70 To authorize state action, the
officer depends in the first instance on the existence of the substantive criminal
law and sufficient proof of its violation by another. The substantive criminal law
thereby shapes the officer’s conduct, just as it shapes the conduct of the
layperson. Conduct is controlled on each side of the coin. For the individual, the
law defines what she cannot do. For the law enforcer, it defines what he can do.71
But the substantive criminal law describes only a single set of conduct
rules (albeit a single set that reaches two audiences). The scope of an officer’s
authority to engage in conduct is shaped also by rules of criminal procedure.
And these rules—particularly, Fourth Amendment rules—may be
characterized likewise as a set of conduct rules for cops. Indeed, several
is that all persons are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also BONNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 45 (“[T]he
vagueness doctrine independently protects principle of legality or rule of law values in situations
where legislation does not adequately constrain the authority of police, prosecutors, and courts to
engage in arbitrary, ad hoc decisionmaking.”).
69 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 630 (“[T]he law necessarily contains two sets of messages.
One set is directed at the general public and provides the guidelines for conduct. These guidelines
are . . . ‘conduct rules.’ The other set of messages is directed at the officials and provides guidelines
for their decisions. These are ‘decision rules.’”).
70 I am not the first person to draw this distinction between the manner by which rules convey
different messages to adjudicators and law enforcers. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth
Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 319 n.90 (2010) (“Speaking for two bodies—the police and
lower courts—means that Court opinions must provide both decision rules to guide courts
and conduct rules to guide police.” (emphasis added)); see also infra note 72 (citing sources).
71 In this vein, it is no accident that the term misconduct (emphasis on the “conduct”) describes
circumstances where a police officer oversteps.
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commentators have done so already.72 There is no consensus over which exact
doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure qualify as a cop’s conduct rules,
but at a minimum they would seem to include the Fourth Amendment’s
ostensible warrant and probable-cause requirements.73 These baseline
procedural requirements represent efforts to define constitutional
reasonableness formalistically—efforts to rely upon hard proxies over
imprecise and holistic considerations of so-called “general reasonableness.”74
This is, of course, consistent with the dominant conception of the principle
of legality and its preference for relatively firm limits on official coercion.75
72 See Mary D. Fan, Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1407, 1439 (2011) (discussing “conduct rule gaming” by police); Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes
of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 92 (2011) (noting how police rely on decision rules to circumvent conduct
rules); John E. Taylor, Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good Faith Under United States
v. Leon, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 155, 171 (2005) (“Although Dan-Cohen developed [his] model in the
context of discussing substantive criminal law and its conduct rules addressing the general public,
the model can be easily extended to the context of criminal procedure.”); see also Crocker, supra note
70, at 318 (“In order to protect privacy, the Supreme Court must fashion conduct rules to regulate
police behavior.”); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2471 (1996) (“The Warren Court established and
embellished conduct rules governing police practices under three main constitutional rubrics:
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance
of counsel in all criminal cases.”); cf. Malcolm Thorburn, A Liberal Criminal Law Cannot be Reduced
to These Two Types of Rules, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 22, 23 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen
Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011) (“So is ‘arrest with a warrant’ a conduct rule or a decision
rule? It seems that it is, instead, a conduct rule that issues from the exercise of a decision rule.”).
73 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 72, at 171 (describing the warrant and probable cause requirements
as “conduct rules telling police officers how they should conduct criminal investigations.”); see also
Steiker, supra note 72, at 2472.
74 See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
227, 255 (1984) (describing the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to define “reasonableness” precisely);
Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness”, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1642, 1644 (1998) (“[T]ypically (and formalistically), . . . the Court considers the legality of a search
to turn exclusively on whether there is a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that
evidence of a criminal offense is present in a given location.”); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman,
& Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 887-88 (2009) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine is replete with
rule-like presumptions of reasonableness for generically defined fact patterns.”); see also Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (“In determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
we have given great weight to . . . the need for a bright-line constitutional standard”); Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471 (1985) (providing a
comparison of “bright line” versus “no lines” approaches to interpreting the Fourth Amendment).
See generally Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward
a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 129 (1989)
(noting the Supreme Court’s turn towards “general reasonableness.”).
75 Unsurprisingly, left-liberal proponents of a formalistic legality principle have used almost
identical language to describe both sets of conduct rules for cops. Without precisely defined crimes, the
officer may exercise “dictatorial power over the streets;” without structured search-and-seizure rules, the
officer may act “despotically and capriciously.” Compare Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional
Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
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Thus, we may draw a straight line between the Court’s prevailing
substantive and procedural approaches. In each context, the prospective evil
remains the same—“petty tyranny” or worse.76 And precision is thought to
prevent it.77 Moreover, the two sets of conduct rules for cops are designed to
operate compatibly. Consider, again, the officer who intends to arrest me.
According to his substantive conduct rules, he may not make up a crime.
According to his procedural conduct rules, he may not arrest on an inchoate
hunch. His authority arises out of the interplay between his conduct rules.
C. Dynamic Conduct Rules
But, as we shall see, formalism’s aspirations ring hollow in practice. It is
not so easy to maintain precisely drawn conduct rules. Even the brightest
rules may have their fuzzy edges—in application and even in formulation. In
this vein, John Jeffries has described the vagueness doctrine as “evaluative.”78
And the Court has made plain that it will not demand “meticulous specificity”
or “impractical” standards of statutory clarity.79 Likewise, probable cause is “a
practical, common sense [standard] . . . given all the circumstances,” not a
“hypertechnical” rule.80 Still, the officer’s contemporary conduct rules are
designed to concentrate the analysis upon a single and relatively formal
question—technical guilt accuracy. In this way, the modern criminal statute
speaks to people in terms more exact than the common law offense, which
sought to proscribe only “general moral blameworthiness.”81 Likewise, the
Officers, and the Like, CRIM. L. BULL. 3, no.4, at 222-24 (1967), with Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 411 (1974) [hereinafter Amsterdam, Perspectives]
(“[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may
act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seizures.”).
76 Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 75, at 411.
77 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967) (discussing dangers of “after-the-event
justification” and emphasizing importance of compelling law enforcement to “observe precise limits
established in advance”).
78 Jeffries, supra note 11 at 196; see also Low & Johnson, supra note 11, at 2052 (describing the
indefiniteness of prevailing vagueness doctrine).
79 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1948); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 352
(1983) (“due process does not require ‘impossible standards of clarity.’”); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“[W]e can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. The words
of the ordinance are marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (observing that unconstitutional indefiniteness “is itself an indefinite concept”).
80 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-38 (1983); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text
(discussing probable cause as a somewhat uncertain and epistemic question).
81 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 994 (1932) (observing that,
historically, the measure of culpability was “general moral blameworthiness”); see also William E.
Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 893, 910 (1978) (explaining that eighteenth-century juries were considered to be “good
judges of the common law of the land” and were instructed “to do justice between the parties not
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prevailing requirements of warrant and probable cause depend upon
“quantitative” measures of legal guilt as compared to alternative “qualitative”
considerations.82 This is all to say that formalism describes a spectrum, and it
may be that no real-world conduct rule has ever landed squarely at either
endpoint. Ironically, then, the best measure of formalism may be contextual—
to evaluate the question relationally by contrasting one legal rule against
alternative historical, conceptual, or positive analogues.83
Moreover, the realist knows that conduct rules change with time. One
conduct rule unintentionally might reshape another. Or a conduct rule
inadvertently might deliver multiple messages to multiple audiences. And,
significantly, the more precisely defined the rule, the more readily the wrong
audience eventually might overhear it. Probable cause offers a nice
illustration. Members of the public might not know precisely what the
standard demands, but they understand that the Fourth Amendment is said
to require it.84 In turn, an individual might come—accurately or not—to read
her own conduct rules as modified by probable cause. Thereafter, she might
no longer construe a particular statutory offense as it was meant to be
construed—as commanding simply “do not do X.” Instead, she might read it
to declare: “do not give an officer probable cause to believe that you have done X.”
The claim, here, is that conduct rules are products of more than ex ante
design. They are products of what is read and understood and by whom. They
are products of the bleed between overlapping conduct rules and even
perceptible norms and practices.85
by any quirks of the law . . . but by common sense as between man and man” (quoting Letter from
James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Dec. 25, 1779)).
82 On the distinction between “general reasonableness” and more formal Fourth Amendment
tests, see Colb, supra note 74, at 1644 (describing “probable cause” as a quantitative standard of
confidence, as compared to a qualitative approach to reasonableness); Bradley, supra note 74, at 1471
(describing two distinct models of Fourth Amendment adjudication); see generally Bowers, Pointless
Indignity, supra note 40; Wasserstrom, supra note 74; infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text
(endorsing a two-ply test, incorporating both models of Fourth Amendment adjudication).
83 In this vein, Bill Stuntz has described probable cause as a test of “formal legality,”
notwithstanding its fuzzier margins. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 258 (2011). Likewise, even though vagueness doctrine entails a somewhat evaluative
standard, Mark Kelman has observed that it still resonates in the more formalistic “rule-respecting liberal
tradition.” Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 207, 212 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011).
84 Indeed, the idea of probable cause has even become something of a cultural artifact—
inspiring songs, fiction, and movies. See, e.g., BRAND NUBIAN, Probable Cause, on FOUNDATION
(Arista Records 1998) (“You don’t have to break no laws/They just say probable cause.”); RIDLEY
PEARSON, PROBABLE CAUSE (1990); PROBABLE CAUSE (Pacific Victory Pictures 1994).
85 By way of further example, motorists commonly read vehicle-and-traffic conduct rules in light
of prevailing enforcement norms. For instance, a speed limit may be taken to permit the driver to go
up to nine miles faster than the posted figure. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 749, 767 (2013) (describing “the real rule [as] a speed limit of 74 and not 65”); cf. Taylor, supra
note 72, at 172 (explaining that conduct rules are meaningful only to the extent they are enforced).
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The legality principle (as currently construed) may command relatively
precise rules, but our understanding of those rules and their reach responds
likewise to forces on the ground and to other legal and extralegal impulses—
to what police officers know and do with their (and our) conduct rules; to
what we know and do about what police officers know and do; to what police
officers know and do about what we know and do; and to what courts know
and do to accommodate (or not) the multitude of dynamic forces and
conditions. Simply put, conduct rules are what we make of them. And, as I
examine in the next three Parts, what we make of them is far from clear-cut
or easy to anticipate.
II. LEGALITY & SOVEREIGNTY
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a police officer’s subjective
motivation is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.86 In a system
committed to formal legality, inquiries into good or bad reasons are thought
to be just too wooly. Consider, again, the officer’s arrest authority. Technical
guilt accuracy is the categorical measure of constitutional reasonableness.
Concretely, the police officer needs only probable cause to believe the arrestee
has committed an offense—any offense, including even a noncriminal
violation.87 This last point is subtle but profoundly important. We are a
nation of petty rule breakers—low-level speeders, creators of trivial
disorder.88 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of motorists break vehicle and
traffic laws on an almost daily basis.89 To do so is customary—a matter of
86
87

See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (holding that the probable cause “rule extends
even to minor misdemeanors”); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (applying the probable
cause rule “to all arrests”); see also Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and
Legalism’s Limits, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 339 (2014) (collecting cases); Bowers, Pointless
Indignity, supra note 1, at 998–1004, 1019–21; see, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72 (2001)
(per curiam) (affirming constitutionality of full-custodial arrest for noncriminal traffic violation);
Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rrests for violations of purely
civil laws are common enough.”); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming
arrest for failure to signal lane change); Miller v. City of Portland, No. 3:11–cv–01509–JE, 2014 WL
320555, at *8 (D. Or. Jan. 29, 2014) (affirming full-custodial arrest for noncriminal jaywalking and
observing that it is “immaterial to the scope of the Fourth Amendment” whether the state “has
denominated this particular offense a ‘violation’ rather than a ‘crime’”).
88 Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157,
1163-64 (2004) (“American criminal justice is founded on overcriminalization and discretion . . . . Minor
crimes absorb the bulk of our ordinary, local enforcement efforts and there is an endless supply of minor
crime which may be pursued . . . . Many, if not most Americans repeatedly violate our substantive laws
everyday, exposing themselves to police intrusion . . . .”). See generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the
Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2007) (examining the manner by which void-for-vagueness doctrine
has failed adequately to limit discretionary enforcement of vehicle and traffic laws).
89 See e.g., Fred Mannering, An Empirical Analysis of Driver Perceptions of The Relationship
Between Speed Limits and Safety, Transportation Research Part F, https://engineering.purdue.edu/
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course, almost. But, once a pedestrian or motorist has violated some
frequently flouted traffic or public-order law, her unexceptional conduct
exposes her to the exceptional intrusion of a full-custodial arrest.90
Of course, she may predict accurately that no officer would likely treat her
trivial offense so harshly. But her guess is only a statistical expectation of
“sovereign grace.”91 Her plans for unmolested passage are empirical and
sociological, not legal. Legal entitlement belongs to the officer. He may rely
upon byzantine vehicle and traffic law as a license to intrude.
Observe, then, the manner by which precision has empowered. With welldefined substantive conduct rules, the officer can easily identify a violation.
The carefully drawn statute thereby grants the officer tremendous discretion
to determine, practically, the offender and, likewise, the implications of the
offense—to pick and choose which motorist should receive a warning, a ticket,
or a trip to central booking.92 It is a choice that tends to turn on administrative
or equitable considerations, not legal guilt.93 The Fourth Amendment
disregards the questions that most matter: against whom will police enforce
a public-order offense, and for what reason?
~flm/CE361_files/Mannering-TRF-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPN3-KHUC] (“[O]bserved data
show that only about 5% of drivers operate at or below speed limits on interstate highway segments
posted at 55 mph, and that as few as 23% of drivers operate at or below the posted speed limit on
non-freeway facilities.”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 88, at 1520 (citing data to show that traffic laws
are set by safety engineers with the assumption that some or even most motorists will speed).
90 Weinstein, supra note 88, at 1164 (“[I]t is almost impossible to drive a car in America without
giving the police a legally valid reason to stop and arrest you. Walking down the street, or sitting on
a stoop, is little better . . . [in light of] proscriptions against disorderly conduct [and other publicorder offenses].”).
91 Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the
Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 413 (2008) (“[T]he rule of law is replete with . . . places
where law runs up against sovereign prerogative. In those places, law runs out . . . . [The] law
authorizes the exercise of a power that it does not regulate.”).
92 Logan, supra note 87, at 331 (“[P]olice officers . . . wield near-total discretion to execute
arrests for low-level social-disorder offenses.”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 88, at 1503 n.38 (“[T]raffic
laws confer virtually unlimited discretion on police to investigate whichever motorist they wish.”).
93 Weinstein, supra note 88, at 1163-64 (“Anywhere in America today, if a practical and
experienced police officer decides to impose some constraint, . . . she can often do so with almost
certain impunity . . . . Police resources, not minor offenders, limit the number of arrests for minor
offenses.”); see also FEELEY, supra note 32, at 284 (observing that decisionmaking in petty cases “are
based on a host of considerations other than the strength of the evidence and applicable law,”
including “assessments of the ‘real’ trouble”); id. at 159-61 (“I think the legal factors probably come
into play in about one in every twenty-five cases . . . . [M]ost of the appeals are sort of commonsense assessments of the situation.”) (quoting prosecutor); Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation
and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 929 (1960) (noting
equitable considerations predominate “for petty causes where expense of protracted investigation is
out of proportion to the advantage of wholly assured [legal] result”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, supra note 1, at 1662 n.21 (explaining that in petty cases “equitable considerations tend to
predominate” over questions of legal guilt). See generally id. (describing three strands of analysis and
three corresponding types of abuse: the legal, the administrative, and the equitable).
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A. Reasons & Reasonableness
The obvious fear is that the officer’s reasons and choices may have more to
do with implicit (or even explicit) race bias than with public safety or order.94
On this score, we may hope that the Equal Protection Clause might take up
some of the slack. But, absent a frank admission of a discriminatory purpose,
such claims are practical nonstarters.95 As a police union president recently
conceded: “If an officer has probable cause to make a stop, there’s absolutely
no way you can prove racial profiling unless you get into that officer’s head.”96
In any event, an officer may behave arbitrarily without implicating race or
ethnicity.97 Invidious discrimination is just one of the most reprehensible
versions of arbitrary state action, but not the only version.98 Consider the

94
95

Supra notes 22, 37-40 and infra notes 112–15, 122, 204–08, 421–30 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection claim—
notwithstanding a rigorous statistical showing of discriminatory charging and sentencing effects—
where no discriminatory purpose could be demonstrated in the immediate case); see also Chavez v.
Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d. 612, 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no discriminatory purpose
despite statistical showing of racial disparities in traffic stops); PBS, Bryan Stevenson and Michelle
Alexander, BILL MOYERS JOURNAL (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/
04022010/watch.html [https://perma.cc/982G-MWRG] (“McClesky [sic] versus Kemp has
immunized the criminal justice system from judicial scrutiny for racial bias. It has made it virtually
impossible to challenge . . . for racial bias in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination . . .
[which] is almost impossible to come by in the absence of some kind of admission.”); Sarat & Clarke,
supra note 91, at 395 (“Even a cursory glance at the [equal protection] case law reveals the extent to
which judges . . . have abandoned oversight.”).
96 Matt Ferner, New California Law Aims to Curb Racial Profiling by Police, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-law-police-racial-profiling_us_
5612fd05e4b0368a1a60c3ff [https://perma.cc/EK56-PSQN]; see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra
note 40, at 1037 (“[P]lenty of room for mischief (unconscious or otherwise) remains between the
limits of the Fourth Amendment and equal protection—between the requirement that an arresting
officer possess probable cause and the requirement that an arrest have a nondiscriminatory
purpose.”). Even without race bias, order-maintenance enforcement may remain localized to
distressed majority-minority neighborhoods. Disorder correlates with urban poverty and urban
poverty correlates with race. Thus, normatively dubious arrests pool in historically disadvantaged
communities. See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1699 (“[T]he most
persuasive explanation for why authorities target poor and minority communities for order
maintenance policing is that disorder is disproportionately found there, and resources being finite,
enforcement dollars are best spent on geographically targeted policing . . . even if public order crime
is, to some degree, everywhere.”); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1795, 1820-22 (1998) (“Looking in poor neighborhoods tends to be both successful and cheap . . . .
Street stops can go forward with little or no advance investigation . . . . [T]he stops themselves
consume little time, so the police have no strong incentive to ration them carefully.”).
97 See infra notes 295, 302–05, 369–73, 378–79, 382–85 and accompanying text (discussing a
broader conception of arbitrariness, and examining Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff, 136
S. Ct. 2056 (2016)).
98 See Jeffries, supra note 11, at 213 (observing that the “worst case” scenario for the rule of law
is “hidden bias and prejudice”); see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1003 (“[E]qual
protection is designed to regulate out of existence certain always-bad moral reasons. When it comes
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facts of Atwater v. Lago Vista. An officer arrested a white “soccer mom” for the
non-jailable offense of failing to buckle seatbelts.99 According to one
commentator, the officer was a “jerk, acting out of seemingly personal
pique.”100 And, remarkably, the Court agreed. It castigated the officer for
subjecting the motorist to the “gratuitous humiliations” of a full custodial
arrest, and it spoke reverently of her trampled-upon “claim to live free of
pointless indignity and confinement.”101 In short, even the Court considered
the arrest arbitrary by any folk measure.
Nevertheless, the majority held the intrusion constitutionally reasonable
because—to put it in our terms—the officer had satisfied his conduct rules. It did
not matter that the officer had “behaved badly,” as the majority conceded.102
The motorist had violated vehicle and traffic law. That was enough.
Thereafter, the officer was entitled to indulge whatever “nonlegal impetus”
drove him to respond so inequitably and nonsensically.103 With probable
cause, he was “authorized . . . to make a custodial arrest.”104 More to the point,
he was “authorized [but] not required” to make the arrest.105 His conduct rules
were “power-directing.”106 They served primarily as “means of insulating” the
arrest from constitutional challenge.107 They described a safe harbor within
which he could plan and carry out exercises of official coercion.108 Within that
safe harbor, he needed no genuine or even manufactured good reason.109
to sometimes-bad reasons (like the decision to arrest for morally neutral petty crime), . . . [t]he Court
has opted to regulate not at all.”).
99 Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001); see also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Four on the
Fourth: High Court Gets Several Chances to Elaborate on Standards for Searches and Seizures, 86 ABA J.
4, 32 (2000) (describing the arrestee as a “soccer mom”). See generally Bowers, supra note 1 (examining
Atwater in great detail).
100 Wayne A. Logan, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police Power Takes a More
Intrusive Turn, 46 AKRON L. REV. 413, 429 (2013) [hereinafter Logan, Florence v. Board].
101 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47.
102 See id. (“[The] police officer . . . was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.”).
103 See Schauer, infra note 139, at 429 (defining a “nonlegal impetus” as, inter alia, an
“idiosyncratic reaction to . . . the very particular facts of the case”).
104 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
105 See id. (emphasis added).
106 See Eric J. Miller, Are There Two Types of Decision Rules?, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 20, 21 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2009)
(defining “power-directing” conduct rules).
107 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
108 See infra Section II.B (describing the manner by which rules, counterintuitively, produce
discretion and opportunities for sovereign choice); cf. infra note 146 and accompanying text
(discussing opportunities for legal professionals to game rules).
109 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353-54 (“[H]is subjective reason for making the arrest need not be
the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” (quoting Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004))); Weinstein, supra note 88, at 1163-64 (“This state of affairs runs
counter to the notion that official power is constrained . . . that law enforcement must have a reason
under the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)).
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The formalist might respond that probable cause, as a metric of legal guilt,
constitutes its own persuasive reason or justification. But technical guilt accuracy is
ultimately insufficient for discretionary order–maintenance arrests (though it
might the right measure for serious offenses for which categorical arrest is
anticipated).110 In petty public-order cases, probable cause merely translates to a
troubling form of “constitutional carte blanche”111—a plenary authority to harass
and humiliate, to constrain and coerce, to behave in a manner antithetical to the
purpose of the legality principle “as an important prophylaxis against the arbitrary
and abusive exercise of discretion in the enforcement of the penal law.”112 John
Jeffries has written that order–maintenance enforcement “invite[s]
manipulation.”113 As he saw it, the problem was the failure of courts to adjudicate
the actions of legal officials in a class of cases that almost never proceed to trial.114
But, even as to the public-order cases that do get litigated, judges never resolve the
normative matters that matter most, instead asking and answering only relatively
off-topic questions of whether officers violated formal conduct rules, like the
requirement of probable cause.
B. Precision & Pretext
An officer may also pick between offenses. He may substitute one
demonstrable offense for a roughly suspected other.115 In the process, the
principle of legality loses grip. At the extreme, an expansive penal code

110 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1658 (“Most people anticipate
something approximating categorical enforcement of very serious felonies but anticipate
nonenforcement of some nontrivial number of petty crime incidents.”).
111 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Atwater majority insisted that lowlevel, order–maintenance arrests are vanishingly rare. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 321, 353 (majority
opinion) (disclaiming an “epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,” and noting the “dearth of
[Atwater-like] horribles demanding redress”). But it is not obvious that they are so uncommon—at
least in certain communities. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “people of color are disproportionate[ly] victims” of “suspicionless stop[s]”);
Logan, supra note 87, at 336 nn.128-29 (cataloguing cases and studies of full-custodial arrests for
traffic and other non-jailable public-order offenses); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban
Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1064 (2013) (describing the practice of “making a fullcustodial arrest for [non-criminal] marijuana possession”); see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra
note 40, at 993; see, e.g., infra notes 392–93 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive and
institutional biases in favor of arrest, and describing the arrest of Sandra Bland, following traffic
stop for failure to signal a lane change).
112 BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 81; see also Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1333-35 (2008) (“[O]ur legal culture has come
to view unreviewable discretion . . . as the very definition of lawlessness.”); see supra notes 4-5, 26,
41–42, infra notes 127, 250, 295, 385, 421–32, and accompanying text.
113 Jeffries, supra note 11, at 197.
114 Id.
115 Supra Section II.A.
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resembles a “menu of options” more than a set of effective constraints.116 Law
enforcement becomes a matter of “picking the man and then searching the
law books . . . to pin some offense on him.”117 This, then, is what Richard
McAdams meant when he suggested that pretextual arrests and charges may
“fail on rule of law grounds.”118 Constructively, the state’s evidentiary burden
diminishes as to the genuine object crime.119
Consider, for instance, United States v. Whren.120 Vice squad officers
observed a vehicle occupied by several young African-American men. The
officers harbored an inarticulable suspicion that the occupants were narcotics
traffickers (based on what, we may wonder?).121 But, of course, their educated
guess could not authorize a vehicle stop. So they waited. In short order, the
officers observed the motorist commit two low level traffic infractions. They
stopped the vehicle and recovered cocaine. The reason for the stop was
obviously pretext. Vice squad officers do not care about the enforcement of
traffic laws. And, even if we disregard the racial subtext,122 we still may see
the case for what it was—an intrusion motivated by rough hunch. The officers

116 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 932-34 (2006) (arguing that criminal laws create “a menu of options” for police and prosecutors
to decide whether to arrest and charge); see also STUNTZ, supra note 83, at 509, 521 (“Broad criminal
codes ensure inconsistency. Broad codes cannot be enforced as written; thus, the definition of the
law-on-the-street necessarily differs, and may differ a lot, from the law-on-the-books.”); Stuntz,
supra note 96, at 3-4, 36 (“Law enforcers . . . define the laws they enforce . . . . Too much law amounts
to no law at all.”); Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Criminal Law and Procedures: The
Pessimists’ View, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 517, 521 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey,
& Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011).
117 See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 18, 19 (1940); see also
RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 609, 621 (2d ed. 2005)
(“[P]olice may employ commonly violated but relatively clear laws to pick and choose among the
violators they will stop.”).
118 See Richard H. McAdams, The Entrapment Defense Defended, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 509, 519-20 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds.,
2011) (describing use of pretext as a state of affairs that “stands on its head the distinctive criminal
law idea of the principle of legality”).
119 See id.; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972) (describing how
a prosecution “may be merely the cloak for a conviction that could not be obtained on the real but
undisclosed grounds for the arrest”); id. at 170 (remarking that it “would be in the highest degree
unfortunate” if law enforcement “should entertain, connive at or coquette with the idea” to punish
an individual by pretext “in a case where there is not enough evidence” for the object crime) (quoting
Gordon Hewart); cf. STUNTZ, supra note 83, at 301 (explaining the way in which legal officials may
rely upon pretext to escape accountability).
120 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff ’d, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
121 Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441-42 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing
that when officers act in the absence of individualized suspicion their motivation is “less likely to be
inarticulable than unspeakable” (emphasis omitted)).
122 See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2001, 2005-09 (1998) (examining the overlap between pretext and discriminatory traffic stops).
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were confident that the young men were bad guys, up to no good.123 And they
were empowered to act on that estimation of poor character—that perception
of what I have called “normative guilt.”124 It was irrelevant that the officers
were unable to satisfy their drug–law conduct rules; the officers satisfied their
traffic–law conduct rules, and those rules were ready substitutes.125
Thus, we discover the limits of the dominant conception of the legality
principle. It is too cramped to account for pretext or its implications. The officers
were free to behave in a manner that would have been arbitrary (according to
even the Court’s formal legal definition) but for the happenstance of other
available legal tools. And, as to vice squad officers, the array of vehicle and traffic
law is just that—happenstance, a happy expedient that gave the officers “the same
kind of authority . . . [as] old-style vagrancy and loitering laws.”126
III. EXCEPTIONS TO CONDUCT RULES. EXCEPTIONS
AS CONDUCT RULES?
But our rule of law is not entirely lawless. The officer still must satisfy his
conduct rules, right? Not quite. As it happens, even if he is not legally
authorized, he may be equitably excused. This is nothing new. Criminal
procedure students learn early on that baseline Fourth Amendment conduct
rules are replete with exceptions. Warrants and probable cause are hardly “per

123 See Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle,
72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1067–68 (1998) (explaining that many traffic and public-order offenses may be
“designed to give police probable cause for arresting those suspected of being up to no good”).
124 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1678-79 (describing the concept
of normative guilt and contrasting it with legal guilt).
125 Significantly, there was a time when the Court was much more skeptical about the use of
pretext. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 67, at 189 (discussing early constitutional efforts to regulate
vagrancy statutes and observing that the “[Supreme] Court as a whole had sporadically hinted that
[these] uses of vagrancy laws in the service of more serious crime control goals might be
problematic.” (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964))); see also Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973) (“A seizure reasonable . . . in one setting may be unreasonable in a different
setting.”); supra notes 225–42 and accompanying text.
126 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 842, 853-54 (2001); see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life
in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 618 (1997)
(“[B]road and overinclusive rules enhance police discretion, and . . . a plethora of narrow rules may
not meaningfully constrain it.”). As Wayne LaFave explained a half-century ago, one of the principal
problems with vague statutes is that officers may manipulate them “to justify detention and
interrogation of persons suspected of more serious crimes.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST; THE
DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY: THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION’S SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 87-88 (1965). And this is how officers now use minor traffic and public-order offenses.
Mazrui, supra note 88, at 1502 n.32 (“[W]hen courts invalidate ‘vague’ laws, ironically they often
invite greater degrees of police discretion.”); supra notes 42, 66–68, 89–94, infra notes 233–36, and
accompanying text.
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se” requirements, notwithstanding the Court’s assurances.127 To the contrary,
the Court has adopted a number of bright line exceptions, justified typically
by pressing circumstance.128 Thus, a police officer needs no warrant to search
a vehicle, which is considered inherently mobile.129 Following the same logic,
the officer may conduct a warrantless arrest outside the home and, thereafter,
may search the person.130 And, because traffic stops are thought to be
especially dangerous, an officer is given “unquestioned command of the
situation” to minimize the risk of harm.131 This means that he may remove
drivers and passengers and may even secure and frisk them on the roadside
without individualized suspicion, much less a warrant or probable cause.132
In carving out these bright line exceptions, the Court has tempered the
conventional conduct rules with a methodology of understanding—
specifically, an understanding of the officer and his predicament. But even
though the bright line exception is a product of understanding, it naturally
constitutes a rigid and recognizable pronouncement. In this way, it remains
entirely consistent with legality’s conventional formal approach with its
preference for precisely drawn conduct rules. The more obvious challenge to
the dominant conception of the legality principle is the piecemeal exception—
which is the principal subject of the rest of this Article.
A. Understanding the Methodology
The piecemeal exception entails an all-things-considered and ex post form
of evaluation. The exception is designed to meet persuasive moral and
prudential demands in domains where, under the particular circumstances,
“law runs out.”133 The methodology has more in common with Max Weber’s
preferred mode of sociological inquiry, called verstehen, whereby we
127 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasizing that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment”).
128 Indeed, immediately after the Katz Court declared warrantless searches “per se unreasonable,”
it acknowledged “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 357.
129 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-62 (1925).
130 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (holding constitutional warrantless
arrests outside the home); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1973) (holding constitutional
warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests); see also infra note 391 (discussing Robinson).
131 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 324 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
132 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977) (per curiam) (granting officers the
categorical authority to remove drivers from vehicles “as a matter of course”); see also Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (extending the Mimms rule to passengers); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 113
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In the instant case, the officer did not have even the slightest hint, prior
to ordering respondent out of the car, that respondent might have a gun . . . . The car was stopped
for the most routine of police procedures, the issuance of a summons for an expired license plate.”).
133 See Sarat & Clarke, supra note 91, at 413 (“[T]he rule of law is replete with gaps, fissures,
and failures . . . . In those places, law runs out.”); see also infra notes 139, 182, and accompanying text.

2017]

Annoy No Cop

159

understand “the nature of the situation” by “projecting ourselves” into it.134
To a degree, juries may do this when they evaluate situational excuses, and
judges may do this when they contemplate Fourth Amendment exceptions.135
Judges evaluate the Fourth Amendment question of constitutional
reasonableness from the perspective of the officer and ask whether his failure
to follow the prevailing conduct rules was reasonably explicable and thereby
excusable, in light of sometimes delicate, evolving, and even dangerous
extenuating circumstances.136 It is a matter of understanding an officer’s
objectively good reasons for falling short in “circumstances of emergency,
high pressure, and emotion.”137
The analogue to this mode of legal reasoning is particularism, a moral
philosophy that rejects generally applicable rules and instead prioritizes the
exercise of human intuition and practical deliberation as applied to concrete
cases.138 The premise is that the “bivalence” of a rule may be competent to
produce only a boxy and fictive representation of fine-grained reality.139
Comparatively, the ambivalence of a particularistic approach allows the
adjudicator to get to the bottom of a complicated story.140 On this reading,
134 See William T. Tucker, Max Weber’s “Verstehen”, 6 SOC. Q. 157, 158, 161-63 (1965)
(explaining that sociologically meaningful understanding “comes about only as the individual orients
himself with reference to the conduct of others”)
135 See infra Section V.D (discussing situational excuses and other affirmative defenses).
136 See infra Part V.
137 Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 639.
138 Solum, supra note 52, at 98; see also JOHN KEKES, HOW SHOULD WE LIVE? A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO EVERYDAY MORALITY 47 (2014) (expressing the strong particularist account that
“moral judgment can get along perfectly well without any appeal to principles” (quoting Jonathan
Dancy)); cf. DAVIS, infra note 140, at 20 (noting it is “through case-to-case consideration, where the
human mind is often at its best,” not in formulation or application of generally applicable rules).
139 Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 405-06 (describing the “bivalence” of rules and their inability to demand
“some of this and some of that”).
140 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 93, 96 (1993) (“[T]he
‘matter of the practical’ can be grasped only crudely by rules given in advance, and adequately only
by a flexible judgment suited to the complexities of the case . . . . The point of the rule of law is to
bring us as close as possible . . . . But no such rules can be precise or sensitive enough.”); Roscoe
Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 802, 816 (1923) (“The times call insistently
for results in actual cases, not merely for abstractly just general rules.”); Sarat & Clarke, supra note
91, at 406 (“[I]n certain circumstances, the rule of law is not enough.”); Solum, supra note 52, at 206
(“[T]here will always be cases in which the problem is not that the rule was not given its optimal
formulation. Rather, the problem is that the infinite variety and complexity of particular fact
situations outruns our capacity to formulate general rules.”); R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas:
The Roles of Particularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 214 (2008) (noting that
formal law can become “insensitive, mechanical, morally blind, or ‘rule fetishist.’”); cf. KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 21 (1976) (“[A] needed . . .
escape from rigid rules [is] a far cry from the proposition that where law ends tyranny begins.”).
This is, of course, the rules–standards debate—that rules may be clearer and easier to
administer, but that standards respond better to context. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER,
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the piecemeal exception is defensible. It is animated by the admirable human
impulse to understand meaningfully just how hard it often is to follow the
rules.
B. Understanding the Exception
Meaningful understanding of this kind does not fit well within legality’s
typical playbook. Nevertheless, it need not offend the principle, even
according to legality’s prevailing formulation. According to Dan-Cohen, “no
one is likely to complain about the frustration of an expectation” when a
particularistic doctrine of excuse is “more lenient than the relevant conduct
rules.”141 In other words, the rule of law abides pleasant surprises because such
surprises do not affect the individual’s opportunities to plan conduct in the
shadow of law.142 Dan-Cohen further suggested that a criminal justice system
might even strive to keep the prospective beneficiary unaware of a potentially
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 (1992). I have picked sides in the debate. See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra
note 40, at 1024-25 (describing the virtues of standards); see also Bowers, Baselines, supra note 56, at
1114-15 (questioning the criminal justice system’s widespread dependence upon bright-line rules);
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 355
(2012) [hereinafter Bowers, Normative Grand Juries] (expressing concern that “the Court has come
to rely too heavily on bright-line rules”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at
1672 (“Complete justice demands both the simple justice that arises from fair and virtuous treatment
and the legal justice that arises from the application of legal rules.”). And I have my allies. See, e.g.,
Alschuler, supra note 74, at 231 (describing the manner by which bright line Fourth Amendment
rules, as applied, may produce a “disregard of values”); cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral
Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222 (2010) (“[O]ne virtue of
standards is that their lack of precision induces moral deliberation.”); Jeremy Waldron, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 269, 273-74 (2010) (observing that
less-structured legal standards may improve the “quality of moral argument” by leading individuals
“to reflect upon . . . a given practice”). But I am not insensitive to countervailing claims concerning
rules’ virtue and value. I am just skeptical of the great promise ascribed to formal rules by their
proponents and, more to the point, by the dominant conception of the legality principle. See infra
Sections V.B–C (endorsing a procedural conception of the legality principle, and proposing
evaluative approaches to certain Fourth Amendment questions).
141 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 634, 671 (explaining that, with respect to leniency, “no one
is likely to feel ‘entrapped’ by the law” in a manner that might offend the rule of law); Shiffrin, supra
note 140, at 1240 (discussing the affirmative defense of self-defense, and concluding that “[t]he use
of a standard in this circumstance operates less as a ‘blind,’ trapping those who might otherwise steer
clear of danger . . . because the standard here operates as a defense in response to a conduct norm.”).
142 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 673 (“[B]y definition, conduct rules are all one needs to know
in order to obey the law.”); see also Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 3, 10-11 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey,
& Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2011) (“[T]he rule of law allegedly promotes liberty or autonomy by
increasing predictability. But the need for security of individual expectations is not a great obstacle . . .
when decision rules are more lenient than conduct rules would lead people to expect. In such cases no
one is likely to complain of frustrated expectations.”).
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available piecemeal exception. “Acoustic separation,” as Dan-Cohen dubbed
it, prevents the individual from feigning situational excuses like duress, which
tend to be genuinely felt only when they are unplanned.143 Comparatively, an
individual who designs his conduct to fit a particular exception to a conduct
rule is probably playing games—concocting extenuating circumstances (or, at
least, not experiencing them genuinely).
But “acoustic separation” (or a lack thereof) is not my principal concern.144
My focus is a practical point about timing—specifically, that a judge is not
permitted to implement a methodology of meaningful understanding until
after conduct rules are broken. Put differently, the dominant conception of
the legality principle allows a judge to consider the whole story only as a
means to excuse, not as a means to condemn. The logic may seem obvious—
no one ought to be penalized just for following the rules. Indeed, this assertion is
really just a restatement of legality’s keystone—“nulla poena sine lege” or “there
is no penalty without law.”145 By this reasoning, a layperson may act immorally
or destructively—without fear of judicial interference—unless and until a

143 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 25, at 641 (“The typical situation that gives rise to a defense
of duress or necessity involves an actor of no special legal sophistication caught in circumstances
of emergency, high pressure, and emotion. The likelihood that the actor is aware of the defense
or able to act on such awareness is in these circumstances at its lowest.”); see also Anne M.
Coughlin, Of Decision Rules and Conduct Rules, or Doing the Police in Different Voices, in CRIMINAL
LAW CONVERSATIONS 15, 16 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds.,
2011) (“What does the lawbreaker have to whine about? The fact that she thought she was going
to be punished, but lo and behold, duress provides an escape hatch? That would be goofy, to say
the very least.”); cf. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1439 (1995)
(“[Affirmative] defenses are legislated only in bare outline.”). Acoustic separation could create
other problems, however. Anne Coughlin observed that victims of crime are entitled to know
when a criminal justice system might excuse offenders, particularly with respect to crimes that
traditionally have been under-enforced, like sexual assault. Coughlin, supra, at 16 (“The women
interpret this conduct rule to mean . . . [no] non-consensual sex . . . . [Thus, when women are]
told, nope, sorry, that was not rape, . . . [it] may produce uncertainty, insecurity, a loss of
autonomy, and a loss of faith in the rule of law.”).
144 Still, a lack of acoustic separation is a concern, as it pertains to the police. Without
acoustic separation, officers may more readily manipulate exceptions to conduct rules to inflict
rough punishment. Fan, supra note 72, at 1418 (noting that “[police] are sensitive to shifts in the
law—even subtle and less publicized decision rule shifts that limit remedies for constitutional
violations—and can adjust behavior accordingly”); Steiker, supra note 72, at 2471 (“The law
enforcement community’s easy access to decision rules should create concerns that sophisticated
law enforcement agents will see some incentives to violate conduct rules when no court-imposed
sanction will follow.”); cf. Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1242 n.82 (explaining that “rules [may]
facilitate gaming behavior”); supra note 73 and accompanying text. See generally Bibas, supra note
116 (distinguishing between professional criminal-justice “insiders” and lay “outsiders”).
Although manipulation is not my focus, I touch on the problem in places. See, e.g., infra notes
225–31 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 186-89 (1937) (describing
development of the principle).
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statutory rule proscribes her conduct.146 And an officer may likewise behave
badly without fear of judicial interference—unless and until a Fourth
Amendment rule proscribes his conduct.147
There is a snag, however. The legality principle’s bedrock proposition—
that a rule follower is free to go about his business—disregards the way in
which the business of the rule-following layperson is categorically different
from the business of the rule-following cop. The layperson plans a lawabiding life. In contrast, the officer plans law-abiding intrusions into the lives
of laypeople. Their plans intersect, and when they intersect, the officer’s
piecemeal exception may become the layperson’s piecemeal burden. But, of
course, the premise and promise of the legality principle is that a layperson’s
burdens—her conduct rules—are not meant to be piecemeal. Her burdens are
supposed to always remain precise.148
The result is a doctrinal asymmetry that I call the sword/shield distinction.
An officer may be granted a qualitative excuse—a particularistic shield—once
he has failed to follow Fourth Amendment conduct rules. But the layperson
has no particularistic sword with which to challenge the legally authorized,
yet morally problematic, intrusion. Extralegal arguments are only available to
forgive police conduct that otherwise would have been legally arbitrary. In
comparison, a legally authorized intrusion just is constitutional, even if it is
obviously arbitrary for extralegal reasons. Put differently, the officer may
invoke a normative conception of reasonableness to ground his excuse, but
the individual may invoke no normative conception of unreasonableness to
ground her constitutional claim. The consequent asymmetry puts the
individual in a pinch. She cannot adequately learn the law in practice where
the law is a product of police practices (and a court’s understanding of those
practices).149 Nor may she ask a court for meaningful understanding of her
own predicament.150 In the process, her conduct rules are defined not only by
a penal code’s precise rules, but also by the flexible and fuzzy exceptions that
benefit law enforcement at her expense.

146
147
148

See infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (discussing the conduct requirement).
Cf. infra notes 100–11 (discussing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)).
See supra notes 5, 26, 47, 50-53, 113 and accompanying text (discussing the legality principle’s
purpose as a buffer against arbitrary coercion).
149 Cf. State v. Pomianek, 110 A.3d 841, 843-46 (N.J. 2015) (holding unconstitutionally vague a
purported mens rea provision that “impose[d] criminal liability based solely on the victim’s perception
of the underlying crime, regardless of the defendant’s intent”) (emphasis added). In essence, the
Pomianek Court held that a defendant could not be required to read a victim’s abstract mind. Id.
150 See infra notes 159–64, 179, 181–220, 240–53 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine and
hypotheticals).
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE POLICE
In this Part, I examine the doctrines that exemplify the Supreme Court’s
asymmetric methodology of understanding. Specifically, I analyze and interpret
the opinions by which the Court has accommodated the officer’s reasonable
perspective—his mistakes, his needs, his fears—even as it has demanded that the
individual make her constitutional pitch according to rules or not at all.
A. Mistake
Consider, for a moment, the Fourth Amendment doctrine of consent.
With voluntary consent, the officer may search without a warrant or probable
cause (or, for that matter, individualized suspicion of any kind).151 Again, his
search just is reasonable—categorically. In this way, the doctrine of actual
consent is not piecemeal; it describes a bright-line exception that reshapes
the officer’s baseline conduct rules in a relatively precise fashion. Thereafter,
his modified conduct rules may be summarized to read: “an officer needs (i)
a warrant and probable cause as to a valid offense, or, alternatively, he needs
(ii) actual voluntary consent.”
But the consent inquiry does not always end there. Even if an officer has
failed to secure actual consent, he still may rely upon so-called apparent
consent—a piecemeal exception to the officer’s (already tempered) baseline
conduct rules. As the Court observed in Illinois v. Rodriguez: “[W]hat is
generally demanded of . . . agents of the government . . . is not that they
always be correct, but that they always be reasonable . . . . [S]ufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness.”152 In Rodriguez,
the Court credited the officers’ reasonable (albeit erroneous) perspective that
a home’s occupant had authority to consent to a search. The Court thereby
reached two steps beyond the conventional legalistic framework—from the
purported requirements of warrant and probable cause, to a categorical
alternative of actual consent, to a piecemeal exception of apparent consent.153
At that degree of remove, the constitutionality of the police intrusion no
longer relied principally upon facts about the world, but on an
epistemological inquiry into whether the officers’ mistake was an

151 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (involving a consent search of
a car after the vehicle was pulled over for a broken headlight and license plate light).
152 See 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 188 (1990) (emphasis added) (indicating that the relevant inquiry
was whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief ” that his actions were lawful (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
153 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1139 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (indicating
that, pursuant to prevailing consent doctrine, “[i]nstead of adhering to the warrant requirement . . .
police . . . may dodge it”).
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“understandable and . . . reasonable response to the situation.”154 And this question
turned on the officer’s reasonable beliefs—his good reasons for his failure to
follow the law. The complication is that, by making the law a product of police
perspective, the Court “significantly expand[ed]” police power, as Justice
Sotomayor observed in a related dissent.155 If the resident had wished to keep
the state at bay, he had to do more than identify and assert his rights; he also
had to block unauthorized others from his front door, thereby preventing
them from undermining his legal position by looking enough like authorized
occupants to reasonable cops.
To get to this point, the Rodriguez Court endorsed a mode of
particularistic evaluation that it had rejected in more legalistic decisions, like
Whren v. United States.156 The Whren Court held that the constitutionality of
an arrest was “not in doubt” as long as it was supported by probable cause.157
In doing so, the Court declined to adopt the defendant’s alternative
qualitative test: “[whether] a reasonable officer in the same circumstances
would not have made the stop for the reasons given.”158 The Court determined
that any constitutional test oriented around a reasonable officer’s perspective
would be unpredictable and thereby incompatible with the legality principle.
It would compel judges “to plumb the collective consciousness of law
enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable officer’ would have
been moved to act.”159
But, of course, this is the very same test of constitutional reasonableness
that the Rodriguez Court endorsed. Notably, Rodriguez was a decision
authored by the very same Supreme Court Justice, Antonin Scalia. Then, why
did Justice Scalia conclude that an evaluation of reasonable perspective
constituted an exercise in “virtual subjectivity” in one context but not in the

154 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added); see also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,
803-04 (1971) (asking whether an officer’s mistake “was understandable” given “the situation
facing him at the time.”).
155 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Giving
officers license to effect seizures so long as they can attach to their reasonable view of the facts some
reasonable legal interpretation (or misinterpretation) . . . significantly expands [police] authority.”);
Logan, supra note 72, at 93 (noting that when courts credit such mistakes, “[t]he public is not freed
from the grip of state control but rather is subjected to it”); infra notes 166–78, 272, 281, 286, 299–
300, and accompanying text.
156 See 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (“[T]he officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners
had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”);
see also Colb, supra note 74, at 1654 (describing Whren as turning on “the formal legal status . . . of [the
driver’s] specific conduct under the traffic laws”); supra Part II (discussing legalistic decisions).
157 Whren, 517 U.S. at 817.
158 Id. at 814; cf. Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1044-48 (endorsing and defending
this alternative Fourth Amendment test).
159 Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
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other?160 The dominant conception of legality provides the basis for the
difference. Whereas Whren established a baseline conduct rule (that an arrest
requires probable cause), Rodriguez provided for a piecemeal exception (that
a search may be excused by reasonable mistake). By now, the underlying
rationale ought to be apparent: positive legality allows courts to adopt a
particularistic methodology only as to exceptions.161 This is the sword/shield
distinction in a nutshell. In Rodriguez, the officers possessed a viable equitable
shield of reasonable perspective after their understandable mistakes led them
to deviate from their bright-line conduct rules. But, in Whren, the defendant
had no equitable sword with which to challenge a pretextual (but rule-bound)
traffic stop. The rule-bound stop was constitutionally reasonable categorically
(even in the face of a persuasive argument that the particular exercise of
pretext was unreasonable in the folk sense of the word).162
*

*

*

There is nothing new to the Court’s willingness to accommodate some
police errors. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment has long tolerated reasonable
mistakes of fact—for instance, mistakes about the facts that support a finding
of probable cause.163 But, recently, the Court excused even an officer’s
reasonable misinterpretation of code law. In Heien v. North Carolina, a police
sergeant observed a “very stiff and nervous” driver, whom he proceeded to
tail and ultimately stop for operating a vehicle with a broken taillight.164 But,

160
161

Id.
Supra Section III.B and accompanying text; cf. Logan, supra note 72, at 74 (describing
mistake doctrine as a form of “[j]udicial forgiveness” (emphasis added)).
162 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001)); see also Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1010-13 (examining the normative
implications of Atwater in greater detail).
163 See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971) (“The upshot was that the officers in good
faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, . . . [but] the
arrest [was] a reasonable response.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“Officers can
have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . .”).
An obvious response to my critique of a decision like Saucier is that I am making a mountain of a
molehill. Probable cause is, by its very nature, a probabilistic and sometimes inaccurate measure. As
Holmes observed: “[I]f the law is to punish at all, it must . . . go on probabilities.” OLIVER WENDEL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 72 (1881); see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the imprecision of probable cause). Thus, when we say that there is probable cause, we
actually mean only that an adjudicator—a magistrate or judge—has declared it so. The question
remains epistemic, and the final arbiter necessarily brings her own perspective to bear. Nevertheless,
we may recognize the inevitable role of uncertainty in criminal justice without accepting uncritically
all efforts to stack probabilities upon probabilities. We should acknowledge that we compound
endemic uncertainties when we allow an officer to make reasonable mistakes about what a final
arbiter will decide.
164 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
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in fact, the sergeant had the traffic law wrong. North Carolina motorists
permissibly may drive a car with just one working taillight. Nevertheless, the
Court held the stop (and a subsequent consent search) constitutional because
it deemed the sergeant’s mistake reasonable.165
Notice the manner by which the Heien decision intersects with Whren v.
United States.166 After Heien, an officer may engage in pretextual stops premised
on no law. This was what so troubled Justice Sotomayor in her Heien dissent:
“[W]e assumed in Whren that when an officer acts on pretext, at least that
pretext would be the violation of an actual law.”167 But, for the majority, it did
not matter that the sergeant’s conduct fell “outside the scope of the law.”168 The
determinative criteria were police perspective and practice.169 Understanding
trumped legality, notwithstanding the traditional rule that individuals are
presumed to know the law and are strictly liable for their errors.170
It is a bit ironic, to say the least, that the Court would excuse the legal
mistakes of a trained official (a sergeant, no less).171 Still, I am unconvinced
that the Court was wholly misguided. To the contrary, I subscribe to the
premise that an excuse of mistake of law should be available to anyone (even
the sergeant, here), particularly as to mala prohibita public-order offenses.172
But we cannot ignore the implications for the dominant conception of the
legality principle, which is grounded on the idea that the criminal law must
remain immutable and impervious to perspective or any other particularistic
influence.173 It is on those formalistic terms that the Heien decision fails, not
on my own comparatively functional terms. The entrenched view, articulated
165
166
167
168
169

Id.
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 536.
See id. (explaining that allowing reasonable mistakes of both law and fact gives officers “fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection”).
170 See, e.g., State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 137, 138 (1926) (refusing to recognize a defense of mistake
of law notwithstanding the existence of lower-court precedent supporting the erroneous reading).
171 See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“One is left to wonder . . . why an
innocent citizen should be made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the law may be
susceptible to an interpretive question.”).
172 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 133, 152 (1997) (endorsing a negligence standard for reasonable mistakes of law); see also
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 207 (“Not surprisingly, it is precisely in the context of modern
regulatory offenses that plausible claims of ignorance of the law most commonly arise. In such cases,
the policy of ignorantia legis must be explained as something other than an attempt to describe
reality.”). And it appears the sergeant’s mistake was reasonable. As the Heien Court observed, the
statute in question was “genuinely ambiguous” and posed “a quite difficult question of
interpretation,” such that one court could read the “statute’s conflicting signals in one way” while
another court “could easily take the officer’s view.” Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541-42.
173 As Justice Sotomayor remarked in dissent: “‘[T]he notion that the law is definite and
knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal system.” Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543.
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by Jerome Hall more than half a century ago, was to keep mistake from
bending or upending law:
[A] doctrine [of mistake of law] would contradict the essential requisites of a
legal system, the implications of the principle of legality. To permit an
individual to plead successfully that he had a different . . . interpretation of
the law would contradict the . . . postulates of a legal order . . . [T]he
consequence would be: Whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the
law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though the law were thus and so,
i.e., the law actually is thus and so.174

The Heien Court endorsed an alternative conception of law as a
manifestation of belief and practice. Naturally, an officer is bound to have a
better grasp over this body of “practice law,” since it is his beliefs that matter.175
To divine the operative law’s shape, the officer may rely upon his own
perspective and norms as a lens to draw blurry lines into sharper focus. This
amounts to a procedural form of notice.176 The officer might not know
precisely which types of mistakes are reasonable enough, but he knows
enough to realize that he enjoys the benefit of the doubt. Comparatively, the
individual can no longer bank on even positive legality’s foundational
guarantee, which Justice Scalia once described as “an admirable belief that the
law is the law.”177 The individual is left to pay two prices for the officer’s errors:
the quality of her rights diminishes, as the clarity of her obligations gets
obscured. And she suffers these twin penalties pursuant to a dictum that reads
as almost arbitrary—“ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse, unless you have a
badge (and wear it well enough).”

174 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 380-83 (2d ed. 1960); see also
Logan, supra note 72, at 91-92, 95 (“When courts forgive mistaken police constructions of laws, a
problem akin to that attending judicial approval of vague laws arises; a ‘potent message’ is broadcast
to law enforcement that ‘the limits of official coercion are not fixed; the suggestion box is always
open.’” (quoting Jeffries, supra note 11, at 223)).
175 See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1154-55 (2013)
(describing “practice law,” as defined by legal officials’ norms, perspectives, and actions).
176 See infra notes 330–34 and accompanying text (discussing concept of procedural notice).
177 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 480 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he only ‘fair warning’ discussed in our precedents . . . is fair warning of what the law
is. That warning . . . safeguards [defendants] against changes in the law after the fact.”); cf. Heien, 135 S.
Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he meaning of the law is not probabilistic in the same way
that factual determinations are. Rather, ‘the notion that the law is definite and knowable’ sits at the
foundation of our legal system.”) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
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B. Fear
Just as the Supreme Court has forgiven reasonable police mistakes, so too
it has sought to understand the distinct and very real fears of the cop on the
beat. Indeed, we may fairly describe much of Fourth Amendment exigency
doctrine as a judicial effort to prioritize officer safety over a strict application
of the usual conduct rules. And, here again, the Court has evaluated allthings-considered claims of exigent circumstances “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer.”178
Consider the Court’s recent decision in Ryburn v. Huff.179 Officers went to
the home of a juvenile who allegedly had threatened to “shoot up” his school.
The officers repeatedly banged on the front door until the boy’s mother
emerged. When an officer demanded to know whether there were guns inside,
the mother retreated into the home. The officer would later claim that this
“extremely unusual” behavior “scared” him—that he “didn’t know what was
in that house” and had “seen too many officers killed.”180 But, of course, the
mother had no legal obligation to cooperate, as even the Court
acknowledged.181 Thus, the officers’ extralegal fears ran up against the mother’s
attempt to exercise her legal rights. And her legal rights came up short. Again,
asymmetric understanding trumped legality, because, as the Court put it,
even “lawful conduct may portend imminent violence.”182
It does not follow that the Court got it wrong. A blind fidelity to Fourth
Amendment conduct rules might have left the officers in an untenably tight
178 See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (evaluating constitutionality of warrantless
entry, premised on exigency of officer safety, based upon “the perspective of a reasonable [police]
officer”); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (“The Constitution is no more violated
when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the
person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they
enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a
violent felon who is about to escape.”); cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013)
(“[E]xigency . . . must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”).
179 132 S. Ct. at 987 (2012).
180 Id. at 988-89.
181 See id. at 990 (observing that the mother had “merely asserted her right to end her
conversation with the officers and returned to her home”).
182 Id. at 991; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment does
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger
their lives or the lives of others.” (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99
(1967))). Admittedly, Ryburn was a qualified immunity case and not a case squarely about
constitutional reasonableness. “The Court’s analysis strongly suggests, however, that the Justices
believed the officers’ conduct was lawful.” RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 2014 SUPPLEMENT 91-92 (2014); see also Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 990 (“No
decision of this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even roughly comparable
to those present in this case.”); id. (“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to enter a residence
if the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence.”
(citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006))).
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spot. More generally, a rule-bound approach would prove insufficient to
“cover all exigencies, especially . . . in situations of emergency or extreme
peril.”183 In the real world, exceptions must be carved out. The difficulty,
however, is that there is no such thing as a singular real world. To the contrary,
the officer and the individual interact at the intersection of their “two separate
worlds,” defined by their separate “lived experiences.”184 The individual
cannot be expected to know and understand the officer’s world any more than
the officer can be expected to know and understand the individual’s world. It
follows that the individual should not be obligated to anticipate what
reasonably might pique the officer’s fears—particularly when those fears are
evaluated always from the officer’s perspective. Indeed, the very premise of
the dominant conception of the legality principle is that, in order to plan a
law-abiding life, an individual should be required to anticipate only her own
law as it applies to her own world—her own rights and obligations, designated
by her own precisely drawn conduct rules. In Ryburn, however, the Court used
a methodology of asymmetric understanding to unintentionally destabilize
that premise. The mother could not assert her rights without compromising
them. Nor could she accurately comprehend her obligations. As her
information costs rose, she was made to bear the burden of the officers’ fears.
She too was put in a tight spot. But she had no opportunity to articulate her
predicament—to ask for her worldview to count also in the balance of reasons.
On the same score, consider Kentucky v. King, a case in which the Supreme
Court held that police officers purposefully could create exigent
circumstances by loudly announcing their presence at the door of a home to
see how occupants might react.185 Here, as in Ryburn, the Court framed the
qualitative question asymmetrically only—simply, whether the officer
reasonably believed exigent circumstances existed to excuse entry at the
moment of entry, independent of the actions taken by the officer to produce
the belief or circumstances in the first instance.186 For his part, the defendant
had two other qualitative questions in mind—two alternative constitutional
tests—neither of which the Court was willing to entertain. Pursuant to the
first alternative test, the Court would have asked whether the officers
“engage[d] in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry
was imminent and inevitable.”187 With this test, the Court would have
transitioned to a methodology of understanding oriented around the
183 See Sarat & Clarke, supra note 91, at 408 (explaining that, under such circumstances, a legal
official may come to act “both inside and outside the law”).
184 Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105
J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 297 (2016).
185 563 U.S. 452, 468 (2011).
186 Id. at 465-66.
187 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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reasonable perspective of the occupants, not the police officers. But, tellingly,
the Court dismissed this test as too “nebulous and impractical,”188 just as it
had rejected the defendant’s proposed test in Whren as an exercise in “virtual
subjectivity.”189 Again, we discover that the dominant conception of the
legality principle permits evaluation of only the perspectives of the intended
subjects of a conduct rule (and only in circumstances in which those
perspectives might operate to excuse rule violations—here, the officers’ failure
to secure a warrant before entering the home).190 Only some perspectives
matter some of the time, and the layperson’s perspective is not one.
Pursuant to the defendant’s second alternative test, the King Court would
have asked whether the officers had behaved in a manner wholly “contrary to
standard or good law enforcement practices (or to the policies or practices of
their jurisdictions).”191 In other words, the defendant wanted the Court to
consider the officers’ potentially bad reasons—here, the normatively dubious
practice of manufacturing exigent circumstances. But this test was rejected
on like logic—namely, that a conduct rule should not be piecemeal, pursuant
to the dominant conception of the legality principle. By the King Court’s
reasoning, an evaluation of unreasonable reasons would subject officers to an
imprecise constitutional obligation and thereby “fails to provide clear
guidance for law enforcement officers.”192 Ultimately, then, it did not matter
what motivated the officers to bang loudly. It also did not matter whether
they wished only to circumvent their conduct rules by engineering exigent
circumstances.193 It did not even matter that other reasonable officers might
not have banged so loudly or at all.194 Post-King, the incentives are troubling
but also eminently clear. It is cheap and easy for officers to shout forcefully
and take things from there—to shake the tree and see what falls. They are
free to take advantage of the investigative tactic known as “knock and talk”
(or, more accurately, “bang and yell”) to circumvent legality’s costlier conduct

188
189
190

Id. at 469.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
See King, 563 U.S. at 459 (“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law . . . that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable . . . . But we have also
recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” (internal citations omitted)); see also supra
Section III.B (describing the relationship between the dominant conception of legality and
particularistic methodologies).
191 King, 563 U.S. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 Id.
193 See supra note 145, infra notes 217–19, and accompanying text (discussing the manner by
which criminal justice professionals may manipulate conduct rules and exceptions).
194 Indeed, the officers admitted frankly that they “banged on the door as loud as [they] could,”
shouting “[p]olice, police, police.” King, 563 U.S. at 471.
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rules and exact a bit of rough justice.195 And, in response, a home’s inhabitants
cannot be heard to complain.
By now, the complication ought to be apparent. Individuals cannot
predictably or credibly decipher or rely upon legality’s purported conduct
rules and corresponding rights against intrusion. Consider the King Court’s
admonishment: “Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional
rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves
to blame for the warrantless exigent circumstances search that may ensue.”196
But, in fact, these occupants were not obviously “attempt[ing] to destroy
evidence.”197 To the contrary, they were quite possibly trying to exercise their
rights. The officers testified only that “[i]t sounded as [though] things were
being moved inside the apartment,” and that they “could hear people inside
moving.”198 These sounds reasonably might have signaled exigent
circumstances, but the sounds also might have signaled a lawful course of
action. Significantly, home occupants enjoy constitutional rights “to prepare
. . . for the entry of the police,” which is why officers are typically required to
announce their presence.199 And it is hard to imagine how these occupants
might have composed themselves without moving their bodies and personal
belongings.200 Simply put, the officers might have been wrong. The occupants
might have been asserting rights—assertions that served only to trigger and
excuse a quicker and more forceful intrusion. In any event, we know already
that the King officers were wrong in at least one meaningful respect. The
officers were pursuing a particular suspect, but he was not there.201 Likewise,
in Ryburn, the officers believed that there were guns in the home, but none
were found.202 Thus, we discover that there is the potential for overlap
between doctrines of understanding—here, fear and mistake.
The result of overlapping doctrines of asymmetric understanding is to
further undermine the clarity of the individual’s obligations and the quality
of her rights. In the face of ambiguity, civilians may be left to act at their own
peril—a frightening prospect made readily apparent to the residents of
majority–minority high-crime communities. Eventually, these residents may
even come to conclude, somewhat hopelessly, that there is no practical
alternative but to teach children to tread lightly, as Justice Sotomayor noted:
195
196
197
198
199
200

See infra notes 279–96 and accompanying text (describing arrest as a form of rough punishment).
King, 563 U.S. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
See id. (“[T]he knock-and-announce rule protects those elements of privacy and dignity
that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance. It gives . . . the opportunity to collect oneself before
answering the door . . . to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
201 King, 563 U.S. at 455-57.
202 Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 471-72 (2012).
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For generations, black and brown parents have given their children “the
talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands
where they can be seen; do not even think about talking back to a stranger—
all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.203

And Ta-Nehisi Coates echoed the sentiment in a warning to his own son:
“One must be without error out here. Walk in single file. Work quietly. Pack
an extra number 2 pencil.”204
No proponent of the rule of law should prize “the talk.” Its substance is
not the autonomous life, but a compelled form of cowering survival. More to
the point, it reveals the universality of fear. In his harrowing and provocative
memoir, Coates described a childhood in Baltimore “blindfolded by fear”—
fear of the criminals (who were, in turn, “dangerously afraid”) and fear of the
officers authorized to turn their own fears and misunderstandings into
“destruction”:
It does not matter if the destruction is the result of an unfortunate
overreaction. It does not matter if it originates in a misunderstanding . . . .
Sell cigarettes without the proper authority and your body can be destroyed.
Resent the people trying to entrap your body and it can be destroyed.”205

Ultimately, there is plenty of fear to go around. The police officer has no
monopoly on the sentiment. And, in dangerous situations, any party may be
prone to mistake. But only the officer may rely upon his emotions and errors
to claim an ex post excuse.206 This, then, is what Coates meant when he
concluded that “our errors always cost us more.”207

203 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., TALIB
KWELI, The Proud, on QUALITY (Rawkus Records 2002) (“[W]hat the fuck do I tell my son?/I want
him livin’ right, livin’ good, respect the rules . . . . /How do I break the news that when he gets some
size/He’ll be perceived as a threat or see the fear in they eyes/It’s in they job description to terminate
the threat/So forty-one shots to the body is what he can expect.”).
204 COATES, supra note 21, at 95 (emphasis added); see also id. at 82 (describing members of
high-crime communities “who are made to fear not just the criminals among them but the police
who lord over them.”).
205 Id. at 9 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14 (“When I was your age the only people I knew
were black, and all of them were powerfully, adamantly, dangerously afraid . . . . I think back on
those boys now and all I see is fear.”); id. at 126 (“[M]y eyes were made in Baltimore . . . . [M]y eyes
were blindfolded by fear.”); id. at 75-76 (describing the “terror” he felt during a traffic stop); id. at
16 (“Everyone had lost a child, somehow, to the streets, to jail, to drugs, to guns”). See generally
ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF
THE INNER CITY (1999).
206 See COATES, supra note 21, at 71 (“[T]he policeman who cracks you with a nightstick will
quickly find his excuse in your furtive movements.”).
207 See id. at 95–96 (“Make no mistakes . . . . the story of a black body’s destruction must
always begin with his or her error, real or imagined.”).
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Before we leave fear and mistake, consider a hypothetical based partially
on a pair of recent decisions. Imagine an upstanding and competent officer
who reasonably believes in the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. As
it turns out, the officer has failed on two separate scores to satisfy his conduct
rules. First, the warrant is stale. Second, the statute supporting the warrant
is invalid. But, in the midst of a fast-paced street encounter “fraught with
danger,” he reasonably neglects to do everything he might have done to
double check and discover his errors.208 Still, he may rely upon his reasonable
fears and mistakes—factual and legal—to excuse his otherwise unlawful
seizure.209 Now, imagine a disreputable and incompetent officer—a bully and
a brute—who knows nothing of a valid, outstanding arrest warrant (for, say,
a “small [but genuine] traffic” offense).210 This bad actor may want only to
subject the motorist to “an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority.”211
Nevertheless, he may rely upon the existence of the valid arrest warrant (of
which he was unaware) to authorize his seizure post hoc—to figuratively and
literally paper over his otherwise unlawful conduct.212
Our hypothetical officers enjoy two very real constitutional hooks based
on two distinct constitutional methodologies—first, a methodology of
understanding to excuse good-but-flawed police work; and, second, a
methodology of legality to authorize bad-and-flawed police work that just so
happened to be made legal by the coincidence of the valid warrant.213
Consistent with the dominant conception of the legality principle, both
officers retain “clear and crisp instructions,” instructing them on how they
208 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (describing when street stops are permitted
because of “justifiable suspicion . . . that criminal activity is afoot”).
209 The Court has made clear that, pursuant to the good faith mistake doctrine, the
exclusionary rule does not apply to reasonable errors about the existence of warrants. See, e.g.,
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136-37 (2009).
210 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
211 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (“While [the] decision to initiate the stop was mistaken, his
conduct thereafter was lawful.”). The Strieff Court held that the existence of a valid warrant was
sufficient to attenuate the unconstitutional stop from the arrest and search of the person.
Accordingly, the exclusionary rule did not apply to the seizure of evidence. See id. at 2060, 2063
(acknowledging that even “the prosecutor conceded that [the officer] lacked reasonable suspicion,”
but describing the stop as “an isolated instance of negligence”).
213 See id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The mere existence of a warrant not only gives
an officer legal cause to arrest and search a person, it also forgives an officer who, with no knowledge
of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that person on a whim or hunch.”). Consider also Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). There, the officers likewise papered over an unconstitutional search.
Id. at 535-36. They broke into a warehouse without a warrant or any applicable warrant exception.
Id. Finding drugs, they exited immediately and sought a warrant, alleging only facts known to them
before the illegal entry. Id. The Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Id. at 541-44.
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lawfully might proceed.214 But, if either officer slips up, he may turn to
alternative justifications or excuses—here, the justification of the preexisting
warrant or the excuses of reasonable fear and mistake.215 The officer’s surprises
are all pleasant surprises. He may not be able to predict the particulars of the
given surprise, but still he may learn to expect one—like a kid waiting for
Christmas.216 At a minimum, he will come to recognize that judges will strive
to understand him. Likewise, he will know that there are millions of open
warrants nationwide, authorizing the arrests of the majority of residents of
certain heavily policed communities, such as Ferguson, Missouri.217 The
consequent opportunities for rough punishment are “staggering.”218
The officer may indulge his fears, whereas the layperson remains
paralyzed by hers. She may do all she can to learn (and live by) her conduct
rules. All the same, she may be made to suffer at the officer’s whim.219
C. Need
A police officer is not simply a law enforcer. He is a peacekeeper and a
community caretaker—a manager of crowds, a mediator of disputes, and a
first responder to the sick and injured.220 In recognition that these so-called
214 Frederick Schauer, Response & Rejoinder: The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 170
(2013); see also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2197 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“[L]aw enforcement officers . . . depend on predictable rules to do their
job.”); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 314 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing officers’
interest in “‘fair notice’ that they are acting unconstitutionally”) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S.
730, 739 (2002)); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (describing the system’s “essential
interest in readily administrable rules”).
215 Cf. infra notes 398–403 and accompanying text (distinguishing justifications and excuses as
they relate to officers’ conduct rules).
216 See supra notes 144, 193, and accompanying text (discussing lack of “acoustic separation” and
consequent opportunities for police officers to manipulate known conduct rules and exceptions
therefrom); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 10 ( “Every [petty misdemeanor] arrest [i]s like opening
a box of Cracker Jack. What kind of toy am I going to get? Got a gun? Got a knife? Got a warrant?
. . . It [i]s exhilarating for the cops.” (quoting William Bratton, NYPD police commissioner)).
217 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing studies and statistics and noting
that “in the town of Ferguson, Missouri—with a population of 21,000—16,000 people had
outstanding warrants against them.”).
218 See id. at 2073 (discussing implications of “staggering” numbers of open arrest warrants for
trivial offenses and unpaid fines).
219 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (“[T]his ordinance says
that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer
of that city. The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It ‘does not
provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-tomoment opinions of a policeman on his beat.’”); supra notes 41, 111 and accompanying text
(discussing vagueness doctrine and untrammelled police discretion).
220 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1005. As Justice Thomas once observed:
“Police officers are not, and have never been, simply enforcers of the criminal law. They wear other
hats—importantly, they have long been vested with the responsibility for preserving the public
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“special needs” cases transcend “the normal need for law enforcement,” the
Court has developed an alternative “free form” jurisprudence, called “general
reasonableness.”221 As Egon Bittner explained: “The procedures employed in
keeping the peace are not determined by legal mandates but are, instead,
responses to certain demand conditions.”222 In other words, peacekeeping and
community caretaking constitute forms of exigency where the pressing
circumstances are, at least plausibly, unrelated to law-enforcement objectives.223
But the Court has drawn no crisp line between law enforcement and
purported special need.224 Consider Brigham City v. Stuart.225 With neither
probable cause nor a warrant, officers entered a home to break up a boisterous
party. They did more than just keep the peace, however. They made arrests.
They parlayed one source of Fourth Amendment power into another type of
Fourth Amendment intrusion. And, just as officers may use one offense as
pretext for another,226 so too they may use “special needs” as pretexts to
investigate: “It . . . does not matter here—even if their subjective motivations
could be so neatly unraveled—whether the officers entered the kitchen to
arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured
peace.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 106 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes,
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.”).
221 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & County of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535, 536-37, 539 (1967); see also
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is only when a governmental
purpose aside from crime-solving is at stake that [the Court may] engage in the free-form
reasonableness inquiry . . . .”); Colb, supra note 74, at 1656 (“[R]easonableness balancing doctrine
ordinarily operates as a mechanism that permits searches and seizures when the government lacks
individualized probable cause.”). See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 74. Notably, such an
unstructured approach may be consistent with historical practice. See Jessica K. Lowe, A Separate
Peace? The Politics of Localized Law in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 788, 793
(2011) (discussing, but not endorsing, the historical perspective that “keeping the peace [at common
law] . . . was not about applying a particular set of rules”).
222 Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOCIO. REV. 699,
714 (1967); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (“[I]n dealing with the rapidly unfolding and
often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess.”).
223 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-37 (“Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation . . .
there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.”); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 619 (1989) (applying a Fourth Amendment balancing test); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
448 (1973) (applying general unreasonableness standard to an administrative search); Seidman,
Points of Intersection, supra note 48, at 158 (indicating that legal tests “are no longer fixed” when “the
government’s interests do not relate to law enforcement”).
224 See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U.
CHI. LEG. F. 261, 302 (“Law enforcement and community caretaking goals are often entangled.”);
see also Bittner, supra note 48, at 714 (“[P]atrolmen do not act alternatively as one or the other . . . .
[P]eace keeping occasionally acquires the external aspects of law enforcement.”).
225 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
226 See supra Part II (discussing overcriminalization and pretextual stops and arrests).
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and prevent further violence.”227 The only relevant inquiry was whether
reasonable officers could have believed that a special need existed within the
home, not whether these particular officers subjectively believed it (or ever
aimed to address it).
Thus, an officer may come to the aid of an injured person when his genuine
intention is only to enforce criminal law.228 Or he may make an arrest when his
genuine intention is only to keep order.229 Either way, the state may subsequently
argue in the alternative. It may pivot to whichever conception of reasonableness
is most permissive under the circumstances, because an intrusion considered
reasonable for one purpose is considered reasonable for all purposes.230
Moreover, when it comes to maintaining order, we may expect an officer’s
peacekeeping and law-enforcement purposes to correspond with fair
frequency. The goals of peacekeeping and misdemeanor law enforcement are
substantially the same—quality of life and social control.231 Indeed, this
overlap might explain why historical courts held fast for so long to common
law offenses concerning “the public health of the nation.”232 Generations after
most other crimes had come to be defined by statute, public-order common
law offenses continued to be recognized as flexible means to promote the
perceived common good.233 Ultimately, the dominant conception of the

227
228

Stuart, 547 U.S. at 405.
Cf. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22 (1984) (noting that police were entitled to
“seiz[e] evidence under the plain-view doctrine while they were in petitioner’s house to offer her
assistance”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“[T]he police may seize any evidence that
is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.”).
229 See Bittner, supra note 48, at 710 (“[P]atrolmen encounter certain matters they attend to by
means of coercive action, . . . called ‘preventative arrests.’”); id. (“[P]atrolmen . . . use [the law] as a
resource to solve certain pressing practical problems in keeping the peace.”).
230 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1008 (“[T]he Court—by refusing to consider
an officer’s subjective reasons for action—has failed to draw a line between peacekeeping and law
enforcement objectives when an officer’s motives are mixed. That is, police officers may exploit their
peacekeeping authority to build criminal cases . . .”).
231 See Natapoff, supra note 112, at 1087-88 (“At its best, order maintenance policing aims to do
what zoning, nuisance law, and other urban development policies do: improve the livability, safety,
and economic value of shared urban spaces. Those are laudable goals, but they are not centrally about
evidence and culpability.”); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors,
66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614 (2014) (concluding that the modern criminal justice system has taken on
a role “largely organized around the supervision and regulation of the population . . .”).
232 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR
BOOKS, book 4 at 439 (George Sharswood ed., 1866); see, e.g., Shaw v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [1962] AC 220 (Eng.); Rex v. Manley, [1932] 29 AC 574, 575 (KB) (Eng.) (recognizing
the validity of the common law crime of “effect[ing] a public mischief ”).
233 See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277, 281 (Pa. 1812) (“The malicious ingenuity of
mankind is constantly producing new inventions in the art of disturbing their neighbours. To this
invention must be opposed general principles [and common law crimes], calculated to meet and
punish them.”); see also Shaw, [1962] AC at 267 (claiming that it is the duty of courts to “guard . . .
against attacks which may be the more insidious because they are novel and unprepared for”).
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legality principle won out, and the criminal justice system transitioned to
precisely drawn public-order statutes.234 But peacekeeping endures as a
“residual power to enforce . . . safety and order”—a stopgap that officers may
manipulate to fight crime.235
Look no further than the Terry stop-and-frisk. In its initial iteration, the
practice was intended to serve peacekeeping needs only—particularly, the need
for officer and public safety.236 But officers are well aware that stop-and-frisks
also may turn up evidence of crime, which makes the practice quite useful in
settings where conventional Fourth Amendment conduct rules would prohibit
searches. Unsurprisingly, then, the stop-and-frisk has evolved (or devolved)
over time from a peacekeeping measure to a law-enforcement expedient.237
Nevertheless, peacekeeping still provides the operative test—a fluid evaluation
of “common sense and ordinary human experience” over the “rigid criteria” of
warrants and probable cause.238 But whose “common sense” matters? Whose
“ordinary human experience”? Only the “inferences” of the reasonable
officer.239 The individual is left with no comparable opportunity to tell her own
story arising out of her own lived experiences.240 In this way, flexibility goes
only so far. The “rich . . . diversity” of street encounters does not account for
the rich diversity of reasonable perspectives regarding these encounters.241
Consider, for instance, the pedestrian who flees at an officer’s approach.
He cannot be heard to explain that he ran because he too had seen “too many
. . . killed,” that he too was scared.242 To the contrary, in Illinois v. Wardlow, the
Supreme Court used the very fact of a suspect’s “headlong” flight as a reason
to excuse a subsequent stop and frisk. The Court accepted uncritically the

234
235
236

Supra Section I.A and notes 73-76.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 232, at 439.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968) (observing that general “crime prevention and
detention” are not appropriate bases for a stop-and-frisk); see also Seidman, supra note 48, at 154 (“[T]he
commentators have missed a significant aspect of Terry that has not expanded at all: For almost thirty
years, the Court has steadfastly refused to permit Terry frisks designed to uncover evidence of crime.
Instead, the frisk is permissible only to protect the officer from the threat of violence.”)
237 See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race,
and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1277-79 (1998);
cf. supra notes 73, 109, 145 and accompanying text (discussing police manipulation of known conduct
rules and exceptions therefrom).
238 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
239 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (observing that reasonableness should be
evaluated according to the reasonable officer’s “inferences about human behavior”).
240 See supra notes 157–163, infra notes 243–52, and accompanying text.
241 Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (describing street encounters as “incredibly rich in diversity”); see also
infra notes 355–59 and accompanying text (discussing studies of “cultural cognition”).
242 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Ryburn).
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state’s narrative that flight is “the consummate act” of culpable “evasion.”243
And it wholly disregarded what else pedestrians might try to evade. There are,
in fact, many “innocent and understandable” reasons why a person might “quit
the vicinity with all speed,” as the Wardlow dissent made plain.244 Look no
further than the recent shootings of civilians by police and of police by
civilians.245 Street encounters are dangerous. Once engaged, a pedestrian
might understandably perceive that her safest course of action is to run.246
More to the point, pedestrians have every right to flee—that is, unless
and until officers have satisfied their conduct rules.247 In Wardlow, the suspect
ran after officers approached on a blind hunch (but perhaps not a colorblind
hunch).248 And the dominant conception of the legality principle promises
that the pedestrian should be allowed to leave in the face of inchoate
suspicion.249 Here, however, the exercise of that right did not function as a
directive to the officers to stand down. To the contrary, the pedestrian’s right
of flight was self-defeating.250 It provoked pursuit and empowered seizure.
The lesson is not lost on either officers or pedestrians: it is cheap, easy, and
effective for police to approach a hot spot with sirens blaring—to create fear,

243 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate
act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”).
But cf. id. at 129, n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting the Biblical proverb that “the wicked
flee when no man pursueth”).
244 Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“[A] reasonable person may conclude that an
officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity . . . [and] a substantial element
of danger—either from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and the police.”).
245 See infra notes 342, 386–87, 423 and accompanying text (describing tragic deaths of civilians
and police officers).
246 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Among . . . minorities and those
residing in high crime areas, there is also the . . . belie[f] that contact with the police can itself
be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For
such a person, unprovoked flight is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’”); see also supra notes 202–11
and accompanying text (describing encounters “fraught with danger” (quoting Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323 (1999))).
247 Supra Section I.B, notes 147-149, and accompanying text.
248 The majority in Wardlow failed to consider the frequency or danger of racially motivated
stops. Cf. 528 U.S. at 132 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Among some citizens, particularly
minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person
is entirely innocent, but . . . believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous.”); supra
notes 156-162 and accompanying text (describing pretextual traffic stop of a group of young AfricanAmerican men in Whren v. United States).
249 See supra Part I (defining the relationship between legality, personal autonomy, and state
authority); see also Jeremy Waldron, How the Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 206
(2012) (describing as lawless a system that would leave “people . . . waiting for coercive intervention
from the state”).
250 Cf. supra notes 178–90 and accompanying text (discussing Ryburn v. Huff and Kentucky v. King).
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see who runs, give chase, and capture.251 And pedestrians face an unenviable
choice: stay or go at peril.
This is not to say that it is inappropriate to allow police officers to undertake
reasonable peacekeeping measures. But there are countervailing moral
questions. Most obviously, there is the question of whether it was
constitutionally reasonable in the first instance to make a criminal case out of a
search or seizure that was constitutionally reasonable for peacekeeping reasons
only. That question is never asked and answered. An individual has no chance
to argue that the law enforcer and peacekeeper are not similarly situated—that,
under certain circumstances, deference to the peacekeeper ought not extend to
the law enforcer (whether or not he is one and the same person wearing two
different hats).252 Comparatively, officers are empowered by overlapping
jurisprudential approaches: a law-enforcement approach, designed deliberately
and deliberatively and crafted with precision; and a peacekeeping approach,
cobbled together post hoc to meet extralegal needs. Officers may repurpose,
without explanation, these multiple strands of constitutional power.253 They
may slide readily between peacekeeping and law-enforcement roles to pursue
prerogatives antithetical to the purpose of the legality principle.
V. UNDERSTANDING PROCEDURAL LEGALITY
On the afternoon of July 10, 2015, Officer Brian Encinia pulled over a
twenty-eight-year-old woman, Sandra Bland, for failure to signal a lane
change, which she initiated after Encinia’s squad car approached close behind
her vehicle. A dashboard video camera captured the infraction and much of
what happened next.254 It appears that Encinia was going to let Bland off with
a warning. But then he asked a question. And, from there, the situation
deteriorated rapidly. The written word cannot capture the parties’ tones nor
the mood of the exchange. Nevertheless, I pick up from the pivotal moment,
with emphasis added to key passages:

251 Significantly, in California v. Hodari D., the Court held that a mere show of authority—no
matter how forceful—is not a seizure. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). Fourth Amendment scrutiny is not
triggered until officers apply physical force or compel the suspect to submit to the show of authority. Id.
252 See infra note 312 and accompanying text (proposing a “special exclusionary rule” that might
exclude evidence or bar charges that were products of a peacekeeping search or seizure).
253 See supra Part II (examining the constitutional irrelevance of subjective motivation and the
corresponding ability of officers to manipulate their conduct rules and exceptions).
254 A recording of the dashcam footage is publicly available. See TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, Sandra Bland Traffic Stop, YOUTUBE (July 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=CaW09Ymr2BA [https://perma.cc/4QSQ-LU5F]. The entire written transcript is also
available. See Ryan Grim, The Transcript of Sandra Bland’s Arrest Is as Revealing as the Video HUFFINGTON
POST (July 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sandra-bland-arrest-transcript_us
_55b03a88e4b0a9b94853b1f1 [https://perma.cc/496M-Q44H] [hereinafter Bland Transcript].
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Encinia:

Okay, ma’am. (Pause.) You okay?

Bland:

I’m waiting on you. This is your job. I’m waiting on you.
When’re you going to let me go?

Encinia:

I don’t know. You seem very really irritated.

Bland:

I am. I really am. I feel like it’s crap what I’m getting a ticket
for. I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up,
tailing me, so I move over and you stop me. So, yeah, I am a
little irritated, but that doesn’t stop you from giving me a
ticket, so [inaudible] ticket.

Encinia:

Are you done?

Bland:

You asked me what was wrong, now I told you.

Encinia:

Okay.

Bland:

So now I’m done, yeah.

Encinia:

You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If you don’t mind?

Bland:

I’m in my car, why do I have to put out my cigarette?

Encinia:

Well you can step on out now.

Bland:

I don’t have to step out of my car.

Encinia:

Step out of the car.

Bland:

Why am I . . .

Encinia:

Step out of the car!

Bland:

No, you don’t have the right. No, you don’t have the right.

Encinia:

Step out of the car.

Bland:

You do not have the right. You do not have the right to do this.

Encinia:

I do have the right, now step out or I will remove you.

Bland:

I refuse to talk to you other than to identify myself. [crosstalk] I am
getting removed for a failure to signal?

Encinia:

Step out or I will remove you. I’m giving you a lawful order. Get
out of the car now or I’m going to remove you.

Bland:

And I’m calling my lawyer.

Encinia:

I’m going to yank you out of here. (Reaches inside the car.)

Bland:

OK, you’re going to yank me out of my car? OK, alright.
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Encinia:

(Calling in backup): 2547.

Bland:

Let’s do this.

Encinia:

Yeah, we’re going to. (Grabs for Bland.)

Bland:

Don’t touch me!

Encinia:

Get out of the car!

Bland:

Don’t touch me. Don’t touch me! I’m not under arrest - You don’t
have the right to take me out of the car.

Encinia:

You are under arrest!

Bland:

I’m under arrest? For what? For what? For what?

Encinia

(To Dispatch.) 2547 county FM 1098 [inaudible] send me another
unit. (To Bland) Get out of the car! Get out of the car now!

Bland:

Why am I being apprehended? You’re trying to give me a ticket
for failure . . .

Encinia:

I said get out of the car!

Bland:

Why am I being apprehended? You just opened my -

Encinia:

I’m giving you a lawful order. I’m going to drag you out of here.

Bland:

So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car?

Encinia:

Get out of the car!

Bland:

And then you’re going to [crosstalk] me?

Encinia:

I will light you up! Get out! Now! (Draws stun gun and points it
at Bland.)

Bland:

Wow. Wow. (Exiting car.)

Encinia:

Get out. Now. Get out of the car!

Bland:

For a failure to signal? You’re doing all of this for a failure to
signal?

Encinia:

Get over there.

Bland:

Right. Yeah, let’s take this to court, let’s do this.
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All it took was two minutes for things to fall apart. The confrontation
continued thereafter with Encinia struggling off-screen to cuff Bland. At one
point, a brief physical altercation can be heard, after which Bland cried out:
“You just slammed me, knocked my head into the ground. I got epilepsy, you
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motherfucker!” Encinia replied: “Good. Good.”255 Subsequently, prosecutors
charged Bland with assaulting a public servant. A court held her on $5000 bail.
Three days later, she was dead—an apparent jailhouse suicide by asphyxiation.
A. Legality, Understanding & Rough Justice
What do we know? We know that Officer Encinia was not a good cop. He
may not have been quite a bully, but he displayed a stunning lack of
professionalism.256 And, ultimately, he was fired for his bad behavior.257 The
problem was not only that Encinia failed to control his anger and irritation,
but also that he used his emotions as reasons for action. He had no moral or
prudential basis to arrest Bland or even to order her out of the vehicle. At
several turns, he escalated.258 Even his initial question could be read as a
provocation, asking whether she was “okay” in an obviously less-thanconcerned tone. There was no need to pressure her to extinguish her cigarette.
There was no need to threaten to “yank her out.” There was no need for verbal
abuse. And there was no need—at least initially—for physical contact.259 One
might respond that there was also no need for Bland to lash out—that she
mocked him, just as he mocked her. But only one of them was a professional.
More to the point, only one of them had the law at his back.
And Encinia did have the law at his back. Encinia was right on the
constitutional law, and Bland was wrong.260 As we know, in the course of a
valid traffic stop, officers enjoy categorical authority (a blanket exception
from the conventional conduct rules) to order motorists and passengers out
of vehicles.261 And we know also that his subjective motivation was irrelevant
to the analysis.262 Thus, he could indulge his annoyance by removing her for
255
256

Bland Transcript, supra note 254.
According to Seth Stoughton, a former police officer and current law professor, Encinia
was more interested in “demanding that [Bland] recognize his dominance” than he was in good
policing. Seth Stoughton, Cop Expert: Why Sandra Bland’s Arrest Was Legal but not Good Policing,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 24, 2015), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/sandra-bland-videolegal-but-not-good-policing [https://perma.cc/E5P4-M5E9].
257 Tina Burnside & Joshua Berlinger, Trooper Who Arrested Sandra Bland Formally Fired, CNN
(Mar. 3, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/us/sandra-bland-officer/fired/index.html [https://perma.cc/
LZ6N-UAGD]; see also infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text (discussing promise of political
and institutional checks on inequitable policing and arbitrary exercises of official coercion).
258 See Stoughton, supra note 256 (“[Encinia’s] words send a powerful signal: ‘What you said
does not matter.’”).
259 See infra notes 337–48 and accompanying text (discussing excessive force doctrine).
260 See Stoughton, supra note 256 (“Encinia had the authority to order Bland to exit her
vehicle.”).
261 Supra note 132 and accompanying text.
262 Supra note 86 accompanying text. We know also that Encina was entitled to lay hands on
Bland and use some physical force—at least, once Bland refused Encinia’s lawful order to leave the
vehicle. See infra notes 337–48 and accompanying text (discussing excessive force doctrine). We cannot
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her disobedience. Indeed, he taunted her with this very reality: “You were
getting a warning . . . now you’re going to jail.”263 And, although
constitutionally, he had no need to explain himself, he could not help but
reveal his real reasons to dispatch:
She gave me her driver’s license. I came back to the car . . . to complete [the
stop] and tell her what’s she receiving and what to do and so forth. At that
time, she’s still very much irritated and so forth . . . . She wouldn’t even look
at me. She’s looking straight ahead, just mad.264

There’s the rub. Bland’s real offense, in Encinia’s estimation, was disrespect.
And Encinia was entitled constitutionally not only to pull her from her car for
that manufactured offense, but also to arrest her. Indeed, pursuant to Atwater v.
Lago Vista, he could have arrested her from the outset based solely upon the traffic
infraction—that is, even before she refused his lawful (but awful) orders.265
Bland’s problem was formal guilt—the fact that she actually had
committed the traffic offense. Her mistake was to think that her rights
reached beyond legal guilt—to silly stops and inequitable intrusions. She
knew that she had the legal right to smoke a cigarette in her own car. She
knew that she had the legal right to express simmering annoyance at a trivial
traffic stop. And she knew even that she had the legal right to annoy a traffic
cop. Her error was to suppose that these legal rights were meaningful under
the immediate circumstances. In this way, she bought into the empty promise
of the dominant conception of the legality principle. She thought that the
formal rules would protect her from official acts of intimidation and
harassment, normatively defined. She believed that the criminal justice
system would not tolerate illiberal commands. And she paid the price for her
confusion.266 She was surprised—unfairly surprised—to discover that Encinia
know precisely how a court might have decided the question of excessive force with respect to whatever
transpired between Encinia and Bland off-screen. But that is beyond the scope of this Article.
263 Bland Transcript, supra note 254.
264 Id.
265 See 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001); supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (discussing Atwater).
266 Notably, Encinia may come to pay a legal price, too. But, here, the exception may prove
the rule. Encinia was arrested and charged with perjury, because a grand jury “did not believe [his]
statement that he removed Bland from the car . . . so he could conduct a safer traffic investigation.”
Burnside & Berlinger, supra note 257. Legally, Encinia would have been better served acknowledging
his subjective reason—that he removed Bland merely for her disobedience. Even if that reason is
unpopular, it is not unconstitutional, pursuant to prevailing doctrine. See supra Sections II.A-B
(describing doctrinal proposition that subjective motivation is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment
analyses). Ironically, then, Encinia now faces the rough justice of a pretextual prosecution. The
prosecuted crime is perjury, but the extralegal offense is bad policing, as determined by a grand jury.
Cf. Stoughton, supra note 256 (commenting on Bland’s arrest and concluding that “even though it
was lawful, it was not good policing”). See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 140, at 330
(observing that grand juries may reach decisions based on equitable considerations).
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could impose upon her a whole new set of conduct rules, entirely of his own
design: Extinguish your cigarette or else. Don’t talk back or else. Get out of the car
or else.267
The temptation is to respond that, in due course, individuals like Sandra
Bland may learn the shape of police authority. With experience comes
knowledge—knowledge of the breadth of an officer’s real conduct rules in
application. But, if that form of notice were to be deemed sufficient, then
legality’s premise would ring hollow indeed.268 Little would remain of even
the bedrock liberal proscription against status crimes.269 When everyday
activities—like walking and driving—call down official exercises of coercion,
then the minimally social existence is proscribed at the officer’s will. In such
circumstances, the informed individual is no better off than the dumbfounded.
He lives as either a hermit or at peril. Anytime the officer does “not like the
cut of his jib,” he may be subjected to intrusion—a state of affairs that Justice
Douglas once described as “a long step down the totalitarian path.”270
And asymmetric understanding has made worse the prevailing
pathologies of pretext and overcriminalization. Imagine that Officer Encinia
had the law or facts wrong—that he had misconstrued a lawful lane change
for an illegal one. The arrest would still be constitutional as long as his error
was reasonable.271 Worse still, if Bland—like millions of Americans—had an
outstanding “small traffic” warrant for a previously unpaid (or unpayable)
fine, her arrest would be constitutional whether Encinia’s mistake was
reasonable or not.272
267 Supra notes 254–60. On this score, consider the observation of hip-hop impresario and
entrepreneur, Jay-Z (who was once Shawn Carter, a young man of limited means, coming of age in
the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn):

And I heard: “Son do you know why I’m stoppin’ you for?”/ Cause I’m young, and I’m black,
and my hat’s real low?/ Do I look like a mind reader, sir? I don’t know./ Am I under arrest,
or should I guess some more?/ “Well you was doin’ fifty-five in a fifty-four.”

JAY Z, 99 Problems, on THE BLACK ALBUM (Roc-A-Fella Records 2004).
268 Cf. Betancourt v. Bloomberg, 448 F.3d 547, 559 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting)
(noting that there is nothing “comforting” about a court interpreting the meaning of a statute based
on the way it is used).
269 PACKER, supra note 6, at 74 (“It is important, especially in a society that likes to describe
itself as ‘free’ and ‘open,’ that a government should be empowered to coerce people only for what
they do and not for what they are.”); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)
(holding status crimes unconstitutional).
270 Terry, 392 U.S. at 38-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
271 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation when an otherwise illegal stop was effectuated because of a reasonable mistake of law);
supra note 155 and accompanying text.
272 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Outstanding
warrants are surprisingly common . . . . The States and Federal Government maintain databases with
over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses.”);
see also supra notes 34, 112, 204, infra notes 424–30, and accompanying text (discussing Strieff).
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By way of final example, consider the traffic stop of John Felton, an
African-American motorist, pulled over outside his mother’s home in Dayton,
Ohio. Felton used his cellphone to record the stop and demanded to know the
officer’s reasons for stopping him. At first, the officer provided only the legal
explanation—that Felton had failed to signal his turn early enough: “I am
acknowledging that you did signal . . . you just didn’t do it one hundred feet
prior to your turn.”273 In other words, Felton had almost complied with the
law—but not quite. The triviality of this legalistic (but obviously pretextual)
reason was not lost on Felton, who surmised the truth: “You just needed a
[legalistic] reason to pull me over, sir.”274 While the officer checked the licenses
of Felton and his passenger, Felton expressed his frustration to his camera:
He needed a reason to pull me over . . . . He followed me for almost two
miles. And then when I get to my mom’s house, he want to put on his lights.
I’m keeping this shit recording. He ain’t about to Sandra Bland me . . . . I didn’t
do shit . . . . He just needed a reason.275

The statement is telling. Felton is the informed individual. He knew what
happened to Sandra Bland. He knew the broad scope of the officer’s authority.
He knew that the officer might act for extralegal reasons. He knew that the
law would not adequately protect him from the officer. And he knew that his
cellphone camera was a better bet than a constitutional claim.276 He knew the
state of play, but he could do nothing with his information. He could only
guess at the officer’s real reasons.
Courageously, he tried one final time: “Sir, you trailed me for how long? . . .
I’m not doing nothing . . . . [W]hy were you trailing me?” And, somewhat
astonishingly, the officer came clean: “Because you made direct eye contact with
me and held onto it when I was passing you.” The officer revealed his ready-made
conduct rule—Don’t look at me or else. Don’t make me wonder about you or else.277
*

*

*

273 John Felton Stopped for Eye Contact, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2015) https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UeJBAo-M5Eg [https://perma.cc/YKS6-2RGN] (emphasis added).
274 According to Felton: “This is so childish.” Id.
275 Id. (emphasis added).
276 See infra notes 396–97 and accompanying text (discussing the promise of political and
institutional checks).
277 Cf. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that pretextual stops
are especially “degrading”).
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It may be tempting to downplay the traffic stop or even the arrest—to
claim, for instance, that John Felton suffered only “inconvenience,” not the
kind of coercion that ought to implicate heightened concerns about precision
and notice.278 Indeed, the dominant conception of the legality principle is
built around a formal distinction between law-enforcement intrusions and
criminal punishments. On this reading, only criminal punishments are
serious enough to merit the full complement of constitutional protections
typically associated with the legality principle. Punishment is thought to be
a product of criminal conviction only—not of searches, seizures, or even more
serious intrusions, like full-custodial arrests or preventative detention.279
Indeed, the Supreme Court relied on this formal distinction to distinguish its
holding in Heien v. North Carolina from the conventional rule that mistakes
of law are impermissible: “[J]ust because [police] mistakes of law cannot
justify . . . the imposition or the avoidance of criminal liability, it does not
follow that they cannot justify an investigatory stop.”280
But moral philosophers have long endorsed a more functional definition
of punishment. The prevailing philosophic conception is that punishment is a
brand of coercion that entails hard treatment and stigma.281 And arrests would
seem readily to satisfy this description, as even certain Supreme Court Justices
have acknowledged. Justice Powell, for instance, called arrests “a serious
personal intrusion.”282 Likewise, Justice Stevens emphasized the potential
stigmatic consequences when he referenced the “odium of . . . arrest.”283 Even
a majority of the Court once labeled the arrest “a public act that may seriously
interfere with the defendant’s liberty . . . disrupt his employment, drain his
financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and
create anxiety in him, his family, and his friends.”284 We may extend these
278 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam) (“[A] mere
inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.”).
279 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that pretrial detention is
regulation, not punishment); see also Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventative State, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 777 (1998) (“Courts and commentators often tend to conclude, too quickly,
that if some policy or practice is not ‘really’ punishment, then there is nothing wrong with it.”).
280 See 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (explaining that the government still “cannot impose criminal
liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law”).
281 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 75, 89, 98 (1970) (“Both the ‘hard treatment’ aspect
of punishment and its reprobative function must be part of the definition of legal punishment.”).
282 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
283 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting
Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 449, 511 (1896)).
284 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); see also Logan, Florence v. Board, supra
note 100, at 413 (“[W]hen it comes to minor offense arrestees, the taxing, delay-ridden and confusing
adjudicatory process itself is punitive, very often dwarfing the personal consequences of de jure
punishment levied by the state.”); cf. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826-44
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observations likewise to street stops, which Justice Sotomayor dubbed
“invasive, frightening, and humiliating encounters”285 that “have severe
consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name.”286
Sotomayor understood that we must consider also what civilians think and
feel—that stops “risk treating members of our communities as second-class
citizens.”287 Social science has shown that pedestrians and motorists typically
experience police treatment as meaningfully harsh and stigmatizing—
perceptions that are shared by others in heavily policed communities.288 Even
police officers and prosecutors may come to view stops and low-level arrests
as forms of rough punishment (and often, punishment enough).289 Moreover,
(2015) (examining the collateral consequences of arrest); supra notes 33–40 (discussing collateral
consequences of stops and arrests).
285 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
286 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing
stops as “degrading” and “humiliations”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“When an officer commands passengers . . . to leave the vehicle and stand
by the side of the road in full view of the public, the seizure is serious, not trivial.”); id. at 419
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[C]itizens who cherish individual liberty and are offended, embarrassed,
and sometimes provoked by arbitrary official commands may well consider the burden [of being
ordered out of a vehicle] to be significant. In all events, the aggregation of thousands upon thousands
of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as substantial”); id. at 420
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To order passengers about during the course of a traffic stop . . . can hardly
be classified as a de minimis intrusion.”); see, e.g., infra notes 100–11, 255–73, 423–31 and accompanying
text (discussing cases and incidents).
287 Strieff, 135 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
288 See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-andFrisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 175 (2015) (“The fact that racial minorities
in cities disproportionately encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional contexts
fuels [their] perceptions of illegitimacy of the police.”); see also Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 98-99 (2007) (describing the “fallout of . . . highly localized police
enforcement”); Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 246 (examining popular perceptions of ordermaintenance policing); Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young
Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 85 (2007) (finding that
minority members of “distressed communities” harbor expectations of disrespectful treatment by
police officers); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing:
A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 266 (2010)
(“Respondents felt that their neighborhoods had been besieged by police”); ; infra notes 374–75, 423,
and accompanying text (discussing “procedural justice”); see also, e.g., BRAND NUBIAN, Probable
Cause, on FOUNDATION (Arista Records 1998) (“Couldn’t believe it when he took me in/Threw me
and my man up in the van, a seven-hour stand/ . . . Now Giuliani wanna talk about the ‘quality of
life’/Think he got the right to follow me at night/ . . . Up in central booking . . . people looking.”).
289 FEELEY, supra note 32, at 161 (“Traditional police practice encourages officers to administer
rough justice on the street in lieu of arrest, but modern police professionalism dictates that an arrest
should be made whenever there is any basis for doing so.”); see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at
351 (“[O]fficers will often . . . [search or seize] to harass or inconvenience suspects, or to ‘send a
message.’”); Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 7
(2000) (describing certain arrests as “ends unto themselves”); cf. PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE
HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 119–20, 155 (2008) (describing
how police use arrest, inter alia, “to assert authority” and impose rough justice). Elsewhere I examine
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because the Supreme Court has refused to constitutionalize either respectful
policing or subjective intent, bad officers may use even ordinary force as
means to degrade and terrify, with no moral explanation for inequitable
conduct.290 Worse still, there are much rougher forms of punishment that are
not only serious but also permanent. Of course, misdirected police violence
is typically unintended, but the consequences remain the same. One false
move (and a bit of bad luck) could describe the boundary between life and
death—a killing that might be excused, after the fact, as an erroneous but
understandable reaction to the officer’s reasonable perceptions of danger.291
And, even once the risk of violence subsides, the burdens of case processing
continue.292 In the face of these “process costs,” some petty crime defendants

the phenomenon of rough punishment in more detail. See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence,
supra note 1, at 1698-99 (discussing unintended implications of professional and legalistic policing);
BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32.
290 See Meares et al., supra note 184, at 123, 141 (“The constitutional criminal procedure as it is
written has no capacity to tell police how to arrest or stop someone in a way that will tend to support
procedural fairness . . . . Nothing about constitutional law prohibits a police officer from being rude,
and very little . . . promotes the kinds of dignity concerns that people tend to care about.”); see also
Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 989 (“[T]he Constitution provides no protection against
obdurate jerks and mean-spirited bullies.”); Stoughton, supra note 256 (“[T]here is no law that
requires officers to meaningfully engage with people.”); see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 121 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that civilians “may regard the police command as
nothing more than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority”); supra notes 99–109
(discussing Atwater v. Lago Vista).
291 See supra Part IV, infra notes 339, 388, 422–30, and accompanying text (discussing doctrines
of mistake, fear, and excessive force and describing potentially lethal consequences of civilian
missteps); see also COATES, supra note 21, at 9 (“Turn into a dark stairwell and your body can be
destroyed.”). In some cases, a civilian might make all the right moves and still be unsafe. See, e.g.,
Francisco Alvarado et al., North Miami Police Shoot Black Man Who Said His Hands Were Raised While
He Tried to Help Autistic Group-Home Resident, WASH. POST (July 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/21/fla-police-shoot-black-man-with-hishands-up-as-he-tries-to-help-autistic-patient/?utm_term=.95c16dd2e166 [https://perma.cc/FD55-S93K].
Coates put it simply: “Each time a police officer engages us, death, injury, maiming is possible.”
COATES, supra note 21, at 131. The list of dead bodies is long and growing. See, e.g., List of Killings by
Law Enforcement Officers in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_killings_
by_law_enforcement_officers_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/5N4U-D8MY] (collecting incidents
of individuals killed by police officers).
With respect to John Felton, it is frightening to imagine what might have happened to him had
he followed through on his misguided plan to resist his traffic stop: “I swear to God, if he need
anything, I’m getting out of the car, rolling my windows up and I walk into the house, telling him
he can call his backup and everything. But I’m sitting in my mom’s house, because I didn’t do shit.”
See Tommy Christopher, Black Man Pulled Over for “Eye Contact” Lucky to be Alive, MEDIATE.COM
(Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.mediaite.com/online/black-man-pulled-over-for-eye-contact-is-lucky-to-be-alive/
[https://perma.cc/9NSL-NZHA] (“[T]he risk of escalation would have increased dramatically had
he decided to exit his car and walk into his mother’s house.”).
292 Cf. FEELEY, supra note 32, at 293 (“In the lower courts a great many appearances are ritualistic
terminations of problems that for all practical purposes were resolved with the arrest itself.”); Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1132 (2008) (discussing process as punishment).
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have come to view criminal convictions as welcome exits from punishment—
opportunities to just “get it over with.”293
In any event, analogies to punishment should not be determinative. The
genuine purpose of the legality principle, appropriately expressed, is to
protect against any arbitrary state command, whatever form it might take—
whether, for instance, arbitrary treatment manifests as an unsubstantiated
final sentence or only as an initial barked order to freeze and put your hands
up.294 It is the job of judges to protect against the “fundamental unfairness”
of inequitable policing, just as it is their job to protect against the “inaccuracy”
of false criminal convictions.295
B. Understanding & Narrative
The risk of arbitrary treatment is endemic to any state that uses penal law
as a principal mechanism to maintain order. The criminal justice system
cannot excise the threat, but it is obliged to try. Many of the most problematic
cases I have examined entailed too-quick police decisions and actions, for
reasons that were unexplained, mistaken, or obviously inequitable. The
response of the left-liberal formalist might be to layer on ever-more precisely
defined conduct rules—for instance, rules categorically prohibiting pretext,
error, or even full-custodial arrest (at least as to some low-level offenses).296
But even if such bright-line reforms were feasible, they likely would prove
inadvisable. The temptation is just too great (and too often normatively
appropriate) to carve piecemeal exceptions. Life outstrips law.297 Inevitably,
an officer will “confront a situation in the field” as to which the facts and law
293 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 69-70 (1978) (“Contrary to what the
newcomer expects, defendants are often eager to plead guilty . . . . [T]hey contrast the relative ease
with which they can plead guilty with the costs in time and effort required to fight a case.”); Bowers,
supra note 292, at 1136 (describing “process pleas,” like pretrial detention, and discussing
circumstances where “conviction may counterintuitively inaugurate freedom”).
294 See supra note 98, infra notes 302–05, 422–30, and accompanying text (describing different
types of arbitrary state treatment in different contexts).
295 Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to
Professor Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 52, 53 (2011) (distinguishing between two Due Process
approaches—one informed by “fundamental fairness,” the other by “accuracy”—and describing the
criminal justice system’s preference for accuracy); see also infra notes 375–81 and accompanying text
(describing the legality principle as the judge’s domain).
296 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 72, at 95 (“[F]ealty to the rule of law compels
that police mistakes of law resulting in affirmative deprivations of liberty should not be tolerated.”);
supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (describing Anthony Amsterdam’s left-liberal formalist
approach to the Fourth Amendment).
297 See Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 98 (“[G]eneral ethical or legal rules are . . . useful as
outlines, but [are] no substitute for a resourceful confrontation with all the circumstances of the
case.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1691 (endorsing evaluative standards
over mechanistic rules); supra notes 139–41, infra notes 360–61, and accompanying text.
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are unclear.298 And it may well be appropriate to consider, when an officer is
called upon to act “on the fly,” how conditions might have appeared to the
average officer in the moment.299 In some extraordinary circumstances, even
pretext might provide a good enough reason for state action.300
But there are countervailing good reasons to invalidate certain morally
problematic exercises of official coercion—even exercises that otherwise
complied with prevailing conduct rules. Thus, Justice O’Connor would have
held unconstitutional the “pointless” arrest in Atwater v. Lago Vista,
notwithstanding the indisputable presence of probable cause as to the
applicable seatbelt offense.301 O’Connor urged the Court, instead, to
undertake a “realistic assessment of the interests” as a means to promote the
“principles that lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment.”302 And, in another
case, Justice Stevens saw a like need to balance an “officer’s interest” against
“the citizen’s interest in not being required to obey an arbitrary command.”303
O’Connor and Stevens both understood that bright-line rules are
incompetent to reach arbitrariness in its varied forms. As Stevens observed,
there are “millions” of street encounters that “are not fungible,” and attention
to these differences should compel us to evaluate each and every police
intrusion from each and every relevant “standpoint.”304 This is the lesson of
verstehen—that we may comprehend a complex phenomenon only by
“identify[ing] its meaning as this meaning is understood by the actors.”305
But how do we operationalize a bilateral approach to understanding? To
some degree, the effort is self-defeating. The very act of prescribing a legal
test undercuts a core objective of particularism, which is to abandon the
kinds of predesigned structures that exclude relevant considerations and

298 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (“To be reasonable is not to be
perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials,
giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection . . . . The limit is that
the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (“[T]he Court has also recognized the need to allow
some latitude for . . . mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of
making arrests and executing warrants.”).
299 Heien, 135 S. Ct at 539.
300 See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 359 (1956) (involving tax prosecution of
organized crime boss); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1442-45 (2009) (discussing pretextual arrest and prosecution of Al Capone for tax
evasion); supra note 266 (referencing pretextual perjury prosecution of Brian Encinia, the officer
who arrested Sandra Bland).
301 532 U.S. at 360 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
302 Id. at 362-63.
303 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121-23 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 121.
305 Guy Oakes, The Verstehen Thesis and the Foundations of Max Weber’s Methodology, 16 HIST. &
THEORY 11, 22 (1977); supra notes 20, 135, and accompanying text.
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preclude thoughtful deliberation.306 Perhaps the best we may hope for is the
common law method, which Jeremy Waldron described as a loose
framework for moving “from general evaluative ideas to more specific but
still evaluative ideas.”307 Building off Waldron’s endorsement, I have
championed a “two-ply” approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness that
would use the common law method to cultivate, organically, a reason-giving
requirement of the sort familiar to administrative law.308 As a means to get
beyond the conduct rules, judges would demand explanations of the real
reasons for action. For present purposes, I plan to sketch and defend two
specific iterations of this incremental approach—two rebuttable presumptions.
Judges could presume unreasonable any obviously pretextual search or seizure,
as well as any full-custodial arrest for a nonviolent misdemeanor or
noncriminal violation. These are modest and uncomplicated reforms. To
trigger bilateral understanding, an individual would first need to make a
threshold showing of obvious pretext or low-level arrest.309 And the great
virtue of a presumption is that it is just a presumption. The state could rebut
it by offering good enough reasons for police intrusions—reasons that might
be contradicted, in turn, by an individual’s countervailing moral claims.

306 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 274, 363 (1996) (arguing that overly mechanistic legal tests “disguise
contentious moral issues” and “drive those assessments underground,” producing arbitrary
decisionmaking); see also supra notes 139–41, 298, and accompanying text (discussing particularism
and the rules–standards debate).
307 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1024 (“[T]he crux of my prescription is not
a call for dyed-in-the-wool particularism but for trust in the common law method—a method that,
in its ‘elaboration of a standard,’ allows for a healthy degree of ‘movement from general evaluative
ideas to more specific but still evaluative ideas.’” (quoting Jeremy Waldron)); see also Ronald J. Allen
& Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1197-1200 (1998) (describing the Fourth Amendment as a
“grown” system of incremental development); cf. Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1222 (celebrating the
deliberative “virtues” of evaluative standards). On a common law approach to constitutional
interpretation, see generally David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015) and David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
308 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1030 (drawing analogies to administrative
law and defending a “two-ply” conception of reasonableness as comparatively “more law-bound”);
cf. Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 307, at 1197-1200 (describing certain Fourth Amendment doctrines
as “grown” orders, produced without central coordination, through “cautious, incremental change,
with a sensitive awareness of the need for close monitoring and adjustment . . . as the common law
demonstrates so well”).
309 Cf. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 514 (“The alternative to the [Atwater] Court’s brightline rule is . . . a standard: Officers should behave reasonably, considering all the circumstances . . . .
Arrests are presumptively reasonable when the crime is serious; not so when the crime isn’t. That
seems to be, roughly, what Justice O’Connor’s dissent argues for. Why, precisely, would that be
unadministrable? . . . [T]he Court seems to believe [that] police uniquely need clear rules to do their
jobs. Perhaps they do . . . . But perhaps they don’t . . . .”).
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Conceptually, we might describe these rebuttable presumptions as just
another set of conduct rules. Here, the rules would read—no pretext, no lowlevel arrest. But, because a rebuttable presumption is a soft rule that might
bend to persuasive enough reasons, the state would not be allowed to rest
exclusively on insincere legalistic justifications and asymmetric equitable
excuses. Instead, the giving of reasons would contribute to the judge’s
understanding of the complete story. The animating idea is that narrative
might come to constitute a loose type of legal standard—that stories might
“complement” legality’s conventional rule-bound baselines.310
The knottier question is remedy. One possibility is simply to suppress the
fruits of inexcusable pretext or arrest. As I suggested already, just because a
search or seizure is reasonable for one purpose, it does not follow that it
should be held reasonable for all purposes.311 Consider, for instance, the
officer who would use a peacekeeping search or seizure to build a criminal
case. A “special exclusionary rule” would allow the peacekeeper to meet his
reasonable “special needs” without also unreasonably exploiting the effort.312
Or consider the vice officer who would stop a speeder on a rough hunch that
she was transporting drugs. A “special exclusionary rule” would prevent him
from unreasonably using traffic law as pretext for narcotics crime.313 But,
significantly, suppression would not overdeter by leading good-but-skittish
officers to act too passively in the face of potential civil or criminal liability.314
As Bill Stuntz wrote of the conventional exclusionary rule: “[S]uppressing
evidence looks like a godsend. Suppression is restitutionary . . . deter[ring]
without overdeterring.”315 But, admittedly, suppression is imperfect. Most
notably, it would fail to remedy the worst normative abuses—the inequitable
misdeeds of bad officers who intend to impose only rough justice without
310 See Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1221 (“[R]ules without clear methods of application may
require standards as complements . . . .”); see also Kelman, supra note 83, at 212 (examining how a
standard may overlay and supplement a rule).
311 Notably, the Court once suggested a more nuanced approach with respect to seizures: “A
seizure reasonable . . . in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting.” Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973); see also supra notes 125, 225–42, and accompanying text.
312 See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches,
and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1557 (2009) (“Some
commentators . . . have argued for the application of a prophylactic exclusionary rule for evidence
found during community-caretaking searches, but have balked at discouraging the searches
themselves.”); supra Section V.C (discussing “special needs” doctrine).
313 Cf. supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (discussing Whren and pretextual stops).
314 Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y, 443, 446 (1997) (“Just as a government faced with large damages liability for running a
municipal pool . . . may simply close the pool, a government faced with large damages liability for
the police may simply reduce the police presence in areas likeliest to give rise to lawsuits.”).
315 Id.; see also id. at 445 (“The social costs of this overdeterrence are surely high: they can be
measured by murders and rapes and drug deals that would not have happened if their perpetrators had
been put away.”).
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building criminal cases.316 This, however, is nothing new. These tradeoffs are
familiar to prevailing Fourth Amendment doctrines of suppression and
qualified immunity.317 That is to say, the details of test and remedy may be
worked out incrementally.318
*

*

*

My more ambitious normative claim is to defend the proposition that
a particularized approach to constitutional reasonableness does not offend
the rule of law. Rather, by surfacing the kinds of contextual questions that
are often buried by conduct rules, narrative may promote a “richer
conception” of legality.319 In this vein, Jeremy Waldron has identified a
distinct rule-of-law “aspect”—a “procedural aspect” as compared to a
“substantive aspect.”320 The more conventional substantive aspect
“emphasizes rules” and determinacy, whereas the procedural emphasizes
“practices and modes of argumentation.”321 Waldron recognized the systemic
preference for the substantive aspect.322 But he argued that, without
procedure as supplement, we produce “an impoverished account of the Rule
of Law, which treats everything besides the determinacy of the rules as
though it did not matter.”323 On this reading, narrative is no extravagance to
be tolerated as long as it does not impede with the real work of the rule of
law; narrative is part and parcel of the real work.324 This, then, explains where
316 Cf. supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text (discussing Atwater v. Lago Vista, and
observing that police sometimes consider rough justice an end rather than a means to produce
criminal prosecutions and convictions); see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 351 (“[O]fficers will
often care little about evidence to be used in formal adjudications; rather they will search in order
to seize . . . or to harass or inconvenience suspects, or to ‘send a message’ to gang members on the
street, or for some other reason having nothing to do with criminal prosecution.”).
317 See Stuntz, supra note 314, at 445-446 (discussing possibility that civil damages and criminal
punishment may overdeter appropriate policing). At a higher level of abstraction, all remedies are
imperfect. Tort damages do not heal physical injuries. Criminal convictions do not resuscitate the slain.
318 Notably, in other criminal procedure contexts, the Court has subscribed to similarly undertheorized remedies. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012) (“In implementing a remedy . . . the
trial court must weigh various factors; and the boundaries of proper discretion need not be defined here.”).
319 Waldron, supra note 25, at 58.
320 See id. at 5 (“[O]ur understanding of the Rule of Law should emphasize not only the value
of settled, determinate rules and the predictability that such rules make possible, but also the
importance of the procedural and argumentative aspects of legal practice.”).
321 Id. at 57.
322 Id. at 54, 57.
323 Id. at 61.
324 See id. at 59 (“I do not think that a conception of law or a conception of the Rule of Law
that sidelines the importance of argumentation can really do justice to the value we place on
governments to treat ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.”); see also id. at
55-56 (describing the adjudicatory practice of “offering both sides an opportunity to be heard” to be
one of the “elementary features of natural justice”).
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positive legality has spun off the rails. It has marginalized procedural
opportunities for storytelling. At best, it has treated these opportunities as
“optional extras,” not “integral parts.”325
Of course, concerns remain about predictability and notice. But these are
relative concerns. And the prevailing paradigm hardly qualifies as a recipe for
consistency and coherence across cases.326 To the contrary, positive legality
often promotes sovereign prerogative over effective limits.327 For this reason,
some scholars have suggested that a degree of equitable oversight might even
produce more predictable law enforcement, particularly when it comes to the
kinds of petty public-order cases for which moral and prudential considerations
predominate over determinations of legal guilt accuracy.328
And, notably, a richer procedural approach to the rule of law might carry
with it also a meaningful procedural form of notice.329 Admittedly, the
individual who is subjected to police coercion cannot recapture her foregone
opportunity to live a life free from state intrusion. Still, she might value the
knowledge that she has the capacity to explain her predicament and demand
an explanation in turn. Along these lines, Tom Tyler has stressed the
importance of systemic “voice” for perceptions of “procedural justice.”330 For
325 See id. at 60 (arguing that “point of view” and “argumentation” are “not optional extras;
they are integral parts of how law works and they are indispensable to the package of law’s respect
for human agency”); see also Waldron, supra note 249, at 212 (arguing that exclusive attention to “the
clarity and determinancy of rules . . . is to slice in half, to truncate, what law and legality rest upon”).
326 See BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32; see also Sections II.A-B. On the limits of the
legality principle, see Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1043 (discussing the manner by which
precisely drawn conduct rules create safe harbors for the unfettered exercise of official coercion);
Jonathan Simon, The Second Coming of Dignity (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
327 Supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
328 According to Bill Stuntz: “[G]iving other decisionmakers discretion promotes consistency,
not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.”
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 2039; see also Kahan & Nussbaum, infra note 360, at 375-76 (“It’s when the law
falsely denies its evaluative underpinnings that it is most likely to be incoherent and inconsistent.”);
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1676 (endorsing transparent exercises of
equitable discretion and adjudication); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical
and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lviii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (describing realist view that “[l]aw would actually be more predictable and just if
judges candidly articulated the theretofore submerged policy assumptions of their decisions”); M.
Glenn Abernathy, Police Discretion and Equal Protection, 14 S.C. L.Q. 472, 486 (1962) (explaining that
judicial constraints “would work more effectively if the facts of police discretion were recognized openly
rather than being hidden beneath the myth of a mandate of full enforcement”); infra notes 360–63 and
accompanying text (discussing the virtue of transparent moralizing).
329 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of procedural notice).
330 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts 44 CT. REV. 26, 30 (2007) (“People want to
have the opportunity to tell their side of the story in their own words before decisions are made about
how to handle the dispute or problem . . . . This desire for voice is found to be one of the reasons that
informal legal procedures such as mediation are very popular.”); see also David Luban, Lawyers as
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 819
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our purposes, the idea of “voice” entails an individual’s awareness not only
that her reasonable concerns are going to be considered, but also that her
reasonable perspective might be brought to bear to resolve any ambiguities of
law and fact. And, since the individual understands her own perspective
better than any other, she is likelier to anticipate how conduct rules may bend
when they must bend. In this way, procedural notice has the capacity to
promote substantive notice going forward. More to the point, since studies
show that ordinary people “‘know’ fairness” better than formal law, the
individual is likelier to discern the shape of constitutional doctrines that
accommodate folk notions of equitable treatment.331 As Martha Nussbaum
remarked: “[T]he equitable person is characterized by a sympathetic
understanding of ‘human things.’”332 From the individual’s standpoint,
then, bilateral understanding is more dependable and predictable than
police-friendly asymmetric understanding. It is even potentially more
dependable and predictable than precisely drawn conduct rules.333
In any event, even if there is some truth to the claim that “argument can
be unsettling,”334 there is surely a difference between “deliberately aiming to
treat like cases unalike, and . . . treating like cases differently . . . because we
. . . have differing opinions . . . of what constitutes right treatment.”335 In this
(explaining that when a procedural system “gag[s] a litigant and refuse[s] even to consider her version
of the case,” it is, “in effect, treating her story as if it did not exist, and treating her point of view as if
it were literally beneath contempt.”); supra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing “rough justice”).
331 See Meares et al., supra note 184, at 104, 121-23, 139 (“[T]he actual lawfulness of a police officer’s
. . . conduct . . . had at best a minor influence upon people’s evaluations of police lawfulness”).
332 Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 94.
333 See Nussbaum & Kahan, infra note 360, at 287 (observing that an Aristotelian conception
of equity requires “asking what a person of practical wisdom would do and feel in the situation,” not
by analyzing only what law commands). Bill Stuntz seemed to intuit this when he wrote: “[S]harp
legal lines between ‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ and everything else ought to be replaced with hazier
boundaries between decent police behavior and the indecent kind.” William J. Stuntz, Local Policing
After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2141 (2002).
334 See Waldron, supra note 25, at 8 (“[T]here are aspects of the procedural side of the Rule of
Law that are in some tension with the ideal of formal predictability.”).
335 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1242-43; see also Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 347 (2006) (“Treating like cases alike is a value, but not the only one. Equality
also requires treating unlike cases unlike . . . . Justice demands a balance of many competing values . . .
that should keep justice from being inexorable and rigid.”). Perhaps the best statement I have read of late
on the virtues of thoughtful moral deliberation over artificial consistency comes from Jacques Barzun:
[J]udgment does not mean outward consistency. The best judgment often looks inconsistent
. . . . [A] traveler was given hospitality by some remote peasants, who noticed with horror that
the man blew on his hand to keep them warm and again on his soup to make it cool. Being
great readers of Euclid and lovers of consistency, the peasants killed their guest, because his
inconsistency frightened them. The poor victim, as we know, had a perfectly sensible idea. Life
is not geometry. The living have to blow hot and cold, whether they like it or not.
Jacques Barzun, The Advantages of Inconsistency, GENTLE REREADER (Feb. 6, 2014),
https://gentlerereader.com/2014/02/ [https://perma.cc/6UTJ-K56E].
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vein, Seana Shiffrin has described the “virtues of fog”—that qualitative
standards may produce sites of “deliberation and conversation on the ground,
redounding to the moral health of both citizens and a democratic polity.”336
Comparatively, “rule by rote” is incompetent to resolve normatively contested
questions, including the question that concerns us most here—whether police
were “behaving reasonably.”337
*

*

*

If nothing else, a bilateral methodology of meaningful understanding
might temper a particularly pernicious aspect of prevailing Fourth
Amendment doctrine—namely, that judges currently must collapse or expand
temporal horizons of evaluation to accommodate only the officer’s
perspective. With respect to excessive force claims, the implications are
profound and disturbing. To see what I mean, we need to interpret what the
doctrine of excessive force actually is—another prospective piecemeal
exception from an officer’s conventional conduct rules. To wit, the
conventional rule dictates that an officer is obligated to take a suspect into
custody peacefully.338 Nevertheless, he may use physical force, as reasonable
under the circumstances.339 Doctrinally, then, an excessive force claim is
evaluated in the same manner as any other piecemeal Fourth Amendment
exception—“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”340
Again, the dominant conception of the legality principle accommodates the
perspective of only the conduct rule’s subject and only to excuse his conductrule violation. Positive legality thereby dictates that the officer’s story is the
336 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1214, 1240 (2010). Id. at 1214 (“[T]he traditional picture ignores the salutary
impact that superficial opacity may have on citizens’ moral deliberation and on robust democratic
engagement with the law.”).
337 See id. at 1217 (explaining that evaluative standards provoke discussion over whether parties
“are treating one another fairly, whether they are acting in good faith, whether they are taking due
care, whether they are behaving reasonably, and the like”); see also LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 8 (2001) (arguing that an open-textured constitutional standard that
“unsettles creates no permanent losers . . . [leaving] citizens with a forum and a vocabulary that they
can use to continue the argument”). On this score, Bill Stuntz once offered a counterintuitive
criminal justice reform: make penal statutes more vague to provide juries and judges with statutory
breathing room to moderate police and prosecutorial discretion and power. Stuntz, supra note 25, at
1974, 2038-39 (noting that “[t]he criminal law . . . is filled with bright lines” and arguing that
governments should “define criminal prohibitions more vaguely—so jurors can exercise judgment
instead of rubber-stamping prosecutors’ charging decisions”).
338 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
339 See id. (“Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make
an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”).
340 Id.
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only story that matters. And it follows that his relevant timeframe is the only
relevant timeframe.
By way of example, consider the horrific death of Tamir Rice, a twelveyear-old boy, shot by police while he played with a toy gun in a public park.
The officer who killed Rice exited a squad car mere feet from the child and
pulled the trigger within seconds.341 A seemingly significant question was why
the officer had decided to approach so closely and in such an exposed manner,
thereby exacerbating an already apparently dangerous situation. But,
consistent with dominant conception of legality, the prosecutor narrowed the
timeframe to exclude that question: “The Supreme Court instructs [me] to
judge an officer by what he or she knew at the moment.”342 The only moment
relevant to the officer’s excuse was the moment he came face-to-face with the
child. And the prosecutor concluded that it was reasonable, from the officer’s
perspective, to fire the gun at that moment.343 But, because the officer’s
perspective matters, the prosecutor also expanded the time frame to consider
what a reasonable officer might have known about years-old shootings of
officers in the area.344 Notice what the prosecutor selectively left out—not
only the officer’s dubious decision to invite danger, but also police reports
that had described the officer’s firearms skills as “dismal” and his
psychological profile as near “emotional meltdown.”345 These reports were no
part of the narrative, because they were no part of the officer’s excuse.
It is not necessarily my position that the officer should have been charged.
As indicated, I am agnostic as to whether a bilateral methodology ought to
extend to contexts where officers are sued civilly or charged criminally.346
Here, I draw upon excessive force doctrine only to illustrate the ways in which
341 See Daniel Marans, How a Prosecutor Managed to Blame a 12-Year-Old for Getting Killed by a Cop,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/tamir-rice-timothymcginty_us_
5681d451e4b014efe0d91562 [https://perma.cc/FH75-3RSX] (“We are instructed to ask what a reasonable
police officer, with the knowledge he had, would do in this particular situation.” (quoting prosecutor)).
342 Id. (emphasis added).
343 See id.; cf. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Instead
of dealing with the [officer’s entire course of action] . . . the majority dwells on the imminence of
the threat . . . . The majority recharacterizes [the officer’s] decision to shoot . . . as a split-second,
heat-of-the-moment choice, made when the suspect was ‘moments away.’”). According to Brandon
Garrett and Seth Stoughton, this insensitivity to the right timeframes has allowed the Court to treat
as irrelevant “imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless” police conduct that precedes the moment
of physical force. See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L.
REV. 211, 236, 299 (2017) (discussing San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015)).
344 See Marans, supra note 341 (noting that the prosecutor referenced shootings of officers that
occurred in 2006 and 1996); cf. Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.) (evaluating officer’s perception of probable cause based on his
experience doing drug interdiction and thus crediting officer’s “inferences ‘that might well elude an
untrained person,’” and refusing to treat purported drug sale as a “single, isolated transaction”).
345 Marans, supra note 341.
346 Supra notes 312–19 and accompanying text.
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an asymmetric narrative may affect timeframes and transform hard normative
claims into oversimplified police excuses.347 My position is only that a
genuine and complete story entails much more.348
C. Understanding & Craft
The question remains as to whether judges are up to the evaluative task
of comprehending complete stories. Lon Fuller once described a related form
of reflection, termed “productive thinking,” that demands the rejection of
“ready-made solutions” and “familiar props” in favor of “free, flexible, and
effective” evaluation.349 This is, of course, not the judge’s standard stock in
trade. She tends to gravitate to formal rules by training and by disposition.
Rules describe her conventional culture and craft.350 Except, not always. In
other Fourth Amendment contexts, judges have demonstrated that they are
competent to particularize. To date, they have only made serious efforts to
understand officers’ objectively good reasons.351 But, by the same approach,
judges may recognize and reject officers’ objectively bad reasons. They need
only the Supreme Court to extend jurisprudential invitations to do so.
I am somewhat more skeptical about whether judicial elites can access and
understand the perspectives of ordinary individuals. The Court’s record is
uninspiring. Already, there are two narrow Fourth Amendment doctrines
where judges do consider lay perspectives. Specifically, the Court has defined
a search based on whether the state has intruded upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.352 And it has defined a seizure based on
347 See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 594 (1981) (explaining that adjudicators make normative choices “between narrow and broad
time frames,” and the contestable “interpretive ‘choice’” may prove dispositive).
348 See Meares, supra note 288, at 165 (“Although the constitutional framework is based on a
one-off investigative incident, many of those who are stopped—the majority of them young men of
color—do not experience the stops as one-off incidents . . . . Fourth Amendment reasonableness
must account for this fact.”).
349 Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV. 35, 39 (1950); cf. COATES, supra note 21,
at 50 (criticizing the hollow exercise of “limiting the number of possible questions” and “privileging
immediate answers” over “courageous thinking”).
350 See Dennis Jacobs, The Secret Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2855, 2856-59 (2007) (“In
our courts, judges are lawyers . . . . The result is the incremental preference for the lawyered solution
. . . and the confidence and faith that these things produce the best results . . . . [J]udges have a bias
in favor of legalism and the legal profession . . . . It is a matter of like calling unto like.”); see also
People v. Warren, 81 N.W. 360, 363 (Mich. 1899) (“[P]rofessional persons are under a constant
temptation to make the law symmetrical by disregarding small things.”); Hamilton v. People, 29
Mich. 175, 190 (1874) (observing that legal professionals may reject common sense in favor of “rigid
forms and arbitrary classes”); State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 257, 269 (1855) (observing that
the legal professional “generalises, and reduces every thing to an artificial system, formed by study”).
351 See supra Part IV (discussing Supreme Court doctrine that accommodates professional
police perceptions but not lay individual perceptions).
352 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
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whether a reasonable individual would have felt free to terminate an
encounter with police.353 But, as Paul Robinson and I have examined
elsewhere, the Court has adopted somewhat curious conceptions of this
mythical reasonable person. The Court’s reasonable private person seems
exceptionally reclusive, and its reasonable autonomous person seems
exceptionally courageous.354
Still, there are reasons to believe that lower court judges might do better
than Supreme Court Justices. First, because these judges are closer to the
ground, they are likelier to intuit the perspectives of police officers and the
policed. Indeed, lower court judges might even have family and friends who
occupy one or both camps. Recall Justice Sotomayor’s observation: “I would
hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t
lived that life.”355 The comment was clumsy, but it powerfully illustrated how
cultural proximity generates appreciation. And, true to her words, Sotomayor
has come closest, in a series of recent dissents, to championing my preferred
methodology of bilateral understanding.356
Second, lower court judges are uniquely well suited to develop and grasp
the “protean variety of the street encounter” precisely because they may
compel other professionals to help them understand.357 They may ask the
353
354

See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 224-25 (discussing social science studies that
demonstrate that Court holdings often do not align with actual societal expectations of privacy).
Thus, the Court has sometimes extended a reasonable expectation of privacy only to information an
individual keeps secret from the whole world. See White, 401 U.S. at 752 (“[O]ne contemplating
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.”). Compare
Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 225 n.60 (citing a study showing lay disapproval with police
officers rummaging through trash), with California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding
no reasonable expectation of privacy in bagged trash). Likewise, the Court has sometimes imagined
a heroic ability of the individual to exercise rights to ignore police. Compare Bowers & Robinson,
supra note 1, at 226 (“[F]indings suggest that—notwithstanding the Court’s view to the contrary—
reasonable people rarely feel free to refuse police requests.”), and Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue
Encounters” - Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 272 (1991) (“[F]or most black men, the typical police confrontation is not a
consensual encounter. Black men simply do not trust police officers to respect their rights.”), with
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2002) (holding that reasonable bus passengers
should feel free to terminate drug interdiction).
355 Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html [https://perma.cc/FB5L-WPAU].
356 See supra notes 155, 167, 203, 343, infra notes 424–30, and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Sotomayor’s dissents in Mullenix v. Luna, Utah v. Strieff, and Heien v. North Carolina); cf.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132-36 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (considering the reasonable
perspectives of both the officer and the civilian to determine the relevance of an individual’s flight
from police officers); cf. also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 362-63 (2001) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that warrantless misdemeanor arrests require a balancing test).
357 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
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attorneys to develop and deliver narratives, honed to each side’s worldview.
And they may consult social science, like the important empirical work Dan
Kahan and others have done on “cultural cognition”—the idea that culturally
contingent values shape normative beliefs and even perceptions of fact and
risk.358 Lawyers’ stories and social scientists’ studies could thereby provide
useful reference points against which judges might evaluate particular
circumstances and perspectives.
Third, and most importantly, lower court judges are moral actors, who
inevitably wrestle with normative questions (at least internally), even if
prevailing doctrines preclude meaningful constitutional consideration. The
aim is to replace the conventional kind of “stealthy moralizing” with
transparent moral reasoning.359 And, notably, this goal has long been a
principal objective of Aristotelian theories of virtue ethics and
jurisprudence.360 Proponents of these theories stress “the virtue of justice”
over “strict legal justice”—articulated “legal vision” over rigidly applied “legal
rules.”361 They call upon judges to contemplate “what morality asks of all of
us every day and what most of us do, as a general matter.”362
The methodology is introspective, particularistic, and practical—at once,
ordinary and complex. It is an approach that does not lend itself to easy
answers and, therefore, may sit uncomfortably with the dominant conception
of legality. But the judge—well accustomed to reflective deliberation—is up
to the task. Indeed, Lon Fuller even concluded that “the kind of situation most

358 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 120-25 (2007)
(“The theory of cultural cognition posits that the heuristic processing of risk information interacts
decisively with individuals’ defining group commitments.”); Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note
74, at (2009) (discussing the theory of cultural cognition of risk); see also, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et
al., The Salience of Social Contextual Factors in Appraisals of Police Interactions with Citizens, 30 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 599, 619 (2014) (“[S]ocial contextual factors shape citizen
evaluations of police wrongdoing even when people see the same event.”).
359 See Kahan, supra note 172, at 153-54 (“Stealthy moralizing is in fact endemic to criminal law
. . . . The moralizing that occurs with . . . criminal law doctrines . . . [is] on balance a good thing,
and . . . ought at least to be made openly.”); cf. PACKER, supra note 6, at 89 (noting that “the police
and the official prosecutors operate in a setting of secrecy and informality”).
360 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 374 (1996) (“[I]t is when the law refuses to take responsibility for its most
contentious choices that its decisionmakers are spared the need to be principled, and the public the
opportunity to see correctable injustice.”); supra notes 139–42, 298, infra notes 410–15, and accompanying
text (discussing particularism, virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence, and the virtue of transparency).
361 Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centric Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 197 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 93 (“Aristotle[]
. . . define[s] equity as a kind of justice, but a kind that is superior to . . . strict legal justice.”); supra notes
139–41, 306, and accompanying text; Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1672.
362 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1244; see also Waldron, supra note 140, at 284 (describing a
jurisprudential approach that accommodates “a shared sense among us of how one person responds
as a human to another human”).
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likely to elicit ‘productive thinking’ . . . [is] the process of adjudication.”363 My
faith, then, is a faith in the judge as a moral, rational, empathetic, and
sympathetic agent, capable of exercising experiential wisdom and common
sense—and capable, also, of articulating that wisdom and common sense, once
it is exercised.364 My faith may be misplaced. There are judges who are narrowminded and insistent on applying rules for rules’ own sake.365 There are even
judges who are bullies and brutes, just as there are officers who are bullies and
brutes, just as there are defendants who are bullies and brutes, just as there are
people who are bullies and brutes.366 But a layer of judicial oversight
minimizes the chances that the bullying officer will get the best of the
vulnerable individual.367
And there are two final reasons for hope. First, there may be extreme
circumstances in which a normatively arbitrary search may be apparent from
any perspective. Return, again, to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.368 There, even the
Supreme Court came to know and identify the bully—just as it has come to
know and identify the decent enough officer with the good enough excuse.369
The distinction is that the Court lacked the constitutional will to turn its moral
(but rhetorical) condemnation into meaningful constitutional oversight.370 But
a normative conception of reasonableness would provide a jurisprudential
opportunity for a more willing judge to take action. Second, even if a judge
were to underutilize her equitable oversight, the cop on the beat typically
cannot know this ex ante. He cannot know which judge a criminal case might
draw or how that judge might respond to a persuasive normative claim. The
363
364

Fuller, supra note 349, at 39.
Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1231 (“The sort of deliberation that is encouraged [by an
evaluative standard] is moral in nature . . . .”).
365 Jerome Frank once suggested that a rule-bound approach to adjudication may represent a
kind of infantilism—a childlike fear of confronting the real. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 166 (1930) (“The constant effort . . . is regressive, infantile, and immature.”). Judge
Posner, while discussing Frank, wrote that “[t]he child becomes fearful and later in life intolerant of
challenges to accepted modes of thought or structures of authority.” See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK 99-100 (2008) (“Frank . . . believ[ed] that rigid, dichotomous, ‘inside the box’
thinking . . . was rooted in infantile troubles . . . an unwillingness to interpret law flexibly so that it
would keep pace with changing social conditions and understandings.”).
366 For one perspective on a judge as bully, see Albert W. Alschuler, How Frank Easterbrook Kept
George Ryan in Prison, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 7, 7-8 (2015) (describing Judge Easterbrook’s involvement in
the conviction of former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan).
367 See Stuntz, supra note 25, at 2039 (“[G]iving other decisionmakers discretion promotes
consistency, not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and
abuse.” (emphasis added)).
368 532 U.S. 318 (2001); supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text.
369 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47 (condemning the officer for behaving badly and subjecting
the arrestee to “gratuitous humiliations”).
370 Id. at 347 (expressing preference for “readily administrable rules” as opposed to contextual
evaluation).
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mere possibility of oversight, therefore, might lead the officer to self-screen at
the scene—to think twice before intruding in a manner that would be irrational
or overly aggressive.371 This, according to Seana Shiffrin, is yet another hidden
virtue of a comparatively evaluative and opaque standard: In the moment,
“those subject to the standard must consider what is or is not fair or reasonable
or unconscionable—not merely what is or is not in their interest.”372
In any event, it may not matter whether the judge is destined to fail. First,
even when she falls short, her very efforts to understand carry expressive
value.373 As the literature on “procedural justice” teaches, perceptions of
fairness are shaped by opportunities for argument as opposed to favorable
substantive outcomes.374 Second, and more importantly, a judge must strive
to understand (independent of the promise of results) for the fundamental
reason that, by her position, she is obliged to try. The nature of my claim here is
institutional as much as it is normative. The judge may be considered a
warden of the legality principle. Legality is one of her basic responsibilities.
It puts her on the rule-of-law’s front line, just as politics puts the legislator
on representative democracy’s front line.
Indeed, it is precisely because the stakes of law enforcement are so high that
the legality principle is seen as playing such an indispensable role in criminal
justice.375 The rule of lenity, the presumption of innocence, the Double
Jeopardy clause—these and many other procedural protections—are all liberal
devices designed to correct (and even overcorrect) for potentially arbitrary
errors that could harm the individual.376 And the costs of error extend likewise
to moral arbitrariness.377 Particularly in the context of order–maintenance
371 See Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1227 (explaining that “[e]valuative standards . . . empower
citizens” by demanding “that others alter their conduct or take seriously considerations that might
have been neglected or otherwise received relatively short shrift.”); see also COATES, supra note 21,
at 29 (describing the virtue of “ruthlessly interrogat[ing]” one’s own motives and actions).
372 Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1231.
373 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1024 (discussing the expressive value of a
jurisprudence of qualitative reasonableness). See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
374 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 219-20 (citing studies about perceptions of
“procedural justice” and fairness); see also supra notes 288, 320, and accompanying text (discussing
“procedural justice” and the “procedural aspect” of the rule of law).
375 See Waldron, supra note 249, at 217 (observing that the rule of law is especially important to
criminal justice because “its currency is ultimately life and death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and
imprisonment”) (contrasting LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 108 (rev. ed. 1969)); supra notes
48–50 and accompanying text (discussing the special role legality plays with respect to criminal justice).
376 See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (1980) (discussing the liberal principle that “it is
ultimately better to err in favor of nullification than against it”).
377 See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1672; supra notes 140–42, 308,
332–70, and accompanying text.
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enforcement, the normatively inequitable exercise of coercion may hurt every
bit as much as the legally inaccurate.378 With that in mind, the criminal justice
system’s prevailing asymmetries of understanding seem almost anachronistic—
a product of sovereign eras before legality’s purported triumph.379 The modern
message is that when two sets of rules or exceptions stand in tension, the
autonomy interests of the individual ought to outweigh the instrumental needs
of the state. Look no further than Blackstone’s maxim.380
But, notably, I do not go even that far. I do not definitively prize the
individual’s interests above those of the state. I seek only case-specific balance;
that is, bilateral understanding. The liberal state owes genuine reasons to the
autonomous individual, and the judge is duty-bound to provide them:
[I]ndividualized inquiry into the reason for each intrusion . . . [is a] guarantee
against arbitrary harassment . . . . [T]o eliminate any requirement that an officer
be able to explain the reasons for his actions signals an abandonment of effective
judicial supervision . . . and leaves police discretion utterly without limits.381

Ordinary political checks are just too contingent.382 Even if a particular
community–policing measure might carry great practical promise in a
particular political climate, the “flourishing” judge must be willing to provide
appropriate oversight within her own particular domain—the domain of
legality.383 In the face of all forms of arbitrary state treatment, legality is the
judge’s liberal call to action. She cannot abdicate her duties—whatever her

378 See supra Section V.A, notes 321, 410, 124, 218, infra notes 402–06, and accompanying text
(discussing the concept of normative innocence, the phenomenon and instances of rough justice,
and the notion of process as punishment).
379 See supra notes 42, 66–68, 127, 233–36, and accompanying text (discussing common law crimes).
380 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape
than that one innocent suffer.”); Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1041 & n.273 (“[A]s Blackstone’s
maxim prescribes, the state ought to take extra precautions to avoid unwarranted punishment.”); see also
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES
WE LIVE BY 445-46 (2012) (“Cruel and unusual punishments are expressly prohibited by the Constitution;
merciful and unusual punishments are not.”); Matt Matravers, Unreliability, Innocence, and Preventative
Detention, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 81, 82 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly
K. Ferzan eds., 2009) (“[A] situation in which someone is overburdened is worse from the point of view
of justice than one in which someone carries a burden that is too light. It is worse, still, for someone for
whom no burden is appropriate and yet a burden is applied.”).
381 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
382 Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or,
Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089
(1993) (arguing that, in crafting the rules of criminal procedure, the legislature’s “members will be
motivated by what consumers of this legislation are willing to pay for it, in such political currency
as votes, volunteer time, and campaign contributions”).
383 See Solum, supra note 361, at 83 (describing “flourishing” as one of the aims of “virtue
jurisprudence”).
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prospects for success. “The art of life is to do this with a mind, guided by a
lively conscience. With those guides one should not ask for guarantees.”384
*

*

*

Much has been made of the deference owed to officers on the beat. I do not
mean to discount it entirely, but the argument is overplayed.385 First, there is
the claim of danger. Admittedly, police officers do dangerous jobs. The killing
of officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge provide vivid and tragic examples.386 But
it is also dangerous to live as a presumed suspect, as recent killings of civilians
have likewise shown.387 In any event, policing is not an exceptionally dangerous
job, at least as compared to other industries that are regulated without similar
calls for deference. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, policing is only
the fifteenth most dangerous profession.388 Workers in the logging and fishing
industries fare far worse, dying at rates many times higher than officers.389
Even as to homicide, taxi drivers are twice as likely to be victims than police
officers.390 Danger matters, but there is more to the story.
Second, there is the claim of police expertise. And, admittedly, police
officers are experts at their craft. They are trained professionals, and they
develop experiential wisdom. But there are good reasons to believe that
partial state actors, like police officers and prosecutors, are particularly bad at
384
385

Barzun, supra note 335.
See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1028-29 (describing deference claims as
“undefended, underanalyzed, undertheorized, and probably the product of unplanned evolution”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-89, 191 (1976) (discussing related questions of deference to prosecutors
and concluding that “no one has done any systematic thinking to produce the assumptions”).
386 See Julie Bloom et al., Baton Rouge Shooting Jolts a Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/us/baton-rouge-shooting.html [https://5A3J-KBQG]
(reporting on Baton Rouge shooting); Patrick McGee et al., Snipers Kill 5 Dallas Officers at Protest
Against Police Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/dallaspolice-officers-killed.html [https://perma.cc/9226-JMJV] (describing the shooting in Dallas).
387 See, e.g., Matt Furber & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama Calls Police
Shootings ‘an American Issue’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/
us/philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/45UE-QNEQ]
(discussing
outrage in the aftermath of the shooting of Philando Castile); Wesley Lowery et al., Outrage After Video
Captures White Baton Rouge Police Officer Fatally Shooting a Black Man, WASH. POST (July 6, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/06/video-captures-white-batonrouge-police-officer-fatally-shooting-black-man-sparking-outrage/ [https://perma.cc/BWY8-LBBD]
(reporting on shooting of a black man by police).
388 See Max Ehrenfreund, Charted: The 20 Deadliest Jobs in America, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/28/charted-the-20-deadliest-jobs-in-america/
?utm_term=.e3c02cf7bdbe [https://perma.cc/65MU-DEFU] (displaying data for deaths per 100,000 full
time works in specific industries for the year 2013).
389 Id.
390 Id.
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seeing past their own professional perspectives—their own cognitive and
institutional biases.391 Simply put, an officer’s vested interests may outweigh
even his well-developed “situation sense.”392
This is not to say that constitutional law is the best means to cultivate
positive relationships between police and civilians. The most effective reforms
might be political. Police chiefs, policymakers, and civic leaders might better
alter institutional culture to broaden respect for the individual and for her
moral claim to a maximally autonomous life.393 But, as numerous scholars have

391 See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 40, at 1029 (noting that, because of underlying institutional
incentives, “police and prosecutors may be considerably worse than laypeople at moral reasoning and
decisionmaking.”); cf. Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1688-90 (examining a prosecutor’s
cognitive and institutional biases). The institutional biases are somewhat obvious. An officer has prudential
reasons to play on people’s fears, as we have already discovered—to shake the tree and see what falls. See supra
note 196, 252 and accompanying text. After a civilian is stopped (lawfully or not), an officer may check for
warrants. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (“The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff’s arrest is
a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop.”). He may search incident to
arrest, and catalogue pedigree information incident to booking. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224
(1973) (“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of
the lawful arrest . . . . [A] search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.”).
In some circumstances, the police officer may even conduct body cavity searches and harvest DNA
samples. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1521-23 (2012) (holding body-cavity searches
of even misdemeanor detainees constitutional); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (holding
constitutional a statute that provides for taking DNA samples as part of routine booking); see also id. at 1989
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision,
your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly,
and for whatever reason.”). Remarkably, the officer may even benefit financially. In some jurisdictions, officer
compensation is pegged to arrest numbers. See, e.g., Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1984)
(noting that a Mississippi fee statute was not unconstitutional “simply on account of the officer’s motives in
making the arrest”); see also HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH P. SMALL, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE:
RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY: 1997–2017 20 (New York Civil Liberties Union ed.,
2008) (describing so-called “collars-for-dollars” phenomenon whereby officers make order–maintenance arrests
to generate overtime pay); cf. Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12 & 19, 2013, at 18 (discussing police
incentives to enforce criminal laws to trigger civil forfeitures, generating profits for departments). As an early
proponent of order–maintenance policing, James Q. Wilson observed: “A legalistic department will . . . make a
large number of misdemeanor arrests.” JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 172 (1968); see
also Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, supra note 1, at 1698 (“[T]he resultant pool of petty crime arrestees
is somewhat larger than the pool of normatively guilty offenders”).
392 Solum, supra note 360, at 192 (quoting Karl Llewellyn). This seemed to be the case with
Officer Encinia, who could not appreciate what he had done to so upset Sandra Bland: “Over a
simple traffic stop. Yeah, I don’t get it. I really don’t. Why act like that? I don’t know.” Bland
Transcript, supra note 254. Of course, Officer Encinia might be the atypically bad cop. But his words
reveal that if the judge does not strive to understand the individual’s story, it may never be
understood meaningfully.
393 See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 1, at 216-19 (discussing community justice). In the same
vein, social justice movements may push departments to back progressive talk with effective action.
And cameras have kept evidence of some of the worst encounters from falling through the cracks.
Thereafter, the bad apple may face discipline. As indicated, Brian Encinia was terminated and is
facing perjury charges. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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recognized, judges also may play parts to achieve the laudable objectives of
community justice.394 More to the point, they are compelled to try.395
D. Understanding Understood?
One final (and potentially fundamental) objection. Perhaps there is no
asymmetry in the first instance. Courts already recognize a set of
particularistic trial defenses that potentially could build meaningful
understanding into backend questions of criminal conviction. Indeed, there
is a fairly obvious overlap between the criminal defendant’s affirmative
defenses and the officer’s justifications and excuses. To see what I mean,
consider the character of an officer’s intrusions. It is no accident that,
traditionally, the definition of a Fourth Amendment search correlated with
trespass law, because the conduct of the law enforcer often parallels the
conduct of the criminal.396 The officer forces entry into homes. He detains
people. He carries away property. He perpetrates violence. And he even
sometimes kills. These are the actions of the trespasser, the robber, the
kidnapper, and the murderer. But, just as affirmative defenses provide
individuals with justifications and excuses against criminal charges,397 the
Fourth Amendment provides police officers with justifications and excuses
against constitutional claims. Justifications and excuses separate the police
officer from the offender in the same fashion that they separate the
individual from the offender.398

394 Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, for instance, have advocated greater constitutional
deference to legislation and law enforcement that are products of collaboration between civilians
and legal officials. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1173 (1998); see also Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 25, at 2031-39
(offering constitutional reforms designed to localize law enforcement).
395 Supra notes 376, 385 and accompanying text. Elsewhere, I have suggested an alternative or
complementary reform—a “Fourth Amendment jury”—that might evaluate questions of qualitative
reasonableness. Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 112 NW. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017). Of
course, laypeople might have more difficulty understanding the police perspective. I could envision,
therefore, some amount of collaboration between judge and jury. In any event, such an ambitious
proposal, which sounds in “popular constitutionalism,” is beyond the scope of this project. See
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); Bibas, supra note 116, at 914 (examining the respective competencies of
lay “outsiders” and professional criminal-justice “insiders”).
396 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (“By the laws of England, every invasion
of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.” (quoting Lord Camden)).
397 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954 (1985)
(distinguishing between justifications and excuses).
398 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627 (“No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license
. . . . If he admits the fact, he is bound to show, by way of justification, that some positive law has
justified or excused him . . . . [I]t is now incumbent upon the [state actors] to show the law by which
this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.” (quoting Lord Camden)).
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It is for this reason that I have used the term “excuse” quite purposefully
throughout this Article to describe an officer’s piecemeal exceptions from his
baseline conduct rules.399 Moreover, I am not the first academic to compare
the manner by which “reasonableness” has been used in the contexts of
affirmative defenses and criminal procedure.400 And we might extend the
analogy still further. As applied to Fourth Amendment conduct rules, we
could say that a police officer is justified for his otherwise illegal
intrusion when he has satisfied his baseline conduct rules. Indeed, Mitch
Berman has described justifications in just this way: “[O]ne might suppose
that justifications simply are those defenses that fall within the system’s
conduct rules, while excuses are the defenses residing in the [exceptions]. I
think this is precisely right.”401
For the most part, this overlap with affirmative defenses provides only
taxonomical clarity. But it also invites the question of whether the criminal
justice system really has been so unwilling to understand the layperson’s
perspective. Perhaps affirmative defenses take up the slack?402 The problem,
however, is that these trial defenses are largely nonresponsive to the rough
punishment of an inequitable order–maintenance intrusion.403 Simply put,
the question of whether an officer inequitably overreached or overbore is
often irrelevant to the individual’s criminal culpability (or lack thereof).404
Indeed, this is a principal descriptive point of my project: the problems of
order–maintenance policing tend to be unrelated to technical legal guilt.405

399
400

See, e.g., supra notes 140, 144 and accompanying text.
Most notably, scholars have drawn analogies between “reasonableness” in the contexts of
civilian self-defense and police use of force. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1147-48 (2008) (proposing excessive force test modeled on self-defense
doctrine); see also Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 341, at 231 (explaining that both doctrines turn
on questions of imminence, necessity, and justification); cf. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress:
Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1338 (1997) (explaining that the
partial defense of provocation is available to the killer when he successfully “appeals to the very
emotions to which the state appeals to rationalize its own use of violence.”).
401 Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2003).
402 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 35-36 (2003) (observing that “flexible doctrines
of liability, permitting defendants to plead excuse or justification . . . [or] extenuating
circumstances” provide space for “a form of authority to exercise mercy”); Paul H. Robinson, Why
Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control,
86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2000) (“Social science research makes clear that . . . excuse defenses are
part of laypersons’ intuitions of justice.”); Huigens, supra note 143, at 1439 (describing the manner
by which excuses invite “the actual, individualized adjudication of a person by a jury . . . . [of] twelve
people judging another person”).
403 This is a topic I take up elsewhere in more detail. BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32.
404 The entrapment defense may be the exception. But, critically, courts almost never
recognize entrapment claims based upon “outrageous” government conduct. Dripps, supra note 37;
McAdams, supra note 119.
405 Supra notes 30, 35, 111–15, 124, and accompanying text.
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In any event, prevailing affirmative defenses are not nearly as flexible and
forgiving as an officer’s prospective excuses. There is no equivalency of
understanding as between the two domains. Whereas a piecemeal Fourth
Amendment exception may accommodate all manner of extraordinary
policing conditions, affirmative defenses are reserved for a narrow set of fairly
well defined and highly unusual circumstances. Thus, courts have recognized
no general affirmative trial defense of situational excuse.406 And even as to
the conditions that might trigger an established affirmative defense, trial
courts typically consider the question by reference to the fictive every person
only—a point of comparison that, according to Judge Bazelon, stands in the
way of “a deeper understanding” of the defendant’s distinct community,
culture, and experiences.407 Comparatively, the Court’s Fourth Amendment
methodology of understanding slices the evaluation of reasonableness more
finely. The inquiry is attuned to the particular reasonable officer—his
professional training, his experiences, his perceptions of his own
environment.408 If anything, the more apt comparison to the officer’s
piecemeal Fourth Amendment exception is the practice of jury nullification,
which is prohibited by the dominant conception of the rule of law.409
Of course, it is not encouraging that trial courts have failed to slice
affirmative defenses thinly enough. Perhaps, then, my faith in judges is
misplaced after all. Or perhaps there is another reading. The adage that “practice
makes perfect” is surely an overstatement, but it may be fair to say that practice
406 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he criminal law treats the vast majority of
accused persons as fit candidates for punishment, notwithstanding their internal failings or
situational difficulties.”); Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 9 (1985) (“No jurisdiction
in the United States or elsewhere recognizes a criminal defense based on socioeconomic deprivation
simpliciter.”); Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1261 (1976) (“There are various factors which have a strong positive correlation
with violent crime, such as youth and poverty. But social science is not yet ready to make firm causal
statements.”); see also United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 960-65 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing
the defendant’s defense that his crimes were the result of his “rotten social background”); cf. Andrew
D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 314 (1996) (proposing an affirmative
defense of general situational excuse).
407 See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 396 (1976)
(explaining that cultural defenses are necessary to cultivate “a deeper understanding of the causes of
human behavior in general and criminal behavior in particular” (emphasis added)); see also Bedder v.
Director of Public Prosecutions, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1119 (H.L.) (“The reasonable person, the ordinary
person, is the person you must consider.”); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some
Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 996 (2002) (“[T]he dominant culture is not
required to accept the values of another community”). But see, e.g., State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 83 (Me.
1996) (holding that the lower court erred by not considering the defendant’s cultural background).
408 Supra Part IV.
409 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 87-88 (1895) (“[W]hile to facts answer juries, to the
law answers the court” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Leipold, supra note 406, at 253-55
(exploring the practice of jury nullification).
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makes better. And, to date, the judge is not well enough practiced in the craft of
meaningful understanding—a craft that is closer to sociology or literature than
conventional legal training.410 There is no obvious impediment, however, to the
judge developing her capacities, as Sherman Clarke once suggested:
Athletes lift weights, run long distances, and the like. They task themselves
in ways they hope will build the capacities they need. Life too calls for
capacities . . . . What strengths and capacities might we develop through
bearing this weight? . . . [The] ability to see things from the perspective of
others—to not only understand what it is like to be in their shoes, but also to
see what the world looks like though their eyes.411

Max Weber suggested that meaningful understanding is integral to
productive social interaction. But real-world experience has taught that the
gulf may be just too great between the perspectives of police and the
populace. On this reading, urban policing is plagued by misunderstanding.
But, with time and effort, a judge may learn to become an arbiter of
understanding,412 who negotiates sensitively “the two separate worlds”
occupied by the officer and the individual.413 And the common law method is
available to provide (light) guidance.414
Indeed, there is even the possibility that a Fourth Amendment
methodology of bilateral understanding might push judges to likewise
appreciate capaciously and comprehensively criminal trial defenses of general
situational excuse. But that is a topic for another time.415
410 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE, 95-96 (comparing the novelist to the
particularist, who demands “understanding the whole story”); Tucker, supra note 134, at 163 (describing
the sociological methodology of verstehen as an effort to “know enough about the situations from which
individuals come, and couple this with knowledge of a particular situation in which they are involved
at the time of observation”); supra notes 20, 134, 139–41, 306–08, and accompanying text.
411 Sherman J. Clarke, The Juror, the Citizen, and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and
the Burden of Judgment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 421, 422 (2013); see also Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1224
(“Maintenance of moral agency, like muscle tissue, requires exercise through practices of attention and
thoughtful consideration . . . . not merely the will and practice of staying within pre-drawn lines.”).
412 Thanks to Jim Whitman for helping me think through this point.
413 Meares et al., supra note 184, at 105. As studies of diversity in the corporate context show,
the more viewpoints that are heard, the more reliable and sensible the decision making. See generally
SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007). Of course, when it comes to a Fourth
Amendment question there is only one ultimate decisionmaker, but the judge may benefit from
hearing many voices and perspectives. This is the virtue of some of our most cherished constitutional
principles, from federalism, to jury trials, to democratic experimentalism more generally. See
generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745
(2005); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005).
414 See supra notes 307–09 and accompanying text.
415 BOWERS, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 32.
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CONCLUSION
Woody Guthrie was on to something when he inscribed these words on
his guitar: “This Machine Kills Fascists.” He used his instrument to craft fully
formed narratives of oppression.416 Fortunately, very few police officers
behave consistently like oppressors. No doubt, there are some bullies in
uniform—but, hopefully, not too many.417 The threat more often is just the
propensity of the law enforcer to exercise dominion reflexively over the usual
suspect—to fail to perceive the genuine individual with a genuine life
interrupted.418 In a related vein, Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote:
Slavery is not an indefinable mass of flesh. It is a particular, specific enslaved
woman, whose mind is active as your own, whose range of feeling is as vast as
your own; who prefers the way the light falls in one particular spot in the woods,
who enjoys fishing where the water eddies in a nearby stream, who loves her
mother in her own complicated way.419

I do not mean to draw too tight comparisons between the evils of slavery or
fascism and the more complicated normative questions that surround urban
policing. Still, there are dangers common to all institutions of power that come
to treat people as numbers or commodities—as bodies without internal lives and
stories to tell. At a minimum, there is disengagement and disempowerment—
in our terms, the perceived and real inability to “predict and plan” a life.420 This
sense of futility is obvious not only in Coates’s prose, but also in the words of
Eric Garner, who was stopped for unlicensed vending and then died in a
chokehold after he refused to comply with police orders: “Every time you see
me, you want to mess with me. I’m tired of it. This ends today! . . . Please leave
me alone . . . . Every time I turn around, you grab me . . . . I can’t breathe.”421
416 See, e.g., WOODY GUTHRIE, All You Fascists Bound to Lose, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwcKwGS7OSQ [https://perma.cc/HN28-P4NM]; cf. supra note
310 and accompanying text (describing “complete” stories as expressed by rules tempered by standards).
417 But cf. supra notes 101–02, 211, 257, 268, 367–79, and accompanying text (providing examples
of disrespectful or otherwise controversial police behavior).
418 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L.
REV. 885, 907 (1981) (observing that liberalism “has at its core the notion that individuals are the basic
unit of moral and political value.”); Kelman, supra note 347, at 210 (“Each defendant is a unique
individual, with a unique set of perceptions and capabilities. Every crime is committed in a unique
setting.”); cf. Tucker, supra note 134, at 159 (“The individual is . . . the upper limit and the sole carrier
of meaningful conduct.” (quoting Max Weber)); cf. also Josh Bowers, Response: The Unusual Man in the
Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 262 (2009) (discussing “usual suspects” policing).
419 COATES, supra note 21, at 69.
420 HART, supra note 46, at 180; see also supra notes 2, 47, 213, 325, and accompanying text.
421 Eric Garner Video —Unedited version, YOUTUBE (July 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=JpGxagKOkv8 [https://perma.cc/84AA-6PKB] (emphasis added); see also COATES, supra note
21, at 82 (describing “a people who control nothing, who can protect nothing”); supra notes 289, 329
373–75, and accompanying text (discussing “procedural justice” studies).
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One could tell a story of race. Coates did just that.422 But the story is more
complicated.423 There are problems of policing that transcend race. 424 Still,
the discriminatory effects cannot be ignored or lightly dismissed, particularly
within heavily policed majority–minority neighborhoods. On this score,
Justice Sotomayor wrote recently of “the canaries in the coal mine whose
deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere,”
inclusive of all, “white and black, guilty and innocent.”425 Sotomayor
understands that these “voices matter too.”426 They carry messages that
resonate from “the bottom of the well.”427 We cannot ignore them,
jurisprudentially, without conveying our own destructive message—a
message antithetical to liberal criminal justice.428 In Sotomayor’s words, the
message is just this: “[T]hat your body is subject to invasion while courts
excuse the violation of your rights . . . . that you are not a citizen of a
democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be catalogued.”429
422
OF THE

See generally COATES, supra note 21; see also KRS-ONE, Sound of Da Police, on RETURN
BOOM BAP (Showbiz Records 1993) (“[T]he overseer had the right to kill/The officer
has the right to arrest/And if you fight back they put a hole in your chest . . . . /After 400 years,
I’ve got no choices.”).
423 See generally Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
424 See id. at 2070 (“The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated
in this manner. But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this kind of
scrutiny.”). Likewise, race and racism were not factors in Ryburn v. Huff or Atwater v. Lago Vista. See
supra notes 99–112, 142–44, and accompanying text. James Forman has recently discovered decadeslong patterns of problematic policing even within minority-led departments. See generally JAMES
FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017).
425 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
426 Id.
427 See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).
428 Cf. Ekow N. Yankah, The Truth About Trayvon, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at A23,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/the-truth-about-trayvon.html [https://perma.cc/8TQC-HURS]
(advocating “an honest [constitutional] jurisprudence that is brave enough to tackle the way race
infuses our criminal law . . . a jurisprudence that at least begins to [consider] racial disparities”).
429 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Until their voices matter too, our
justice system will continue to be anything but.”). Or consider the perspective of an outsider, lay
theologian G.K. Chesterton:
And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges,
magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of
them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite intelligent), it is
simply that they have got used to it. Strictly they do not see the prisoner in the dock;
all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of
judgment; they only see their own workshop.
G.K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 80, 85–86 (1910); see also Michael
O’Hear, Restorative Justice: Dangers of the Big Tent, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 602, 602 (Paul
H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey, & Kimberly K. Ferzan eds., 2009) (discussing the virtues of a restorative
justice system that “insist[s] that victims and offenders are real human beings, not just wooden
marionettes to be brought upon the criminal justice stage as it serves the convenience of the lawyers”).
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The promise of the legality principle is to keep the overreaching state at
bay—to challenge as arbitrary an official’s legally and normatively illiberal
motivations and actions. To that end, conduct rules lay the foundation. But
rules are competent to do only so much. After the rules, there is
understanding.430 And meaningful understanding is not asymmetric. Nor
may we leave it to sovereign prerogative.431 We are owed understanding. It is
our rightful claim. It is the job of all branches of government to deliver it.432
And legality is the mechanism by which the judiciary does its fair share of the
work. That principle—appropriately appreciated and expressed—is our
jurisprudential call on the state’s debt.

430 See Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 1226 (“[W]here precedent runs out, the parties will have to
try to articulate for themselves what sorts of conduct are beyond the pale and whether the conduct
they contemplate falls within or outside that line”).
431 Cf. PACKER, supra note 6, at 93 (“A good definition of a police state would be a system in
which the law enforcers were allowed to be the judges in their own cases.”); supra notes 4–5, 25, 40–
41, 45–52, 127, 250, 295, 385 and accompanying text (describing sovereign prerogative as lawless, and
discussing inadequacy of ordinary political checks).
432 Cf. Stoughton, supra note 256 (“We all deserve more than legal policing. We deserve
good policing.”).

